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THE FAILED REGULATION OF U.S. TREASURY MARKETS
Yesha Yadav*
In trading the preeminent risk-free security, the $21 trillion U.S.
Treasury market supports the country's borrowing needs, financial stability, and investorappetitefor a safe asset. Straddlingthe nexus between
a securities market and a systemically essential institution, the Treasury
market mustfunction at all costs, even if other marketsfail.
This Article shows that Treasury market structure is fragile,
weakened by a regulatory model poorly suited to match its design. First,
public oversight of Treasuriesis fragmented, divided between five or more
agencies. The rulebookfor Treasuries is sparse, lacking basic guardrails
common to other markets. Without effective rules and institutionalcooperation, regulators are ill-equipped to develop a taxonomy of risks and
strategiesto mitigate them. Second, private self-regulation cannotfill the
gap. Comprising a rival mix of heavily regulated banks and lightly
regulated algorithmicfirms, major Treasuries traders lack incentives to
cooperate. Instead, tradersare motivated to take risks where the costs of
detection and discipline are low. These deficiencies leave the market vulnerable to failure and risk-taking as traders lack sufficient economic

interest to maintain market integrity.
This Article concludes with two proposals to introduce stronger
public and private oversight: (1) formalized coordination between
regulators, led by the Financial Stability Oversight Council; and (2)
mandatory clearingfor Treasuries trades that forces traders to monitor
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, Chancellor Faculty Fellow, Vanderbilt Law
School. I am enormously grateful for thoughtful comments and conversations in the
preparation of this Article. My thanks to Professors Dan Awrey, Bobby Bartlett, Richard
Berner, Margaret Blair, Jonathan Brogaard, Chris Brummer, John Coyle, Kathleen
DeLancey, Hans de Wulf, Sean Foley, Neeraj Gambhir, Jose Garrido, Erik Gerding, Adam
Feibelman, Nicholas Howson, Cathy Hwang, Melissa Jacoby, Kose John, Craig Lewis, Peter
Molk, Benjamin Munyan, Frank Partnoy, Elizabeth Pollman, Adam Pritchard, Gabe
Rauterberg, Morgan Ricks, J.B. Ruhl, Paolo Saguato, Asani Sarkar, Mark Schein, Andrew
Schwartz, Jeffrey Schwartz, Hal Scott, Manmohan Singh, Christina Skinner, Danny Sokol,
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Kevin Stack, Susan Thomas, Rory van Loo, Kumar Venkataraman,
Pradeep Yadav, David Zaring, Nick Zeppos, and David Zaring, and to participants at the
Vanderbilt Law School/Vanderbilt Business School Conference on Central Banking and
Financial Regulation, the Emerging Markets Finance Conference 2018 (Mumbai), the
University of North Carolina Law School Faculty Workshop, the Michigan Law School
Seminar on Market Structure, the Vanderbilt Law School/Ghent Law School Conference
on Corporate Governance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Boston University
Law School Seminar on Financial Regulation, University of Berkeley Law School Faculty
Workshop, and the Yale Law School Conference on Law and Macroeconomics. I am
thankful to Patton Webb for editing and research assistance. Most of all, I owe a deep debt
of gratitude to the truly extraordinary editorial team at the Columbia Law Review, and
especially to Sara Tofighbakhsh, whose exceptional intellect, insight, patience, hard work,
and precision enriched this Article throughout. All errors are my own.

1173

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1174

[Vol. 121:4

each other. As the country's economic lifeline, regulatory neglect of the
Treasury market constitutes an exceptionally reckless administrative
gamble with the potential to damage the country'spreeminence in global

finance.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic ripped through the
economy, the then-$17 trillion market for U.S. government bonds
("Treasuries") was brought to the brink of failure. Because investors rely

on Treasuries to keep them safe during crises, the potential collapse of
Treasuries presented an unthinkable doomsday scenario for global
markets and the U.S. economy.' With the Dow Jones index plummeting

by 2,000 and 3,000 points in a single day, the Treasury market was
supposed to be the safe haven for investors that needed to sell Treasuries

2
to raise cash or buy them as protection. Instead, as panic took hold and

&

1. See Colby Smith & Robin Wigglesworth, US Treasuries: The Lessons from March's
Market Meltdown, Fin. Times (July 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ea6f3104-eeec466a-a082-76ae78d430fd (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (highlighting the significance
of the Treasury market to the global economy and providing a detailed account of the
system-wide risk posed by the events of March 2020); Jeffrey Cheng, David Wessel & Joshua
Younger, How Did COVID-19 Disrupt the Market for U.S. Treasury Debt?, Brookings (May
1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/05/01/how-did-covid-9-disruptthe-market-for-u-s-treasury-debt [https://perma.cc/38F3-F8CH] ("Treasury securities are at
the core of financial markets ... [a] nd they are rainy day assets: safe and stable investments
that banks, companies, and governments accumulate on the assumption that they can be
quickly sold at low cost if they need cash fast."); see also Bryan Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta,
Flight to Safety and U.S. Treasury Securities, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis: Reg'l Economist,
at 18 (2010), https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub assets/
pdf/re/2010/c/treasurysecurities.pdf [https://pena.cc/PS9N-7XAL] ("[I]nvestors turn to
U.S. Treasuries during times of increased uncertainty as a safe haven for their
investments."); Antoine Bouveret, Peter Breuer, Yingyuan Chen, David Jones & Tsuyoshi
Sasaki, Fragilities in the U.S. Treasury Market: Lessons from the "Flash Rally" of October
15, 2014, at 5-6 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/15/222, 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15222.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWY2-5DG6] ("The U.S.
Treasury market is one of the largest and most liquid financial markets in the world, as well
as one of the most important. Treasury securities are the bedrock of the financial
system .... ").
2. See David J. Lynch, Thomas Heath, Taylor Telford & Heather Long, U.S. Stock
Market Suffers Worst Crash Since 1987, as Americans Wake Up to a New Normal of Life,
Wash. Post (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/03/12/
markets-stocks-today-coronavirus (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The roughly $17
trillion Treasury market is the safe haven for investors who want a near-absolute guarantee
that they will get their money back."); Adam Samson, Robin Wigglesworth, Colby Smith
Joe Rennison, Strains in the U.S. Government Bond Market Rattle Investors, Fin. Times
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a305358-6450-1lea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Several fund managers also raised alarm at the worsening health of the US government debt market and warned that, without decisive action,
dysfunction could have a widespread impact on fragile financial markets."); Darrell Duffie,
Still the World's Safe Haven? Redesigning U.S. Treasury Market After the COVID-19 Crisis
2 (Brookings, Hutchins Ctr. Working Paper No. 62, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/WP62 Duffie_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TD2-S6S8] [hereinafter Duffie, Redesigning After COVID-19] (describing how the pandemic and associated
financial disruption "call[ed] into question the longstanding view that Treasuries are a
reliable safe haven in a crisis"); Ian Millhiser, The DowJones Had Its Biggest Point Drop in
History Monday, Vox (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/3/16/21182341/dow-
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investors tried to cash out, the market faltered to a crawl. Waves of orders
went unfulfilled.3 Treasuries prices-a benchmark against which virtually
all other financial assets are priced-whipsawed wildly.4 Facing the
possibility that this unshakable market could fail, the Federal Reserve (the
Fed) stepped in with over one trillion dollars of immediate stabilizing
support.5 Yet despite this intervention and additional aid to help revive
capital markets, the quality and reliability of the Treasury market struggled
to regain its footing.6 This decline could not have come at a worse moment

for the U.S. economy. Treasury borrowing outpaced records, adding
almost $3 trillion to the national debt over spring 2020 alone as Congress
jones-biggest-point-drop-coronavirus-3000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting
on the 2,997 point drop in the Dow Jones Index).
3. See Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1 ("Trading conditions for US Treasuries
had been poor for a while. But that Thursday-the day after Covid-19 was declared a
pandemic-unnerving glitches escalated into mayhem.").
4. See id. (noting highly disruptive volatility in Treasuries prices that manifested in
yields falling to an all-time low before rebounding higher and highlighting the extremely
rare nature of such price swings); see also Michael Fleming & Francisco Ruela, Treasury
Market Liquidity During the COVID-19 Crisis, Liberty St. Econ. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/04/treasury-market-liquidity-duringthe-covid-19crisis.html [https://perma.cc/EA79-BM34] ("The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a sizable increase in uncertainty about economic conditions ... [causing] market
expectations of asset values to shift rapidly, and hence price volatility to increase ....
[V] olatility caused market makers to widen their bid-ask spreads and post less depth ... and
the price impact of trades to increase.").
5. See Lynch et al., supra note 2 (describing the Fed's attempt "to smooth the operations of the giant U.S. Treasury market" by injecting $1.5 trillion to support short-term
funding markets for bonds as well as announcing the purchase of $60 billion in Treasury
bonds); see also Michael Fleming, Asani Sarkar & Peter Van Tessel, The COVID-19
Pandemic and the Fed's Response, Liberty St. Econ. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://libertystreet
economics.newyorkfed.org/2020/04/the-covid-9-pandemic-and-the-feds-response.html
[https://perma.cc/UV5Z-72CX] [hereinafter Fleming et al., COVID-19 and the Fed's
Response] (describing the various stabilizing measures taken by the Fed in response to
COVID-19 and the Treasury markets). One of the extraordinary interventions by the Fed
included establishing a "temporary repurchase agreement facility for foreign and
international monetary authorities," or "FIMA Repo Facility," to offer swap lines for dollars
and Treasuries to foreign central banks in order to ease pressure on the Treasury market.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces
Establishment of a Temporary FIMA Repo Facility to Help Support the Smooth Functioning
of Financial Markets (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/monetary20200331a.htm [https://perma.cc/T5JP-VS73].
6. See, e.g., Fin. Stability Bd., Holistic Review of the March Market Turmoil 2 (Nov.
17, 2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P171120-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RAM4-DLER] (concluding that the exceptional interventions of central banks into the
markets were crucial to saving the market in the short term, but "[t]he financial system
remains vulnerable to another liquidity strain, as the underlying structures and mechanisms
that gave rise to the turmoil are still in place"); John Dizard, Opinion, The U.S. Treasury
Market Is Facing a Train Wreck (Dec. 11, 2020), Fin. Times, https://www.ft.com/content/
ffb2a3b4-1044-4a61-921a-e288ffb82170 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (warning that
"[t]here is going to be a train wreck at the front end of the [Treasury] curve next year"
because. "[t]here is way too much cash chasing too little paper" (quoting Mark Cabana,
head of U.S. rates strategy for Bank of America Securities)).
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enacted far-reaching stimulus measures in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.7 Just as the need for Treasuries has grown existentially urgent,
the Treasury market has revealed itself to be fragile.

This suddenness notwithstanding, the ill-timed collapse in "risk-free"
Treasury markets is unsurprising and overdue. Despite their singular
importance, Treasuries have evolved under a regulatory framework that
lacks effective supervisory and administrative power. Treasury markets
have therefore failed to adapt to emerging risks and technological change
while operating under a system of supervision that is far less intense than
what exists for equity or corporate bond markets. The result is a market
structure in which the regulatory guardrails are minimal and outdated,
leaving it pervasively exposed to failure.
This Article makes two descriptive claims. First, public regulation of
Treasury markets is characterized by excess fragmentation among supervisors, resulting in a lack of coordination as well as a sparse and bureaucratically costly-to-change rulebook. This institutional framework is fragmented by design. Whereas equities or corporate bonds are overseen by a
primary regulator (the SEC), Treasuries are supervised by five or more
major agencies, none of which has lead status. The Treasury writes the
rules, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed) facilitates debt
auctions, the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) supervise securities firms that trade Treasuries, the Fed monitors
banks, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) oversees
8
the derivatives markets linked to Treasuries. This shared oversight is not
necessarily unusual. As Professors Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi observe,
9
fragmentation is a common feature of the administrative state. This
arrangement highlights the market's significance for the financial system

and has the advantage of pooling regulatory expertise and experience. But
7. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No.
116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (establishing various emergency measures to assist businesses
and individuals at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States); Martin
Crutsinger, Treasury Says April-June Borrowing Will Be a Record $2.99T, AP News (May 4,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/35fl7494fbdbbOd7ecbl0d79a7bacce3 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("The economic paralysis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic is
forcing the U.S. Treasury to borrow far more than it ever has before-$2.99 trillion in the
current quarter alone."); see also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of the
Public Debt of the United States (June 2020), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/
reports/pd/mspd/2020/opds062020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GTZ-YVA8] (showing a total
marketable (tradable) public debt of $19.9 trillion out of a total public debt of $26.5
trillion).
8. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, 100 Marq. L. Rev.
185, 199-230 (2016) (providing an overview of these regulatory bodies and their respective
roles in overseeing Treasuries); see also infra section I.B (describing the current patchwork
of agencies and fragmented regulatory structure for Treasury market oversight).
9. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1134 (2012) (detailing the fragmentation common to the administrative state and describing measures for coordination between agencies that exercise
shared oversight over the same areas).
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it also creates high institutional barriers to action10 through information
gaps, turf battles, inconsistent regulatory approaches between agencies,
and the need to coordinate to fulfill basic objectives.11 Perhaps the most
problematic downside to this system is that no single agency possesses a
full picture of the Treasury market with which to craft an optimal

supervisory strategy, should it decide to take the initiative.12 The widespread view that Treasuries are a risk-free security can also engender a lack
of urgency to develop an administrative framework capable of heightened
vigilance. Reflecting these hurdles, agencies have faltered in exercising
joint oversight in recent years.13 Information sharing has required regulators to enter into complex agreements with one another just to pool and
transfer data.14 And even straightforward, commonsense rulemaking has
required time and mobilization, only to result in reforms that are partial

in their coverage.15
10. See Markham, supra note 8, at 199-208 (describing the allocation of oversight
responsibilities between agencies and examples of types of misconduct in both the primary
and secondary market); see also Luis Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Ere Misery Made Me Wise: The
Need to Revisit the Regulatory Framework of the U.S. Treasury Market (July 14, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/need-to-revisit-regulatory-framework-us-treasurymarket.html [https://perma.cc/F4DC-JCS8] (noting the need to update the regulation of
Treasury markets and the current absence of responsive oversight).
11. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1138-55 (detailing the rationales governing
allocation of shared responsibilities across multiple agencies as well as ways to facilitate
coordination despite resistance to change).
12. See id. at 1150-51 (describing weaknesses associated with fragmented regulatory
frameworks, including how fragmented regimes create information asymmetries that lead
to inaction).
13. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Rsrv.
Bank of N.Y., SEC & U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,Joint Staff Report: The U.S.
Treasury Market on October 15, 2014, at 15-19 (July 13, 2015), https://www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Joint StaffReport_.Treasury_10-15-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5GG-7R5] [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff
Report] (analyzing the Flash Rally, an episode of secondary market prices behaving
extremely abnormally over a fifteen-minute period on October 15, 2014, and outlining the
importance of regulatory reform).
14. See Ryan Tracy & Andrew Ackerman, The New Bond Market, Regulators Scramble
to Keep Up, Wall St. J. (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-bondmarket-the-u-s-treasury-struggles-to-keep-up-1443027850 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (demonstrating how the lack of such agreements created oversight difficulties by
limiting important information sharing between regulators).
15. For example, in 2017, regulators created a trade reporting mechanism for
Treasuries requiring banks and broker-dealers to provide trade information to regulators
through FINRA's Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). See Press Release,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces Plans to Enter
Negotiations with FINRA to Potentially Act as Collection Agent of U.S. Treasury Securities
Secondary Market Transactions Data (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/pressreleases/other20l6lO2la.htm [https://perma.cc/76KD-5AXD] [hereinafter
The Fed, FINRA Negotiation Press Release]. At the time it was promulgated, a securities
firm could avoid reporting rules by not classifying itself as a FINRA-regulated broker-dealer
firm, a loophole that was partially remedied in April 2019 by requiring trading platforms to
specifically identify trading firms. See Alexandra Scaggs, Opinion, The Dealer-Trader
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Perhaps most worryingly, these high administrative costs have produced a rulebook for Treasury markets that is noticeably sparser than that

applicable to participants in equities or the corporate bond market,
limiting the levers available to regulators to monitor and discipline traders.
According to one expert, out of the thousands of rules prescribed for
equity brokers and dealers, only about forty-six apply to those in
Treasuries. 6 Indeed, there is doubt even among regulators about which

rules are in fact applicable to Treasury markets, leaving a question mark
over the enforceability of otherwise mainstay prohibitions (such as uncertainty over rules governing brokers trading ahead of client orders).17 Further highlighting the limited tools available to regulators under this handsoff approach, trading platforms that only host Treasuries trades are
exempt from the usual panoply of regulations that apply to securities
trading platforms.' 8 While major equity trading exchanges like the New

&

Distinction and Treasury Market Regulation (Updated), Fin. Times (Oct. 28 2016),
(on file with the
https://www.ft.com/content/35eecdlO-d387-3a2f-9114-62d9023b8c34
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Scaggs, Dealer-Trader Distinction] (illustrating the
FINRA broker-dealer registration-avoidance loophole used by some securities firms to evade
the regulatory perimeter for Treasuries trading reporting rules); James Collin Harkrader
Michael Puglia, Principal Trading Firm Activity in Treasury Cash Markets, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.: FEDS Notes (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/
2 20 0
80 4 .htm
notes/feds-notes/principal-trading-firm-activity-in-treasury-cash-markets- 0
[https://perma.cc/Y4SW-GVBC] (explaining that trade reporting was imperfect as information gaps remained even after implementation of the 2017 reporting system); see also
infra Part III.
16. See Ken Monahan, TRACE "Unlocks" the Treasury Market for the Official Sector.
Everyone Else Gets a Peek Through the Keyhole, Greenwich Assocs.: Blog (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.greenwich.com/blog/frbny-trace-unlocks-treasury-market-everyone-lse-getspeek-through-keyhole [https://perma.cc/89BZ-N7B8] (noting that there used to be only
thirty-nine rules pertaining to Treasuries prior to the 2017 Treasury reporting reform).
17. See e.g., Rule 5320. Prohibition Against Trading Ahead of Customer Orders, Fin.
53
20
Indus. Regul. Auth., https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/
16,
Jan.
visited
(last
5320]
Rule
FINRA,
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/YSY3-MNZW]
2021) (applying the broker-trading rule to equity securities but remaining unclear about
whether it applies to Treasuries traders that trade ahead of their clients). To clarify the
matter, the SEC and FINRA have conducted a review to determine which rules do and ought
to apply to Treasuries. See Letter from Stephen Luparello, Dir., Div. Trading & Mkts., to
Robert W. Cook, President & CEO, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.
[https:/
sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/letter-to-finra-regulation-of-us-treasury-securities.pdf
/perma".cc/FA33-SHQT] [hereinafter Luparello, FINRA Request Letter] (requesting a
review of which FINRA rules apply to, or ought to apply to, Treasuries broker-dealers).
18. See, e.g., SEC Requirements for Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(a)
(2020) (exempting platforms that transact only in U.S. government securities from having
to register as an alternative trading system (ATS) under the jurisdiction of the SEC). But
see Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Extend Regulations ATS and SCI to
Treasuries and Other Government Securities Markets (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov
7
[https://perma.cc/4L78-P2UU] [hereinafter SEC, ATS/
/news/press-release/2020-22
SCI Release] (proposing to amend this exemption and include Treasuries trading platforms
under Regulation ATS). Note, however, that this proposed amendment would not require
a Treasuries ATS to register as a full exchange under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Id.
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York Stock Exchange (NYSE) must provide regular disclosures about their
operations and comply with fairness and good governance standards, 9
venues that only trade Treasuries can avoid these regulations altogether. 20
This Article also argues that, in light of modern technological
advances, private self-regulation in Treasury markets lacks structural
incentives to fill the gap left by weak and fragmented public oversight.
Historically, the purchase and trade of Treasuries have largely been inter-

mediated by a cohort of top-tier banks and investment banks designated
as "primary dealers" for the market.2 ' Currently numbering twenty-four

firms, primary dealers are designated by regulators to oil the machinery of
Treasuries trading by providing liquidity to the market. 22 Because of their

access to new issues, primary dealers are also the key conduits for investors
looking to buy or sell Treasuries. 23 Primary dealers are chosen for their
capacity to regularly purchase government debt (and are expected to do
so), and they are also usually networked banks and investment firms capable of connecting with investors worldwide in the secondary Treasuries
market.2 4 Importantly, the secondary market for Treasuries features an

19. See, e.g., SEC Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale Data with
Respect to Transactions in NMS Stock, 17 C.F.R. § 242.601(a) ("Every national securities
exchange shall file a transaction reporting plan regarding transactions in listed equity and
Nasdaq securities executed through its facilities .... "); SEC Order Protection Rule, id.
§ 242.611 (requiring exchanges to establish policies to prevent trade-throughs); Spotlight
on Regulation SCI, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulation-sci.shtml [https://perma.
cc/9YEE-EMZG] (detailing compliance with rules governing the resilience of technological
and infrastructural processes underlying trading platforms) (last visited Jan. 16, 2021); see
also SEC Regulation SCI-Systems Compliance and Integrity, id. §§ 242.1000-.1007 (requiring that certain "SCI entit[ies]," including "national securities exchange [s]," establish and
maintain policies ensuring system resilience and security).
20. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Prioritizing Regulatory Enhancements for the U.S.
Treasury Market, Keynote Address at the Evolving Structure of the U.S. Treasury Market
Second Annual Conference (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/whitekeynote-us-treasury-market-conference-102416.html [https://perma.cc/AG5D-8PRF] ("These
basic and critical regulatory standards do not apply to platforms that trade U.S. Treasury
securities."). In the same address, White suggested eliminating the regulatory exemption
for Treasuries trading platforms. See id. ("I have reassessed the decision ... to exclude from
Regulation ATS platforms that trade solely government securities.").
21. See Dominique Dupont & Brian Sack, The Treasury Securities Market: Overview
and Recent Developments, 85 Fed. Rsrv. Bull. 785, 786-87 (1999), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1999/12991ead.pdf [https://perma.cc/32P7-9P7C] (providing
an overview of the function of primary dealers, as well as defining marketable securities and
the types of bonds that generally comprise the U.S. Treasury market).
22. See Primary Dealers: List of Primary Dealers, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., https://www.new
yorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers [https://perma.cc/DP76-V47V] [hereinafter N.Y. Fed,
Primary Dealer List] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
23. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 789 ("[T]he [primary] dealer can facilitate
transactions between customers ... .").
24. See id. at 787-90; N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22 (describing how
"[i]n order to be eligible as a primary dealer, a firm must ... [d]emonstrate a substantial
presence as a market maker that provides two-way liquidity in U.S. government securities"
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additional significant aspect: the interdealer market, in which dealers
25
transact with one another to manage their inventories. If one dealer has

clients needing Treasuries that it does not have, it can tap into this
interdealer space to purchase the securities from another dealer and
26
satisfy investor demand. Traditionally, trading in both markets took place

through telephones, faxes, and computer displays of orders, giving the
"

market its reputation as an uncomplicated and ultrasafe corner of the
financial system.2
Over the last decade, however, the Treasury market has experienced
shift away from relying on just primary dealers and analog
fundamental
a
trading mechanics. It is now largely automated, populated to an increasing
degree by high-speed algorithmic traders known as "high-frequency

traders" (HFTs) that use preset computerized programs to trade in
milliseconds and microseconds. 28 At least in the interdealer market,

primary dealers have ceded their dominance in competition with expert,
automated firms that are more agile because they are smaller-and
29
generally much less regulated. High-speed automated trading now drives
as much as 50% to 70% of Treasuries trading volume between dealers."

&

and is expected to "bid on a pro-rata basis in all Treasury auctions at reasonably competitive
prices").
25. Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 789.
26. Id.; see also infra section II.B.
27. Compare Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 806 (describing the Treasury trading
landscape in 1999, when most trades were executed via telephone), with Markham, supra
note 8, at 198-99 (noting that Treasuries are traded virtually around the clock and
underscoring the use of electronic trading for most Treasuries, including by high-frequency
traders). With computer technology, dealer-to-customer markets have utilized "request for
quote" (RFQs) through portals and specialist electronic platforms. See Kevin McPartland,
Greenwich Assocs., U.S. Treasury Trading: The Intersection of Liquidity Makers and Takers
3 (2015) [hereinafter McPartland, Intersection] (asserting that RFQ remains the dominant
method for trading despite changes in technology).
28. John Bates, Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency Trading: Experiences from
the Market and Thoughts on Regulatory Requirements (unpublished manuscript), in Tech.
Advisory Comm., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Technological Trading in the
Markets 27 (July 14, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/pubic/@newsroom/docu
ments/file/tac_071410_binder.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVA7-8EGZ] ("An algorithm is 'a
sequence of steps to achieve a goal'-and the general case of algorithmic trading is 'using a
computer to automate a trading strategy.'").
29. See infra section II.C.1. (describing the transfer of dominance from traditional
primary dealers to high-frequency trading (HFT) firms).
30. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 21, 36-39
(showing that on October 15, 2014, principal trading firms (PTFs)-a term commonly used
to reference HFTs in Treasury markets-accounted for "more than 50 percent" of trading,
and detailing the key features of PTFs and their Treasuries trading strategies); Smith
Wigglesworth, supra note 1 ("Electronic-style trading activity now accounts for more than
75 per cent of liquidity provision in the Treasury market ... ."); Portia Crowe, High
Frequency Traders Are Now Dominating Another Huge Market, Bus. Insider (Sept. 23,
2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/high-frequency-traders-dominate-the-treasuries
-market-2015-9 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that BrokerTec, one of the
major platforms for dealers trading Treasuries with one another, was reported to
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Such trading is familiar in equities markets, and regulators have adopted

a bevy of rules to mitigate negative externalities there.31 But the advent of
HFTs in Treasuries poses challenges within a lax regulatory environment
characterized by patchy reporting, fragmented oversight, and weak levers
to collect information on traders and platforms. 2 Without informational
insight into the real-world effects of new traders and their strategies,
regulators lack the knowledge and authority to effectively tackle the
resulting risks."

This lenient regulatory regime contributes to the limited private
incentives for market actors to self-regulate. Professors Georgy Egorov and
Bard Harstad observe that firms can either come together to self-regulate
in the absence of an active regulator or they can do so in order to preempt
oversight by a strict one.34 But because the regulatory landscape is so
fragmented, the impending prospect of strict government monitoring is
an unlikely motivating factor for Treasuries traders.
Even if market participants wish to police themselves, private incen-

tives fostered by modern Treasury trading relationships undermine effective self-policing. The self-interest that might once have pushed primary
dealers toward promoting protective market behavior has diminished with
the ascendancy of rival, less-regulated automated securities firms. Primary

dealers traditionally had much to lose if the Treasury market performed
poorly, but the economic bonds that used to keep them in line are fraying
as they compete with new automated traders for market share.3 5

intermediate around 65% to 70% of interdealer trading volume); Robert Mackenzie Smith,
Client List Reveals HFT Dominance on BrokerTec, Risk.net (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.risk. net/derivatives/interest-rate-derivatives/2426923/client-list-reveals-hftdominance-brokertec (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Smith, HFT
Dominance] (noting that eight of ten traders on the top interdealer Treasuries trading
platform were high-speed traders).
31. See, e.g., SEC Regulation SCI-Systems Compliance and Integrity, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 242.1000-.1007 (2020) (establishing rules governing electronic trading systems infrastructure in order to promote market resilience).
32. See Aguilar, supra note 10 ("The transformative changes that swept through the
equities and options markets in the past decade have vastly reshaped the landscape of the
Treasury market.. . . As a result, the structure, participants, and technological underpinnings of today's Treasury market are far different than they were just a few years ago."); see
also infra Part IIl.
33. See Tracy & Ackerman, supra note 14 (describing gaps in the current regulatory
framework for governing Treasuries trading and the risks and consequences such gaps pose
with regard to HFTs).
34. See Georgy Egorov & Bard Harstad, Private Politics & Public Regulation, 84 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 1652, 1652-57 (2017) (developing a model illustrating firms' incentives for selfregulation in both the presence and absence of an active regulator).
35. As a small group of repeat players, primary dealers had once held significant
economic skin-in-the-game and reputational investment in the franchise, offering a means
to reduce information deficits and promote cooperation in detecting and managing risk.
See infra section III.B (explaining the misalignment of regulatory incentives created by the
coexistence of primary dealers and HFTs).
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Thus, an overall picture emerges: The asymmetric distribution of regulatory burdens between primary dealers on the one hand and high-speed
securities firms on the other limits opportunities for private cooperation
and mutually reinforces risk-taking behavior by both sets of players.
Unwieldy public monitoring, combined with a light-touch rulebook, allows
all firms to take risks or trade opportunistically with little chance of

detection and discipline. Traders can also cheaply exit the market if
something goes wrong, limiting how fully they must internalize the costs
of their risky behavior. For the less-regulated, nonprimary dealer firms, the
regulatory constraints are even weaker, further increasing their financial
incentive to seek risk in Treasury markets. Faced with diminishing profits
and a less lucrative franchise, primary dealers are also incentivized to take
risks and shirk self-discipline. So, not only is the task of private oversight
logistically harder as the number of traders proliferates and diversifies, but
it is also problematic when self-policing would result in primary dealers
imposing added costs on themselves in a period of fierce competition and
lower profits.
The consequences of this regulatory neglect in Treasury markets were
apparent even prior to the March 2020 COVID-19 crisis, as a number of
disruptions over the years pointed to unaddressed fragilities at the heart
of this supposedly failure-proof market. Famously, on October 15, 2014,
the price of Treasuries surged well in excess of what would have been normal for the time.36 Just after 9:30 AM, the market was roiled by some of the
highest trading volumes in its history, and prices seemed to fluctuate at
random.37 Despite the absence of any significant news, this abnormally
rapid rise-and subsequent correction-caused Treasuries to suffer some
of their largest price moves since 1998.38 The only three other occasions
with greater price shifts have been in response to news of major policy
changes, 39 but this "Flash Rally" came out of nowhere, and attempts to
36. See Matt Levine, Opinion, Algorithms Had Themselves a Treasury Flash Crash,
Bloomberg (July 13, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-13/
algorithms-had-themselves-a-treasury-flash-crash (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing the October 15, 2014 Flash Rally and discussing regulatory findings highlighting
the behavior of "dumb" automated trading algorithms simply responding to price signals
rather than fundamental information as contributing factors).
37. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 15
(describing how yields dropped sixteen points and then subsequently rebounded, all within
fifteen minutes).
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. (observing that the other three instances of large intraday moves since 1998
"followed significant new fundamental information being received by markets"). The
absence of a news trigger is significant, as it would not be unusual for the price of U.S.
Treasuries to rise-in essence, for the returns (yields) from the Treasury bond to fall-after
bad economic news. This is because investors generally seek a "flight to safety" by buying
Treasury bonds (essentially lending money to the U.S. government), although this a
simplification of complicated trends that are also affected by inflation, interest rates, and
competing investment opportunities. See SEC, Interest Rate Risk-When Interest Rates Go
Up, Prices of Fixed-Rate Bonds Fall 1-5 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/files/ibinterest
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explain it delivered little by way of firm conclusions."0 Jamie Dimon, the

Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan, hyperbolically remarked that such
price movements were so rare as to happen only once every three billion

years.4 1 Despite Dimon's optimism, however, a similar incident occurred
only a few years later in June 2018, sending Treasury prices into a short
and inexplicable tailspin.42 Even outside of these flash events, other disruptions also revealed the less-than-perfect operation of Treasury market
infrastructure: The major trading platform for interdealer trading saw an

43
hour-long shutdown in June 2019, slowing activity across the market. To
be sure, flash crashes, slowdowns, and platform malfunctions occur in
other markets as well (like equities).44 Nonetheless, scant regulatory attention and limited levers for intervention leave Treasuries exposed to the
possibility that traders come to see the market as a space where risk-taking

is much less costly and detectable than elsewhere in capital markets.
This Article concludes by outlining two proposals to begin remedying
the deficiencies underlying Treasury market regulation. First, it suggests

mechanisms to foster stronger interagency cooperation and help fill the
gaps in public regulation. As an initial step, Treasury regulators can benefit
by developing a more systematic memorandum of understanding (MOU)
5
to formalize cooperation, information sharing, and enforcement. To
institutionalize pathways for interagency cooperation, this Article also

proposes that regulators harness the coordination mechanism offered by

-

raterisk.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2QK-YXNP] (illustrating the inverse relationship between
Treasury prices and yields); Daniel Kruger, U.S. Government Bonds Fall as 10-Year Yield
Climbs Above 3%, Wall St. J. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-governmentbonds-gain-as-10-year-yield-hovers-near-3-1537200839 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last updated Sept. 17, 2018) (same).
40. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4 (finding
"no single cause" for the price volatility); Levine, supra note 36 ("The regulators don't know
what caused the [volatility].").
41. Levine, supra note 36, at n.7 ("Treasury securities moved ... statistically 7 to 8
standard deviations[,] ... an event that is supposed to happen only once in every 3 billion
years or so .... " (quoting Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO ofJ.P. Morgan)).
42. See Brian Chappatta, Treasury Rally Was a Flash, Not a Crash, Bloomberg (June 7,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-07/treasury-rally-was-a-flas
h-not-a-crash (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (positing that the second flash event
may have been triggered by turmoil in emerging markets and Brazil, resulting in a flight to
U.S. Treasuries).
43. Elizabeth Stanton, Nick Baker & Matthew Leising, Treasuries Hit by One-Hour
Outage on Biggest Electronic Platform, Bloomberg (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2019-01-11 /brokertec-inter-dealer-treasury-broker-suffers-outage
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the outage and highlighting the lack of
a serious impact on the day owing to "fortuitous" market conditions).
44. See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Could Computerized Trading Cause Another Market
7
Crash?, Kiplinger, (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/t041-c00
[https://perma.cc/4AT9s001-could-computerized-trading-cause-another-market-cr.html
KPCG] (highlighting the dangers of "Wall Street's robot traders" accidentally causing flash
crashes, similar to the one which occurred on May 6, 2010).
45. See infra section [V.A.
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the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a post-2008 reform body
that offers preexisting organizational expertise to map the connections
between Treasury markets and the larger financial system.'
Second, to mitigate currently misaligned incentives for private selfregulation in the high-frequency trading (HFT) era, this Article suggests
creating a Treasuries clearinghouse-an industry mechanism that forces

major participants to be more responsible for risk-sharing and mitigation,
requiring each to have skin in the game in order to maintain the resiliency
of the market.47 Common to nearly all major markets, clearinghouses are
a private solution to the risk that traders can renege on their bargains with
counterparties. By supplying the clearinghouse with sufficient funds to
make good on promised transactions, participants subscribe to a mechanism wherein their pocketbooks are at risk in case of another firm's fail-

ure.' As Professor Darrell Duffie also argues, a clearinghouse for the
Treasury market could introduce a stronger focus on risk management
and bring a more organized approach to protecting its safety and soundness.49 To be sure, clearinghouses are not a comprehensive solution; as in
March 2020, market participants may still flee when it no longer suits them
to trade, and algorithms could always go haywire. But a clearinghouse
would provide a recognized bulwark that would anchor Treasuries trading
to systematized risk sharing and management, motivating even rival traders to cooperate more fully in self-monitoring and discipline.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I establishes the importance of
the Treasury market to the national economy, especially in the wake of
COVID-19, and demonstrates that much of the vulnerability is a function
of the uniquely fragmented and light-touch regulatory structure overseeing Treasuries. Part II outlines the market structure of Treasury markets
and traces their evolution from a relatively simple structure dominated by
primary dealers to one populated by high-speed automated traders. This
Part also observes how the changing composition of Treasuries traders
undermines effective private self-regulation. Part III analyzes the risks of
weak public and private regulation in Treasury markets. Part IV suggests
pathways for reform.
46. See infra notes 366-370 and accompanying text.
47. See infra section IV.B; see also Duffie, Redesigning After COVID-19, supra note 2,
at 20 (proposing central clearing for Treasuries as a possible solution to market fragility).
48. See Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets,
101 Geo. L.J. 387, 392-93 (2013) [hereinafterYadav, Problematic Clearinghouses] (describing the core economic benefits of clearinghouses, notably to reduce counterparty risk,
ensure risk-sharing, and increase information about exposures for the market, as well as
downsides, including "misaligned incentives" that result from forcing participants to share
in the loss should a member's risky actions cause insolvency).
49. See Duffle, Redesigning After COVID-19, supra note 2, at 15 ("Central clearing
increases the transparency of settlement risk to regulators and market participants, and in
particular allows [central counterparties] to identify concentrated positions and crowded
trades, adjusting margin requirements accordingly. Central clearing also improves market
safety by lowering exposure to settlement failures .... ").
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I. WHY REGULATE A RISK-FREE MARKET?
The U.S. Treasury market is a key mechanism by which the government funds itself. When tax receipts cannot raise sufficient funds,

Treasuries provide the channel for covering the shortfall. 50 Treasuries also
anchor global financial markets.51 As they are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States, its political institutions, consumer and capital
markets, and taxing power, Treasuries are generally viewed as defaultproof.5 2 Investors worldwide rely on them as a fail-safe store of value to

protect against risk, volatility, and investment losses. 53 The rate at which
the U.S. government borrows is also essential for capital markets: The

"risk-free" rate of Treasury borrowing benchmarks the risk-pricing of
54
virtually all other financial assets.

Likely owing to this longstanding perception, public regulation of
Treasuries is more hands-off and institutionally fragmented compared to
equities or corporate bonds. 55 Treasuries are supervised within a system of
shared interagency authority where no single regulator holds primary
status.56 This arrangement offers the advantage of experience and
50. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 785 ("The [U.S. government] finances its
expenditures in excess of tax receipts through the sale of debt obligations.").
51. See, e.g., Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 5 ("The continuous functioning and
smooth adjustment of the Treasury market is important to global asset markets and financial
stability."); Thomas Heath, What the 10-Year Treasury Yield Means to You? Real Money.,
Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2018/
04/23/what-does-the-yield-on-the-10-year-treasury-mean-to-you (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing how investors choose between investing in Treasuries versus equities); Aswath Damodaran, Into the Abyss: What if Nothing Is Risk Free? 4-5 (July 2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1648164 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Damodaran, Into the Abyss] (unpublished manuscript) (explaining why Treasuries are still
subject to certain classes of risks).
52. Promontory Fin. Grp., Emerging Issues in the Functioning of the U.S. Treasury
Market 10-11 (2016) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Treasury securities are backed
by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government ... and the historical record of no
defaults on the federal debt.").
53. See Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 5 ("Treasury securities are widely used as a riskfree investment instrument and to satisfy hedging, margining, and collateral needs of
market participants.").
54. See Damodaran, Into the Abyss, supra note 51, at 54 (stating that the risk-free rate
"provides the basis for computing expected returns on risky assets[,]" like stocks and bonds).
55. See Government Securities Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (2018) (designing the
current regulatory framework for Treasury markets and setting out the spheres of
responsibility for various existing federal regulators in rulemaking and supervision authority
over Treasuries).
56. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, SEC & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Joint
Study of the Regulatory System for Government Securities 2 (1998) htps://www.treasurydirect.
gov/instit/statreg/gsareg/gsareggsr98rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PYB-2F4X] [hereinafter
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Government Securities Regulation Joint Study] ("The
[Government Securities Act], rather than creating a separate agency to enforce the regulations, relied, for the most part, on the existing federal regulatory structure when assigning
oversight and enforcement responsibilities.").
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expertise, but it also creates high coordination costs, information gaps,
and the risk of lax enforcement, raising the prospect of bureaucratic
inertia in rousing regulators to respond effectively to new challenges. 7
A.

The Treasury Market as Economic Foundationfor the Nation

U.S. government bonds have long nurtured the country's economic,
social, and geopolitical development. Ever since it borrowed to pay for the
Revolutionary War of 1776 (then through the Continental Congress), the

United States has relied on debt to support public policy.58 Treasuries have
enabled the government to raise capital cheaply and to reliably develop
public institutions and social safety nets alongside ambitious policy
initiatives. 59 Historically, levels of national public debt surged around
critical periods like the Civil War, World War I, the Great Depression,

World War II, the 1980s recession, post-9/11, the 2008 Great Recession,
and most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.60 Due to their risk-free status,
Treasuries have been viewed as an essential protective asset for investors
and financial markets worldwide.6 1 As this section underscores, disruptions
to risk-free Treasury markets can directly impair global financial stability
and threaten the United States' capacity to borrow reliably to both fund
large-scale policies and respond to crises.
1.

The National Significance of Risk-Free Status. -

Treasury bonds are

62
designed to encourage investment from the broadest swath of investors.

57. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1150-51 (cataloguing the weaknesses of a
split enforcement regime "in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability").
58. See Peter M. Garber, Alexander Hamilton's Market-Based Debt Reduction Plan,
35 Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Series on Pub. Pol'y 79, 80-81 (1991) (detailing the foundations of public debt by describing Alexander Hamilton's strategy to pay off the Continental
Congress's Revolutionary War debt).
59. See, e.g., Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 785-86 (explaining varied government
uses of Treasuries funding);Justin Lahart, The Treasury Market Is Having a Senior Moment,
Wall St. J. (June 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-treasury-market-is-having-asenior-moment-1528307631 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing the role
of Treasuries in funding Social Security).
60. See Matt Phillips, The Long Story of U.S. Debt, from 1790 to 2011, in 1 Little Chart,
Atlantic (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/the-longstory-of-us-debt-from-1790-to-2011-in-1-little-chart/265185 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (illustrating debt surges throughout U.S. history graphically, with the spikes coinciding with major events); see also Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 785-86 (illustrating
how U.S. government debt expanded to fund the Civil War, World War I, and World War
II).
61. See, e.g., Claire Jones, More 'Money' Treasuries Would Calm Repo Markets, Fin.
Times (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a710474b-3ff5-42fc-b9ab-83325e8787
16 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); U.S. Treasury Securities, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth.,
https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/types-investments/bonds/types-of-bonds/
us-treasury-securities [https://perma.cc/FPF3-8QMK] [hereinafter FINRA, Treasuries
Securities] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
62. See FINRA, Treasuries Securities, supra note 61.
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First, they allow mom-and-pop investors to lend to the U.S. Treasury. 63
Second, different types of bonds allow the debt to be repaid over varying
periods, from maturities that come due within a year (Treasury Bills, or TBills), to longer-term instruments that are paid back over two, five, seven,
and ten years (Treasury Notes), or even over twenty and thirty years

(Treasury Bonds).' The general belief that Treasury debt will always be
repaid, giving those that lend to the United States total certainty about
receiving future streams of cash on time, is crucial to its broad accessibility

and appeal.6 5
For institutional investors, Treasuries are an essential part of any
portfolio. Instead of putting money in stock or corporate bonds whose
66
issuers might fail to pay, Treasuries offer a source of reliable returns.
Holders of Treasuries purchase a hedge against downturns, expecting the
U.S. government to always repay even if nothing else does. 67 The resilience
of this expectation was evident during the worst days of the 2008 Financial

Crisis and subsequent Great Recession: Despite concerns about the
integrity of the U.S. financial system, the Treasury attracted a lasting surge
of cash as investors liquidated their holdings in other securities and sought
63. See id. ("Treasuries ... are appealing to the individual investor. They can be
bought in denominations of $100, making them affordable, and the buying process is quite
convenient."). Efforts have also been made to foster Main Street investment in public debt.
See, e.g., The Payroll Savings Options in TreasuryDirect, TreasuryDirect, https://www
[https://perma.cc/JL9X-FRJ
.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prodtdpayrollinfo.htm
A] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (allowing for direct investments to be made through payroll).
64. See Treasury Bills, TreasuryDirect, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/product
s/prod_tbillsglance.htm [https://perma.cc/3NA7-D5WT] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021);
Treasury Bonds, TreasuryDirect, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_
tbonds-glance.htm [https://perma.cc/AY5G-5UFQ] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021); Treasury
Notes, TreasuryDirect, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prodtnotes-glan
ce.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4FF-89G3] (last visitedJan. 16, 2021). In addition, investors can
also purchase different types of Treasury securities beyond these common varieties, like
those linked to inflation (known as TIPS). See Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
(TIPS), TreasuryDirect, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_tipsglance
.htm [https://perma.cc/AFL2-MBTN] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
65. See FINRA, Treasuries Securities, supra note 61. Standard & Poor's, however,
downgraded the U.S. credit rating from AAA to AA+ in 2011 in response to political gridlock
in Congress. Zachary A. Goldfarb, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, Wash.
Post (Aug. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-consider
ing-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI story.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) ("S&P's downgrade served as an indictment of the gridlock that
sent the nation to the edge of defaulting on its debt obligations.").
66. See Why It Makes Sense to Invest in Treasury Bonds, Economist (May 26, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/why-it-makes-sense-toinvest-in-treasury-bonds (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing hedging using
Treasuries as an "insurance policy" providing guaranteed returns).
67. See id.; see also Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 18 (describing Treasuries as a
"safe haven" in times of financial uncertainty); Jeff Sommer, This Flight to Safety Wasn't
Supposed to Happen, N.Y. Times (June 5, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/
business/06stra.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("When Treasury bonds are
hotter than stocks, it's a sign that something is very wrong with the stock market.").
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the comfort of Treasury bonds.68 As the Recession worsened, the U.S.
government was able to borrow at rates that edged ever closer toward 0%,
highlighting enormous demand for Treasuries in the depths of economic
turmoil.69 Even with COVID-19 cratering the economy in early 2020-and
disrupting the Treasury market itself-the U.S. Treasury continued to
borrow at record-low rates. 70
The risk-free status of Treasuries thus greatly advantages the United

States by permitting the government to borrow expansively to accommodate its need for capital, a power exemplified by the increase in tradable
debt taken on by the Treasury in the decade since the Great Recession.
The approximately $5 trillion of marketable U.S. public debt outstanding
in 2008 quadrupled to around $21 trillion by December 2020.71 This
reflects, in part, an expansion of the Treasury's balance sheet to contain
the COVID-19 crisis and recession-as well as strong appetite by investors
72
to place their capital in a safe haven. Even prior to COVID-19, commentators predicted that the United States would need to rely heavily on the
Treasury market to help pay for rising deficits and major public programs. 73 Following the onset of the pandemic, this dependence has
68. See Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 18 ("[T]he collapse of Lehman Brothers
on Sept. 15, 2008, signaled the beginning of a financial panic . ... [I]nvestors increased
their demand for safer assets, namely U.S. Treasuries .... ").
69. See id. (explaining how increased demand "led to a further decline in the yields
on U.S. Treasuries," with "[y]ields on short-term U.S. securities decreas[ing] sharply to near
zero in November" of 2008).
70. See Alexandra Scaggs, The Treasury Market Is Telling a Different Story About
Growth than the Stock Market Is, Barron's (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/
articles/the-0-year-treasury-yield-just-closed-at-a-new-low-51596578263 [https://perma.cc/
JMH4-3HN9] (describing extremely low rates for U.S. Treasury bonds despite the improving
performance of the stock market in the wake of COVID-19).
71. Compare U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the
United States (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/
2020/opds122020.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE6A-UP29] [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, December 2020 Statement] (showing roughly $21 trillion in marketable public
debt in December 2020), with U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of the Public
Debt of the United States (June 30, 2008), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/
pd/mspd/2008/opds062008.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF63-ZGJH] (showing roughly $5
trillion in marketable public debt in June 2008).
72. Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 18 ("[T]here has been a large expansion in
the amount of Treasury security offerings while yields on Treasuries have actually
declined .... This anomalous behavior can be explained by a significant increase in the
demand for Treasuries-'the flight to safety' in the event of a financial crisis.").
73. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Federal Budget Deficit Projected to Soar to over $1
Trillion in 2020, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/us
(on file with the Columbia Law
/politics/federal-deficit-tax-cuts-spending-trump.html
Review) (discussing the growing budget deficit);Joy Wiltermuth, Treasury Is About to Flood
the Market with Debt to Fund U.S.'s $1 Trillion Deficit-And That Is a Concern,
MarketWatch (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-us-treasury-isabout-to-flood-the-market-with-debt-to-fund-a--trillion-deficit-heres-why-that-is-a-worry-201
9-08-15 [https://perma.cc/7BRS-W6QQ] ("Treasury is expected to ramp up its issuance of
bills, notes and bonds to fund a soaring $1 trillion budget deficit.").
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become acute, unavoidable, and extraordinary. As the economy shrank by
over 30% on an annualized basis by July 202074 and various large-scale

stimulus measures became necessary to manage the economic fallout,
Treasury borrowing soared to record levels: Overall marketable debt of the
United States reached $20.96 trillion in December 2020, an increase of
over $3 trillion from $17.14 trillion in March 2020.75
2. FinancialStability and the ProtectivePower of Treasuries. - Treasuries
also play an essential role in protecting financial markets as the

preeminent "safe asset," acting as an approximate substitute for liquid

76
cash and an ideal safeguard against financial distress. Regulations and
private industry norms have historically ensured that market participants
rely upon Treasuries to facilitate an array of financial functions and
transactions.77
Treasuries are the highest quality form of collateral for firms looking
78
to access credit or enter into securities transactions. Unlike stocks, which
heavily fluctuate in value, or corporate bonds, which carry default risks,
the returns from Treasuries held to maturity can be clearly, precisely, and
reliably calculated. 79 Because they pay out in U.S. dollars-a safe and stable

currency-their returns also come without real currency risks. 80 Because
74. Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Is Expected to Report a Record-Breaking Economic
Plunge, AP News (July 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-technology(on file
gross-domestic-product-business-u-s-news-a96cc78b135712828fdd29dc71fa2869
with the Columbia Law Review).
75. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, December 2020 Statement, supra note 71; U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States (Mar. 31, 2020),
[https://
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2020/opds32020.pdf
perma.cc/YK4Y-6PBN].
76. See Promontory Fin. Grp., supra note 52, at 10-14 (explaining how "Treasury
securities comprise the largest global asset pool that can be considered to carry virtually no
credit risk," as "[m]ost market participants consider Treasury securities to be near cash
equivalents, with an ability to be converted into cash virtually immediately when needed").
But see Gary Gorton & Ping He, Optimal Monetary Policy in a Collateralized Economy 3-4
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22599, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2835857 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (challenging the conventional
wisdom by arguing that Treasuries and cash are not directly substitutable).
77. See generally Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 Yale J. on
Regul. 363 (2016) (detailing the regime of assets presumed to be risk-free and their
importance in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, but also critically analyzing the system
of constructing "safe assets").
78. See Marcin Kacperczyk, Christophe P~rignon & Guillaume Vuillemey, The Private
Production of Safe Assets 15 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract=2984146 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (noting the important role of very
short-term claims for the private sector as a source of safe assets).
79. See Gorton & He, supra note 76, at 2 (highlighting the "convenience yield" of
Treasuries).
80. See Ben S. Bernanke, The Dollar's International Role: An "Exorbitant Privilege"?,
Brookings (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/01/07/
(on file with the Columbia Law
the-dollars-international-role-an-exorbitant-privilege-2
Review) (noting the dollar's preeminence in global economic governance and arguing it is
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of these qualities, Treasuries can also release credit for the holder with
little discounting. All things being equal, a borrower should be able to
access much more money by securing debt using Treasuries than by using
an equivalent dollar value of stocks or corporate bonds. 8 1 The ability to
easily exchange Treasuries for cash has nourished a "repurchase," or
"repo," market in which institutions with cash lend them out on a short-

term basis in return for collateral over a variety of assets, including
Treasuries. 82 Unsurprisingly, Treasuries have proven to be the most
popular form of risk-proofing, representing collateral used for almost 68%
of transactions in the $2.5 trillion bilateral repo lending market in 2019.83

Treasuries are also indispensable to financial dealmaking. Financial
contracts often require that counterparties provide collateral to one
another in order to lock in the bargain, a practice that supports the
operation of critical market infrastructure, like securities exchanges and
their risk management systems. 84 Exchanges, which host hundreds of
billions of dollars' worth of daily trades, must also ensure that parties who

agree to buy and sell securities do not leave exchanges exposed. 85 So, they
due, in part, to the currency's historical stability and the stability of American institutions
more broadly); Katherine Greifeld, Investors Are Dumping Treasuries and Dollar to Take
on More Risk, Bloomberg (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-09-20/treasury-yields-and-dollar-part-ways-as-risk-appetite-rebounds (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (detailing how a "combination of robust U.S. economic growth and
haven flows have buoyed the dollar").
81. See, e.g., Acceptable Collateral for Treasuries, TIPS & Strips, CME Grp.,
https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/financial-and-collateral-management/acceptable-co
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/8GJK-8SMQ]
llateral-for-treasuries-tips-and-strips.html
CME, TIPS/STRIPS] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (showing lenders and counterparties are
likely to apply a larger "haircut" or "discount" when receiving collateral in the form of stocks
or corporate bonds relative to Treasuries).
82. See Viktoria Balkanova, Adam Copeland & Rebecca McCaughrin, Fed. Rsrv. Bank
of N.Y., Reference Guide to U.S. Repo and Securities Lending Markets 2-4 (2015), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr740.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2H88-JWUW]; see also Manmohan Singh, Collateral Flows and Balance Sheet(s) Space,
5 J. Fin. Mkt. Infrastructures 65, 80 (2016) (elaborating on the utility of repo markets for
credit expansion and analyzing how collateral is handled by those using it).
83. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n., U.S. Repo Market Fact Sheet 6 (2020), https://www.sif
ma.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-Repo-Factsheetfinal2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G6YA-NPZ3]. These figures refer to bilateral repo market lending, not including reverse
repo. Id.
84. See, e.g., Edmund Parker, ISDA Variation Margin Protocol-What Is It About? 1
(2016), https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/news/2016/08/isda-variation-marginprotocolwhat-is-it-about/files/artparkeraug2516_isda-variation-margin-protocol/file
attachment/artparkeraug2516_isda-variation-margin-protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BZ5F-S2CH] (illustrating the pervasiveness of collateral agreements).
85. See Daily Market Summary, Nasdaq, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?
id=DailyMarketSummary [https://perma.cc/657M-S8NF] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (showing that the Nasdaq stock exchange hosts billions of dollars in transactions a day); see also
Yadav, Problematic Clearinghouses, supra note 48, at 391 (explaining how clearinghouses
in equities markets require members to maintain reserves of collateral to reduce the risk of
a member failing without sufficient funds to make good on its exposures).
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86
require that traders post collateral to reflect the risks they create.
Treasuries are the preferred type of collateral in these transactions, and
exchanges generally apply the lowest discount to collateral offered in the
form of Treasuries and tend not to limit how much of it traders are allowed
to provide. 87

The protective power of Treasuries also makes them well-suited
regulatory levers to constrain systemic risk. When firms do not have access
to liquid assets, troubles from one institution can pass quickly to another

as short-term debts go unpaid and distressed firms try to sell whatever they
can to generate cash. 88 To mitigate this domino effect, a slew of post-2008
Financial Crisis rulemaking requires firms to maintain a prescribed
amount of high-quality, dependably liquid assets-such as Treasuries-for
rainy day protection. 89 Treasuries have therefore assumed an even more
90
unique significance since 2008 as bulwarks against financial crises. Firms
maintaining protective holdings of Treasuries also extend beyond banks
to other kinds of institutions. 91

86. See, e.g., Financial and Collateral Management: Standard Acceptable Collateral
and Resources, CME Grp., https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/financial-and-collateralmanagement.html [https://perma.cc/8X3F-L6E5] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
87. See CME, TIPS/STRIPS, supra note 81.
88. See Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 110-11
(2016) (arguing that financial panics-"widespread redemption of short-term debt"-are a
key catalyst for macroeconomic disasters and that a "shadow banking" panic in 2007 and
2008 was a probable cause of the 2008 Great Recession); see also Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory
Design for Monetary Instability, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1289, 1290-92 (2012) (arguing that
current regulatory design fails to contain the potential for runs on short-term money
markets and offering an alternative regulatory framework).
89. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Liquidity Risk Management Standards, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 329.1-.10, 329.20(a) (3) (2020) (establishing minimum liquidity standards and the
required daily liquidity coverage ratio for certain institutions, and identifying Treasuries as
a Level 1 liquid asset); see also Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: Protecting the
Financial System from Panics 183-89 (2016) (detailing the enhanced liquidity requirements
applicable to financial institutions following the 2008 Financial Crisis and the emphasis on
holding cash and cash-like assets within this framework).
90. See Jane Ihrig, Edward Kim, Cindy Vojtech & Gretchen C. Weinbach, How Have
Banks Been Managing the Composition of High-Quality Liquid Assets?, 101 Fed. Rsrv. Bank
St. Louis Rev. 177, 181 (2019) (detailing the impact of regulations requiring banks to
maintain highly liquid asset reserves on monetary policy and macroeconomic outcomes).
91. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n Derivatives Clearing
Organizations, 17 C.F.R. § 39.11(e) (1) (ii) (requiring derivatives clearinghouses to maintain
"cash, U.S. Treasury obligations, or high quality, liquid, general obligations of a sovereign
nation" as part of the financial resources necessary to discharge its responsibilities); Nellie
Liang & Pat Parkinson, Enhancing Liquidity of the U.S. Treasury Market Under Stress 6
(Brookings Inst., Hutchins Ctr. Working Paper No. 72, 2020) ("In 2019, open-end mutual
funds held 12 percent of Treasury securities outstanding, and hedge funds held 9
percent. . . ."); see also Jochen R. Andritzky, Government Bonds and Their Investors: What
Are the Facts and Do They Matter? 8-10 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/12/158, 2012)
(detailing the diverse ownership base for Treasuries and guiding rationales for investing in
them).
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The FragmentedFrameworkfor Public Oversight of Treasuries

The distinctive importance of Treasuries gives several regulators a
stake in these markets, a shared interest that is reflected in a division of
92
oversight where-surprisingly-no single agency takes the lead. The

Government Securities Act of 1986 (GSA) taps several existing agencies to
93
The
work together to regulate and oversee the Treasury market.

regulatory bodies vary in their spheres of authority and expertise, with
some traditionally responsible for banking regulation and others for
capital markets supervision: The GSA assigns Treasuries-related oversight
responsibilities to the Fed, N.Y. Fed, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
94
which are all traditionally responsible for banking regulation. The Fed is
responsible for oversight of qualifying depository institutions, and the
Fed's Board of Governors sets guidelines for participating institutions
through regulations and other avenues. 95 The OCC, an independent
bureau of the U.S. Treasury, also bears responsibility for bank regulation,
96
overseeing national banks chartered under the National Bank Act.
Finally, the FDIC serves as the primary regulator over state-insured banks
that are not part of the Federal Reserve System and provides secondary
supervision over other insured banks and savings associations that are
otherwise primarily regulated by the OCC, the Fed, or state banking

92. See Markham, supra note 8, at 199-204 ("Regulatoryjurisdiction over the Treasury
market has been allocated among several regulators, including the Treasury, the Fed, the
New York Fed, and other 'appropriate' banking regulators, and the SEC.").
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (2018). The major public regulators over Treasuries include: (1)
independent agencies (the SEC, CFTC, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC)); (2) executive agencies (the Treasury Department and Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC)); (3) the independent central bank system (the Fed and N.Y. Fed);
and (4) a government-authorized, private self-regulatory organization (FINRA). See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (34) (G)-(H), 78o-5(d)(3)(A) (defining the term "appropriate regulatory
agency" when used in relation to broker-dealers of government securities).
94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(34)(G)-(H), 78o-5(d) (3)(A).
95. See Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ7F-JEKW] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2021). Each of the Fed's twelve district banks oversee depository institutions
within their geographic footprint, sharpening the Fed's control over its member
institutions. See Structure of the Federal Reserve System, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm [ht
tps://perma.cc/2PEQ3BMK] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). Importantly, the N.Y. Fed has
several special responsibilities distinguishing it from other regional banks: It bears sole
responsibility for conducting open market operations, under which primary dealers
purchase (or sell) Treasury securities in exchange for reserves held on account at the Fed.
See What We Do, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/
whatwedo [https://perma.cc/2PEQ3BMK] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
96. What We Do, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, https://www.occ.treas.gov/
about/what-we-do/index-what-we-do.html [https://perma.cc/7JRZ-WB3M] (last visited
Jan. 28, 2021).
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regulators.9 7 Perhaps most famously, the FDIC provides deposit insurance
for nearly all U.S. banks and aids their wind-down and resolution if they

fail. 98
The 1986 GSA expanded the role of these banking regulators, making

each of them responsible for Treasuries trading conducted by the institutions they traditionally oversee. 99 Specifically, the GSA requires financial
institutions dealing in Treasuries to register with or notify their associated
regulatory body of such dealings. 00 Thus, state-chartered Federal Reserve
member banks must notify the Fed of Treasuries dealings, national banks
dealing in Treasuries must notify the OCC, and any institution insured by
the FDIC and dealing in Treasuries must notify the FDIC.

In addition to banking regulators, the GSA places oversight of nonbank broker-dealers transacting in Treasuries under the authority of the
SEC. 101 FINRA, a self-regulated private authority, assists the SEC in super-

vising these registered broker-dealers. 102 The CFTC, the primary regulator
of derivatives securities in U.S. markets, is charged with protecting derivatives connected to Treasuries (notably, Treasury futures).10

97. What We Do, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., https://www.fdic.gov/about/what-wedo/index.html [https://perma.cc/LZ5B-EP3K] (last visitedJan. 28, 2021).
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (34) (G); see also Joseph G. Fallon, The Government Securities
Act of 1986: Balancing Investor Protection with Market Liquidity, 36 Catholic U.L. Rev. 999,
1011 n.115 (1987) (explaining how the GSA delineated regulatory authority among several
preexisting bodies traditionally responsible for banking and capital markets regulation).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
101. Id. § 78c(a) (34) (G) (v); Markham, supra note 8, at 217 ("[The GSA] required nonbanks acting as broker-dealers in government securities to register with the SEC, while banks
were subjected to regulation by the 'appropriate regulatory agency.'").
102. See, e.g., Federal Regulation of Government Securities Brokers and Dealers Under
the Government Securities Act of 1986, Notice to Members 87-19, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth.,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/87-19 [https://perma.cc/7KR8-S5N3] (last
visitedJan. 16, 2021) (providing regulatory guidance on certain registration and compliance
requirements for Treasuries brokers and dealers relating to the GSA).
103. See Markham, supra note 8, at 201-02 ("The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 ...
granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts on U.S. government
securities .. .. "); Mission Statement, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, https://www.
cftc.gov/About/AboutTheCommission [https://perma.cc/B2FF-5FUA] (last visited Jan.
16, 2021); see also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, SEC & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Joint Report on the Government Securities Market, app. at A-9 (1992), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/gsr92rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q57
-GPCS] [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities MarketJoint Report]
("Futures contracts are available for Treasury bills, notes, and bonds and are authorized by,
and traded on, exchanges that are regulated by the [CFTC]."); Jay Clayton, Chair, SEC,
Remarks at the Third Annual Conference on the Evolving Structure of the U.S. Treasury
Market (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/clayton-2017-11-28 [https://
perma.cc/JQU7-AMY9] (describing how the CFTC regulates many of the individuals and
firms that participate in the Treasuries futures market).
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These shared spheres of authority also divide up enforcement responsibilities. The U.S. Treasury safeguards debt auctions.1 04 The SEC, the Fed,
CFTC, or FINRA can oversee and take action against the firms they specif-

ically supervise.115 The N.Y. Fed, working with the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and
SEC, sets out the key responsibilities of primary dealer firms, including
minimum requirements for capital reserves, internal compliance and risk

management controls, reporting standards, and governance. 106 When a
firm falls short of compliance, the N.Y. Fed can work with a firm's main
07
regulator to suspend or terminate its primary dealer status.1
Treasuries generally enjoy "exempt" status in securities regulation,
meaning that issues of government debt do not need to be registered and
108
are not subject to the SEC's mandatory disclosure reporting regime.
They do, however, come within the purview of general antifraud and

antimanipulation provisions, ensuring that regulators can punish creative
schemes to rig Treasury auctions, bid up prices, or trade on insider
information. 109 Other kinds of regulation common to trading in equities
0
or bonds apply with caveats or do not apply at all to Treasuries trading."
The overall framework is therefore structured as follows. The U.S.
Treasury writes the rules for the market and sets the conditions under
which auctions are conducted."1 It also establishes the key terms by which

104. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities Market Joint Report, supra
note 103, at xi-xv, 3 ("The Treasury rules are enforced by the appropriate regulatory
agency. The federal banking regulators fill that role for financial institutions that are
government securities brokers or dealers, and the SEC does so for all other government
securities firms.").
105. For example, although Treasuries are "exempt" securities under the Securities Act
of 1933, they are still subject to antifraud and antimanipulation protections enforced by the
SEC under Rule 10b-5. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note
13, at 9; Markham, supra note 8, at 200.
106. Civil regulators like FINRA and the SEC can impose fines, suspensions, and may
even ban broker-dealers for rules violations, and DOJ can pursue criminal enforcement for
breach of Treasury rules, most notably for bid-rigging at auctions. See, e.g., Kevin Dugan,
Goldman Sachs Probed in Alleged Rigging of Treasury Market, MarketWatch (Mar. 21,
2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-sachs-probed-in-alleged-rigging-oftreasury-market-2016-03-21 [https://perma.cc/3AH5-CRRQ] (outlining DOJ's probe into
the possible criminality of bid-rigging by financial firms).
107. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy on Counterparties for Market
Operations, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y. (Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter N.Y. Fed, Counterparty
Policy], https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/counterparties/policy-on-counterparties-fo
r-market-operations [https://perma.cc/5B9T-72PP] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (2018); see also Markham, supra note 8, at 200.
109. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 9.
110. See, e.g., SEC Requirements for Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.301(a) (4) (ii) (2020) (exempting ATS from SEC reporting requirements if firms only
trade government securities); Luparello, FINRA Request Letter, supra note 17, at 2 (listing
multiple FINRA rules that are not applicable to government securities).
111. See 31 U.S.C. § 3121 (2018) (granting the Secretary of the Treasury the authority
to prescribe rules relating to the issuance and regulation of Treasuries); see also U.S. Dep't
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the secondary market operates.1 2 The N.Y. Fed acts as an agent for the

U.S. Treasury to ensure the smooth operation of its auctions."

3

Mean-

while, a network of specialist regulators separately monitors Treasuries

trading firms. The Fed and N.Y. Fed, as well as the

OCC and FDIC, super-

vise the banks that act as dealers; the SEC and FINRA regulate and monitor

nonbank securities firms; and the CFTC oversees derivatives that are
linked to Treasuries (such as Treasury futures). These complex, shared

jurisdictional boundaries reflect a simple design philosophy to harness the
existing network of agencies to oversee the Treasury market rather than
creating a specific, new regime for this purpose.1 1 4
Importantly, Treasuries trading has long lacked a systematic reporting
15
regime under any of these regulators for secondary market trades.1
Rather than requiring firms to submit standardized reports-as is
commonplace in equities and corporate bonds-the modern-day web of
hands-off Treasuries regulations largely left the matter for market par-

ticipants to organize among themselves. 1 6 While firms and trading platforms have long kept private records or provided private feeds of information, government regulators have avoided imposing systematic affirma-

tive reporting requirements.'

The consequences of this permissive

of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities Market Joint Report, supra note 103, app. at A-12 to
A-14 (outlining protocols for issuing Treasuries and enforcing auction rules).
112. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities Market Joint Report,
supra note 103, app. at A-14-A-15 nn.19-21.
113. See Treasury Debt Auctions and Buybacks as Fiscal Agent, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/treasury-debt-auctions-and-buybacks-as-fiscal-agent
[https://perma.cc/4LPK-QLB9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) ("In its capacity as fiscal agent
of the United States, the [N.Y. Fed] supports [the] Treasury's marketable securities
auctions ... [and] also executes buybacks of Treasury debt as directed by [the] Treasury.").
114. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities Market Joint Report, supra
note 103, app. at A-15 ("The GSA, rather than creating a separate agency to enforce the
new regulations, relied, for the most part, on the existing regulatory structure when
assigning oversight responsibility."). The agencies collaborate through the Inter-Agency
Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (IAWG), formed in 1992 in response to
bid-rigging scandals. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at
48-49.
115. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 9
(explaining fragmented secondary market regulation); Aguilar, supra note 10 (outlining
the secondary market's regulatory framework and noting the absence of a workable regime
for monitoring and data collection); see also infra note 253 and accompanying text (stating
that primary dealers must submit weekly reports to the N.Y. Fed about their positions).
116. See Aguilar, supra note 10 (recommending a number of areas for reform,
including enhancements to the ability of regulatory bodies to monitor and gather data); see
also SEC Large Trader Reporting, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-1 (2020) (requiring mandatory
reporting of equities trades by large traders).
117. See, e.g., BrokerTec Market Data and Analytics, CME Grp., https://www.cme
[https:/
group.com/trading/market-tech-and-data-services/brokertec/data-analytics.html
/perma.cc/5TQ4-V7XC] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (providing an example of private
recordkeeping by firms); see also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra
note 13, at 47-48 (describing the absence of reporting mechanisms and the unavailability
of systematic transaction and participant data).
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approach came into focus during the 2014 Flash Rally, when authorities
struggled to retrieve the data needed to piece together an account of what
118
In 2017 (later
happened when Treasury prices suddenly went haywire.
supplemented in 2019), regulators finally responded with the expansion
of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)-a reporting
framework for secondary market trades in bonds-by requiring FINRA
members to provide data to the agency and for the Fed to receive
19
reporting on behalf of the banks.1
Beyond historically spotty reporting requirements, a host of other
securities rules applies to Treasuries only with qualifications or
exemptions; out of the thousands of FINRA rules applicable to equity
2 0
broker-dealers, just forty-six apply to those active in Treasury markets.
Indeed, regulators themselves are uncertain about which rules do in fact
apply, as evidenced by the SEC tasking FINRA to conduct a review on
which FINRA rules apply or should apply to securities firms trading
Treasuries. 2 ' Given the absence of common understanding even among
regulators, it follows that rules that might be applicable to Treasury market
actors lack an effective enforcement backstop. Moreover, with fragmented
regulatory supervision and the historical dearth of mandatory trade

118. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 47-48
(assessing the landscape of available data after the Flash Rally and finding that "transaction
data is available only for a subset of trades and only to those trading on a specific platform
or venue"); Aguilar, supra note 10 (describing how, after the Flash Rally, regulators had to
"harvest [needed trade data] from individual market participants").
119. See The Fed, FINRA Negotiation Press Release, supra note 15 (detailing the thenproposed agreement under which the Fed would collect secondary market data on
Treasuries in partnership with FINRA); Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15 (detailing the
new FINRA rule increasing data transparency in secondary Treasury markets); Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., https://www.finra.
org/filing-reporting/trace [https://perma.cc/EYU4-W3HN] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021)
(summarizing certain mandatory reporting requirements for fixed income securities); see
also Doug Brain, Michiel De Pooter, Dobrislav Dobrev, MichaelJ. Fleming, PeterJohansson,
Collin Jones, Frank M. Keane, Michael Puglia, Liza Reiderman, Anthony P. Rodrigues & Or
Shachar, Unlocking the Treasury Market Through TRACE, Liberty St. Econ. (Sept. 28,
https://ibertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/09/unlocking-the-treasury2018),
market-through-trace.html [https://perma.cc/L7C7-8CLS] (noting the impact of data
reporting on more fully calibrating the composition of the Treasury market and trading
volumes).
120. Monahan, supra note 16.
121. See Luparello, FINRA Request Letter, supra note 17, at 2. For example, it is not
clear whether FINRA regulations like those prohibiting dealers from using client
information to trade ahead of them ("front running") have any bite in Treasury markets.
See McPartland, Intersection, supra note 27, at 9 ("There is no required trade reporting,
no required participant registrations, an exemption from the Volcker Rule, and no single
body that is responsible for ensuring the [Treasury] market remains controlled and
orderly."); FINRA, Rule 5320, supra note 17 (applying to equity securities).
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reporting, reliably detecting and punishing misbehavior has been costly at
best and practically unworkable at worst.

22

Finally, private Treasuries trading platforms face few legal fetters and,
unlike national exchanges, are not subject to a mandate to oversee and
regulate their respective markets." 3 Treasuries do not trade on national
stock exchanges like the NYSE; they trade on less formal platforms generally categorized as alternative trading systems (ATS).124 ATS are largely
subject to a fairly light-touch regulatory regime under the SEC, which only
requires them to provide disclosures about their governance and to

comply with standards attesting to operational resilience in their trading
infrastructure." 5 Crucially, however, ATS that deal only in Treasuries are
exempt from even these rules.1 This absence of meaningful regulation
for Treasuries trading platforms is striking given that trading activity is
mostly concentrated on just two dominant platforms. Equity ATS-which
are subject to reporting rules-intermediate only a fraction of overall equity trading volume in publicly listed stocks." 7 By contrast, the Treasuries

122. See Monahan, supra note 16 (noting that certain kinds of offenses require
regulators to obtain trading data in order for their misconduct to be noticed and punished).
Modern-day bid-rigging in Treasury auctions continues to be a problem, for example. See
Keri Geiger & Alexandra Scaggs, U.S. Probes Treasuries Niche that Investors Claim Is
Rigged by Big Banks, Bloomberg (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-11-09/u-s-probes-treasuries-niche-that-some-investors-claim-is-rigged (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on a DOJ suit against primary dealers alleging a
"two-pronged scheme" to maximize the spread between their cost of selling and buying
Treasury securities at auction).
123. See SEC, ATS/SCI Release, supra note 18 (proposing to amend various sections of
the SEC's Regulation ATS to remove the exemption for platforms that trade government
securities); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1) (2018)
(stipulating the responsibility of national securities exchanges to enforce all applicable rules
and standards against exchange users);YeshaYadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets,
104 Cornell L. Rev. 1799, 1831-36 (2019) [hereinafterYadav, Oversight Failure] (reviewing
Regulation ATS and its characteristics to highlight the regulatory responsibilities of national
equity exchanges relative to the less formal ATS and stressing the importance of private
oversight by exchanges).
124. See SEC, ATS/SCI Release, supra note 18.
125. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844,
70,847 (Dec. 22, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242 & 249) ("This regulatory
framework should encourage market innovation while ensuring basic investor
protections ... . In general, this approach gives securities markets a choice to register as
exchanges, or to register as broker-dealers and comply with Regulation ATS.").
126. SEC Requirements for Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(a) (2020).
127. Equity trading volume in public stocks is fragmented across fourteen national
exchanges and around thirty to forty ATS. See, e.g., Alternative Trading System ("ATS")
List, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm [https://perma.cc/G8CE-34W3] (last
modified Jan. 29, 2021); National Securities Exchanges, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html [https://perma.cc/TKS3-KHQ9] (last
modified Feb. 26, 2021); see also ATS Transparency Data Quarterly Statistics: 2020 3nd
Quarter Tier 1 NMS Stocks, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., https://www.finra.org/filing-report
ing/otc-transparency/ats-quarterly-statistics (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
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trading platform BrokerTec intermediates between 60% to 80% of all
interdealer Treasuries trading volume, with around 10% to 20% hosted by
the other venue, eSpeed.121 This leaves the Treasury market heavily
dependent on BrokerTec's functions in particular. In September 2020, the
SEC proposed bringing Treasury ATS into the formal regulatory regime
for ATS.1 29 While representing a step toward greater oversight, this move
would only ensure that Treasury platforms are required to comply with the
relatively light regulatory regime for ATS rather than the full rulebook

applicable to national exchanges, which mandates robust internal
monitoring."
II. STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN TREASURY MARKET DESIGN

Part I emphasizes the significance of Treasuries as a protective safe
asset for investors and institutions around the world and the fragmented
regulatory structure tasked with overseeing Treasury markets. This Part
elaborates on emerging risks in the Treasuries secondary markets
following dramatic technological transformations over the last decade.
Traditionally, Treasuries relied on primary dealers to maintain the

functioning of both the primary and secondary markets. 1 3 ' These firms
32
used telephones, faxes, and computer displays to intermediate trades.1
Since 2008, however, there has been a profound structural shift in how
Treasuries are bought and sold. Treasuries now trade using high-speed
algorithms deployed by expert securities firms that are smaller and much
less regulated than primary dealers.1 3' These new dynamics have
introduced important gains in market quality, but primary dealers now
find themselves competing with asymmetrically advantaged high-speed

visited Jan. 16, 2021) (compiling figures on the secondary trading volume on individual
equity ATS).
128. See Katie Kolchin, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, Electronic Trading Market
Structure Primer 36-39 (2019), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
SIFMA-Insights-Electronic-Trading-Market-Structure-Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2CTULE6].
129. SEC, ATS/SCI Release, supra note 18.
130. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2018) (setting out the
requirements for firms that become an exchange). Equities exchanges are governed by a
thick rulebook to ensure they maintain operational standards, impose entry restrictions for
traders, and allocate monitoring responsibilities over those that use the platform. See Yadav,
Oversight Failure, supra note 123, at 1818-27 (highlighting the importance of exchanges as
providers of private oversight and enforcers of securities regulation over traders and issuer
firms).
131. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 787.
132. See MichaelJ. Fleming, Bruce Mizrach & Giang Nguyen, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y.,
The Microstructure of a U.S. Treasury ECN: The BrokerTec Platform 5 (2017), https://www
.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr381.pdf [https://perma.
cc/XAE8-6JRV] [hereinafter Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report] ("Until 1999, nearly all trading in the [interdealer broker] market occurred over the phone via voice-assisted brokers.").
133. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 35-44
(reviewing high-speed electronic trading and the changes associated with its rise).
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As the balance of market power shifts from primary dealers to

specialized securities firms in the interdealer secondary market, these
changes call into question deeply embedded assumptions about the
incentives that historically encouraged traders to privately safeguard the
integrity of the Treasury market.
A.

Primary Dealers and Public-PrivateCooperation

Primary dealers have long played a critical role in maintaining the
operations of the Treasury market, as the Treasury relies on them to
35
facilitate successful offerings and keep the market working fluidly.1 As a
select group of banks and investment firms, primary dealers are in an

elevated position to surveil and safeguard Treasury market operations that
stand apart from other securities markets in its unusual structural design.
1. Issuing Treasuries. - Even though Treasury issues are open to a
broad swath of securities dealers, the twenty-four preselected primary
36
dealers are the main purchasers of Treasury debt.1 According to one
2007 study, primary dealers funded around 71% of all new issues using
137
Primary dealers are made
their own money and for their own accounts.
up of major international banks and investment firms that possess large
balance sheets and act as safe and reliable counterparties to the United

States. 138 In exchange for designation, they agree to "participate consist-

'

ently" in Treasury auctions by bidding for a pro rata share of new issues at
3
"reasonably competitive" prices.1 1 Importantly, they must purchase
40
Treasuries even if market environments appear unfavorable.1 Because of
these demands, only large and well-capitalized firms have historically
4
possessed the resources and experience to take on the commitment.'

134. See id. at 38-39 (describing this competition and noting that higher-speed traders
can "manage their price risk more dynamically").
135. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 787. See generally Kenneth D. Garbade, Fed.
Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., The Early Years of the Primary Dealer System (2016), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr777.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F2LM-3JYH] (providing an exhaustive history of the primary dealer system from the Great
Depression to the modern-day free market system of Treasuries trading).
136. N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22.
137. See Michael J. Fleming, Who Buys Treasury Securities at Auction?, 13 Current
Issues Econ. & Fin. 1, 3 (2007) (finding that primary dealers make up 70.9% of the bidder
category for Treasury securities sold to the public).
138. See N.Y. Fed, Counterparty Policy, supra note 107 (providing an overview of N.Y.
Fed requirements for counterparties); N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22.
139. N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22.
140. See id. ("Primary dealers are expected to participate in open market operations
consistently and competitively, in a variety of market environments, to support the
implementation of monetary policy.").
141. See id. (requiring non-state-chartered primary dealers to have "net regulatory
capital of at least $50 million"). In 2016, the N.Y. Fed made changes to the eligibility criteria
for primary dealers, cutting capital requirements for nonbank broker-dealers but raising
qualifying capital requirements for bank dealers in order to diversify the kinds of firms that
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Becoming a primary dealer has multiple advantages. Commentators
have stressed the positive impact of primary dealer designation on a firm's

reputation: As an institution chosen by the government owing to its
reliability and financial strength, firms that join the club can expect
improvements to their public perception. 42 One study observed that new
primary dealers enjoyed a noticeable boost to their stock price in the weeks
following designation. 4

2. Secondary Trading. - Primary dealers are also key participants in
the secondary market for Treasuries, which is divided into two main parts:
A market for customers buying or selling Treasuries (like a mutual fund)
from dealers, and an interdealer market where dealers transact with one

another to modulate their supplies of securities." Both markets operate
outside of traditional exchanges like the NYSE or Nasdaq." Instead, inter-

actions between a dealer and a customer, or between dealers, have historically been "over-the-counter" (OTC) trades utilizing telephones or elec-

tronic screens where dealers quoted prices to interested counterparties.1'
While the customer-dealer market continues to be

OTC, automation in

the interdealer market has more recently shifted most OTC trading activity
1 47
to largely unregulated electronic platforms.
The dominance of primary dealers in the auction process has
traditionally given them a prime position within the secondary market as
transmission channels for securities between the U.S. government and
investors. 148 As counterparties to the Treasury obligated to regularly

can become dealers. FAQs About the New York Fed's Counterparty Framework for Market
Operations, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets
[https://perma.cc/85
/counterparties/faq-counterparty-framework-for-market-operations
K3-V5S2]. Primary dealer applicants must now show that they actively participated in
Treasury trading for at least a year before applying. See Alexandra Scaggs, What is a Primary
Dealer? Updated, Fin. Times (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6b464965ed75-3850-b68b-1601f13f6a79 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
142. See, e.g., Min Zeng, Three Foreign Banks Interested in Becoming Primary Dealers,
Wall St. J. (Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487045865045
74654443053128538 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing reputational
rewards and other intangible benefits enjoyed by primary dealers).
143. See M. Carpinetti, The Impact of Becoming a Primary Dealer: A Cross-Country
Analysis 17 (Aug. 24, 2017), https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/38981 (M.Sc. thesis, Erasmus
University Rotterdam) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
144. Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 789-90.
145. Id. As a technical matter, Treasuries can be registered with the NYSE, although
secondary trading on the NYSE is limited. Id. at 789.
146. Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report, supra note 132, at 4.
147. See id. at 5-7 (describing the high-speed, electronic nature of the interdealer
market); McPartland, Intersection, supra note 27, at 3 (describing the RFQ system as
dominant in intermediating dealer-client Treasuries trades).
148. See McPartand, Intersection, supra note 27, at 6 (describing how primary dealers
represent a large part of the secondary market); Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, The
Microstructure of the U.S. Treasury Market 6 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper
No. 2007-052B, 2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1070226 (on file with the Columbia Law
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acquire ample reserves of securities, they are best placed to serve networks
of repeat customers around the world. Moreover, primary dealers must
actively participate in the interdealer space, mediating ebbs and flows of
inventory to meet investors' changing needs. 149 This centrality has also
made primary dealers well placed-and motivated-to exercise private
oversight, monitoring the market in order to surveil and discipline
themselves and others.15 ' Although the U.S. Treasury has expressly

disavowed any mandate on primary dealers to function as overseers, 151 it
does rely on primary dealers to assist in basic market surveillance. For
example, the N.Y. Fed tasks primary dealers with providing regular reports
on trading activity and trends, gaining industry-sourced intelligence from
those ideally situated to provide it.1 2 Because primary dealers are

dominant players in both the primary and secondary markets, they have
access to a global base of clients as well as important information on
government auctions and debt management plans.15 3 Thus, as a small

group of repeat players incentivized to preserve the value of their
privileged franchise, primary dealers should be in a prime position to
exercise informal peer discipline on market participants, thus reducing

the costs of self-regulation. Advantaged by experience and expertise,
primary dealers are also optimally positioned to recognize unusual or
troubling behaviors like predatory sales practices, the dumping of batches
of Treasuries (which could potentially presage a crisis), and manipulation.

In theory, then, as a small group of firms with economic and reputational skin in the game, primary dealers also have much to lose if the
Treasury market functions unreliably and should therefore be monitoring

Review) (showing, at least in 2005, an average daily trading volume for primary dealers of
$550 billion).
149. See Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report, supra note 132, at 5 ("The core of the
[primary dealer] market is the interdealer broker (IDB) market, which accounts for nearly
all interdealer trading."); Mizrach & Neely, supra note 148, at 6 (explaining that the N.Y.
Fed requires primary dealers to "participate meaningfully in both the Fed's open market
operations and Treasury auctions").
150. Cf. Yadav, Oversight Failure, supra note 123, at 1818 ("Given their role in bringing
traders together and with proximity to the information they generate, exchanges are ideally
placed to regulate, monitor, and discipline markets.").
151. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., 1992 Securities Market Joint Report, supra note
103, at 17-19 (describing the various ways in which primary dealers support the functioning
and monitoring of the Treasury market, but noting that the relationship between "the
Federal Reserve and the primary dealers is purely a business relationship and not a
regulatory one").
152. Id.
153. See Administration of Relationships with Primary Dealers, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y.
(Jan. 22, 1992), https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers policies_920122.html
[https://perma.cc/9NXU-2A9K] (noting the franchise value and prestige carried by the
primary dealer designation); Zeng, supra note 142 (outlining benefits conferred to firms
with primary dealer status).
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the market out of rational self-interest. 5 4 To be sure, tight-knit, cohesive,
and similarly situated control by privileged dealers invites the risk of
collusion, price-rigging, or a tolerance for risk-taking within the "in-

group.

'155

And primary dealers have, on a number of occasions, incurred

sanctions for attempting to manipulate the market in their favor.15 6 The
downside risk of suboptimal behavior notwithstanding, primary dealers
have a lot to lose if Treasury operations go awry-which ought to compel
them to practice self-discipline and voluntarily keep an eye on the market
for disruptive behaviors that raise the cost of doing business.
B.

The Special Role of the Secondary Market

Despite the unique position of primary dealers, Treasuries are no
different from any other kind of security in terms of market participants'
need for liquidity. 157 It is almost a mantra in finance theory that liquid
securities markets generate economic gains.1 58 If investors can transact

&

&

154. See Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report, supra note 132, at 4-7 (detailing the marketmaking system for Treasuries); Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Dealership Market:
Market-Making with Inventory, 8 J. Fin. Econ. 31, 50-51 (1980) [hereinafter Amihud
Mendelson, Inventory Market-Making] (describing, in a seminal article, the key mechanisms
of market-making and the tools used by dealers to manage inventory risk); Lawrence R.
Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with
Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14J. Fin. Econ. 71, 72 (1985) (detailing the adverse
selection problem of monopolist specialists and the risk of losses they face); Lawrence R.
Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist, 62 J. Bus.
211, 211-12 (1989) (explaining further the risk of adverse selection by monopolistic marketmakers like primary dealers). Primary dealers are expected to make markets, serving the
function of being readily available to trade with counterparties and supply market liquidity.
Glosten, supra, at 211-12; N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22. Market-makers are
ready to use their own money to buy and sell securities, charging a "bid-ask" spread between
what they charge sellers relative to how much they quote for the sale to buyers. Amihud
Mendelson, Inventory Market-Making, supra, at 31-32.
155. See, e.g., Geiger & Scaggs, supra note 122 (reporting on a DOJ inquiry and several
lawsuits filed in July of 2015 that alleged collusion by primary dealers to inflate prices, which
occurred until the "'conspiracy ultimately collapsed' around December 2012").
156. See Markham, supra note 8, at 192-96 (providing examples of instances in which
primary dealers were sanctioned, including the Mozer scheme, the Salomon Brothers
scandal, and the Steinhardt and Caxton Corp. settlements).
157. See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and
Funding Liquidity, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2201, 2228-29 (2009) (discussing the significance of
Treasury market liquidity for the repo market); Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the Brookings Institution: Structure and
Liquidity in Treasury Markets (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/powe1120150803a.htm [https://perma.cc/F86P-6FRJ].
158. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17
J. Fin. Econ. 223, 246 (1986) (showing that policies that increase liquidity also increase firm
value). It is also worth noting that "market liquidity" is a complex concept that may be
measured by multiple metrics such as bid-ask spread, depth of the market, or overall trading
volume. See David Goldreich, Bernd Hanke & Purnendu Nath, The Price of Future
Liquidity: Time-Varying Liquidity in the U.S. Treasury Market, 9 Rev. Fin. 1, 1 (2005)
(defining liquidity as "the ability to quickly and cheaply trade an asset at a fair price"); see
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easily to assume or offload risk, they not only gain privately but also create
59
positive aggregate effects through frequent and seamless interactions.
Government debtholders especially benefit from being able to quickly
trade their claims, particularly when facing a cash crunch and corresponding need to sell Treasuries.160 Economic crises have historically driven high
demand for liquidity: Buyers seek to shore up reserves while sellers attempt
to meet urgent cash needs.1 61 If Treasury markets do not permit easy trading, investors can be expected to discount the capital they put into the
62
A deficiency in
market ex ante, or refrain from entering it altogether.
Treasury market liquidity, and thus of the protective function of
Treasuries, ultimately hurts American taxpayers; the United States would
eventually have to raise more tax revenue to cover a higher interest debt
bill or reevaluate a more limited menu of policy options to reflect a sclerotic and more expensive government bond market.

Fortunately, Treasuries have historically traded in a deeply liquid
secondary market because investors are confident that they can enter and
63
exit both comfortably and predictably.1 Scholars note that certain kinds

of Treasuries have greater appeal to investors-and better liquidity-than
others.1 64 These more attractive securities have commanded a price
also Darrell Duffie, Special Repo Rates, 51 J. Fin. 493, 493, 517-18 (1996) (illustrating how
higher liquidity correlates with lower Treasury repo rates).
159. See Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation
and Implications-The 2020 Edition, at 15-16 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3550293 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (noting the
importance of liquidity in determining risk premia in equities).
160. See Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1 (describing how, in the initial panic
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, "companies, foreign central banks and investment
funds ... [sold] what is typically easiest to sell: Treasuries"). Investors also may not wish to
be locked into a multiyear commitment to hold Treasuries; some seek to change their
investment preference from a low-risk Treasury to a higher-risk corporate bond. Others will
want to buy Treasury debt. They may need to bolster their liquid capital reserves, rebalance
their portfolios into low-risk securities, or put their wealth into investments with regular cash
flows (such as in retirement planning).
161. See id. (describing liquidity flight during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic);
see also Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 1 (describing a similar flight during the 2008
Financial Crisis).
162. See Goldreich et al., supra note 158, at 28-30 (describing a market discount for
illiquidity).
163. See James Clark & Gabriel Mann, A Deeper Look at Liquidity Conditions in the
Treasury Market, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury: Treasury Notes (May 6, 2016), https://www.
treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/A-Deeper-Look-at-Liquidity-Conditions-in-the-TreasuryMarket.aspx [https://perma.cc/SZ5W-3MK3] ("The U.S. Treasury market is the deepest
and most liquid government securities market in the world."); see also Kevin McPartland,
Sizing and Segmenting Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market, Greenwich Assocs. (Dec. 12,
2017), https://www.greenwich.com/fixed-income-fx-cmds/sizing-and-segmenting-tradingus-treasury-market-0 [https://perma.cc/E94Z-2NQ7] [hereinafter McPartland, Sizing and
Segmenting] ("Close to a half trillion dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds trade every day. . .. ").
164. Treasuries are classified as either "on-the-run" or "off-the-run." On-the-run
Treasuries are brand-new issues of a Treasury bond (for example, a two-year bond).
Goldreich et al., supra note 158, at 3. Off-the-run Treasuries are bonds that remain
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premium, trading at higher prices 165 relative to those that investors regard
as lacking full tradability.1 66
Still, secondary liquidity poses distinct challenges for Treasuries
compared to other types of securities. Firms use them-or must use
them-as protection against risk, and the Treasury market functions as a
safe haven in crisis. 167 These distinctive features make it more complicated
for the market to maintain its liquidity and resilience for two main reasons:
(1) heavy one-sided demand following government news releases, and (2)
regulations requiring that certain firms hold Treasuries rather than sell

them when demand spikes, restricting supply.
To this first reason, Treasury markets can face heavy one-sided

demand following macroeconomic news releases because demand for
Treasuries may spike precisely when other markets are in crisis, thus
requiring liquidity in secondary markets to stay resilient under heavy stress.

Secondary market Treasury prices thus depend on regular public news
releases by the government.1" Nearly all types of Treasuries tend to
respond to these macroeconomic news releases, albeit at varying
intensities. 169 While the share prices of public companies depend on
economic events as well as firm-specific news, Treasuries react to episodic
outstanding but with a newer issue of Treasury bonds that carries the same maturity. Id. To
illustrate, if the U.S. Treasury issues two-year bonds on a monthly basis, then there will be
twenty-four outstanding issues of two-year bonds that are "off-the-run." Id. The newest issue
is called "on-the-run" and attracts the greatest investor interest and liquidity. Id. Off-the-run
issues become gradually less liquid the closer they get to being fully paid out. See id. at 9
("Bid-ask spreads continue to widen as the remaining life of the security shortens."). In
addition, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)-Treasury bonds that are indexed
to inflation-are relatively illiquid and trade at a discount relative to conventional Treasury
bonds. See Stefania D'Amico, Don H. Kim & Min Wei, Tips from TIPS: The Informational
Content of Treasury Inflation-Protected Security Prices, 53 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 395,
400 (2018).
165. Bond interest rates have an inverse relationship with prices in trading. Bonds with
higher interest rates (from relatively high-risk issuers) trade at lower prices; by contrast,
bonds with lower interest rates (from relatively low-risk issuers) trade at higher prices.
Understanding Bond Risk, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., https://www.finra.org/investors/learnto-invest/types-investments/bonds/understanding-bond-risk [https://perma.cc/AJD7-ZT6
V] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
166. See Goldreich et al., supra note 158, at 3 (showing lower valuations for illiquid
bonds); see also Jean-Sdbastien Fontaine & Rend Garcia, Bond Liquidity Premia, 25 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 1207, 1211 (2012) (showing that recent bond issues trade at a premium on
account of their heightened liquidity relative to older issues).
167. See The Specter of Default: How Safe Are U.S. Treasuries?, Knowledge@Wharton
(June 6, 2012), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-specter-of-default-howsafe-are-u-s-treasuries [https://perma.cc/AT5AY8T7] (explaining that Treasuries are the
"main tool banks use to manage liquidity").
168. See Pierluigi Balduzzi, Edwin J. Elton & T. Clifton Green, Economic News and
Bond Prices: Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market, 36J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 523, 52325 (2001) ("[P]ublic news explains a substantial fraction of price volatility in the aftermath
of announcements .... ").
169. See id. at 531 (finding that economic announcements generally had an increased
effect on prices for longer-term Treasuries compared to shorter-term Treasuries).
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releases of government data (for example, unemployment numbers)."0

Even prior to the advent of high-frequency trading markets, scholars have
shown that Treasury prices react most forcefully within one minute of a
scheduled news release. 1 It is therefore no surprise that algorithmic
Treasury markets react with much greater speed; according to one study,
72
traders are able to respond to new disclosures within 300 milliseconds.
Empirical studies prior to and following the arrival of HFT also confirm
the intuition that liquidity in Treasury markets comes under stress
following major macroeconomic data releases; trading volumes surge,
prices rise, and volatility increases as investors clamor to enter the market
all at once.17 3 Treasury markets thus bear enormous pressure to supply
liquidity in the period immediately following government disclosures.

To the second reason, the fact that Treasuries are relied on as
regulatory levers means that at least some supply is withheld from the
market because firms must hold them as part of their capital buffers
instead of trading.17 4 This reduces the number of trading counterparties
and potentially raises transaction costs if securities and cash become

170. See id. at 529-31.
171. See id. at 532-34.
172. See Martin Scholtus, Dick van Dijk & Bart Frijns, Speed, Algorithmic Trading, and
Market Quality Around Macroeconomic News Announcements, 38J. Banking & Fin. 89,8990 (2004) (showing that a delay of 300 milliseconds reduces returns by up to 1.95% per year
because fast traders are able to react to news within 5-150 milliseconds). See generally
Thierry Foucault, Johan Hombert & Ioanid Rolu, News Trading and Speed, 71 J. Fin. 335
(2016) (exploring the speed advantage of HFT markets).
173. See Michael J. Fleming & Eli M. Remolona, Price Formation and Liquidity in the
U.S. Treasury Market: The Response to Public Information, 54J. Fin. 1901, 1905-08 (1999)
[hereinafter Fleming & Remolona, Response to Public Information] (describing a two-stage
trading process following the release of announcements, culminating in a "surge" of trading
volume and price volatility); George J. Jiang, Ingrid Lo & Giorgio Valente, High-Frequency
Trading Around Macroeconomic News Announcements: Evidence from the U.S. Treasury
Market 2-4 (Bank Can., Working Paper No. 2014-56, 2014), https://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/123745/1/812711653.pdf [https://perma.cc/264D-G5U4] (noting that
high-frequency traders cause a surge of activity in Treasuries trading in the wake of
macroeconomic news announcements); AlbertJ. Menkveld, Asani Sarkar & Michel van der
Wel, The Informativeness of Customer Order Flow Following Macroeconomic
Announcements: Evidence from Treasury Futures Markets 4-6 (Nov. 2006), https://www.
bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/menveld3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW94DXDH] (unpublished manuscript) (observing correlated trading in Treasury futures).
174. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Liquidity Risk Management Standards, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 329.1-.50 (2020) (establishing minimum liquidity ratios); see also Ihrig et al., supra note
90, at 194 (explaining the ways that the liquidity coverage ratio affects banks' liquidity
management practices); Mark House, Tim Sablik & John R. Walter, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of
Richmond, Understanding the New Liquidity Coverage Ratio Requirements 4 (2016),
https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econo
mic_brief/2016/pdf/eb_16-01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (flagging that a
concern stemming from the liquidity coverage ratios is that "banks may not actually use any
of their mandated stock of liquidity during a crisis"). Private entities also require firms to
support their risk-taking by supplying Treasuries as collateral for their transactions. See
CME, TIPS/STRIPS, supra note 81; see also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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scarcer. 175 Conversely, when financial firms face a systemic crisis and must
sell Treasuries, their actions can pressurize markets as these important
investors liquidate their holdings. Quite apart from crises, the significance
of Treasuries for day-to-day regulatory risk management implies that the
market must be prepared to absorb orders of all sizes in ways that still leave

trading opportunities for other market participants.
C.

Automation, Competition, and Speed in Secondary Markets

The regulatory framework for Treasuries is premised on a market
17
structure that has remained fairly static since the 1980s. ' Yet over the last
decade, securities markets-including Treasuries-have transformed as
automation and algorithmic traders flourished, endowing markets with
speed, data intensity, and interconnectivity.1 77 While policymakers
overseeing other securities markets like equities have introduced rules to

175. See Ihrig et al., supra note 90, at 180-82 (describing the different tiers of securities
acceptable as collateral and the "haircut" applied to each based on perceived tradability).
For example, in September 2019, the rate of borrowing jumped suddenly from around 2%
to almost 10% in the short-term repo market, where financial firms lend each other cash in
return for Treasuries taken as collateral. See Liz McCormick & Alex Harris, The Repo
Market's a Mess. (What's the Repo Market?), Bloomberg (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-19/the-repo-market-s-a-mess-what-s-the-repo-mark
et-quicktake?sref=2qugYeNO (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Repo Rate Spike and
Federal Reserve Intervention, ESCP Fin. Soc'y (Feb. 21, 2020), https://financescp.net/2020
/02/21/repo-rate-spike-and-federal-reserve-intervention [https://perma.cc/2TNA-2AU6].
While commentators offered multiple explanations for the sudden lending halt, one
rationale suggested that large banks were holding onto their cash and Treasuries reserves
in an effort to maintain the strictest level of compliance with capital and liquidity reserve
requirements. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The September Repo Price Spike: Immediate and
Longer-Term Issues, Brookings (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
the-september-repo-price-spike-immediate-and-longer-term-issues [https://perma.cc/8KS7
-RF45].
Although the comparison from the repo market to secondary market trades in
Treasuries is not exact, this event highlights the potential for reserve requirements to impact
the availability of Treasuries and cash. See Joshua Younger, Ryan J. Lessing, Munier Salem
& Henry StJohn,J.P. Morgan, What Is Preventing the Banks from Policing the Repo Market?
2 (2019) (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (reporting on the ample cash held by banks
prior to the September 2019 repo crisis). See generally Pradeep Yadav & Yesha Yadav, The
Stability Illusion in Financial Regulation (Vand. Univ. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 20-46,
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3685404 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing
interactions between the Treasuries-backed repo market and the secondary market for
trading Treasuries).
176. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 785-91; see also Kenneth D. Garbade, The
Emergence of "Regular and Predictable" as a Treasury Debt Management Strategy, 13 Econ.
Pol'y Rev. 53, 56, 69 (2007) ("The emergence of regular and predictable sales of Treasury
notes and bonds reduced the element of surprise in Treasury offerings and allowed investors
to plan future commitments of funds with greater confidence.").
177. See Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial
Markets 7 (Nov. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/dera-wp-hft-synchronizes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NUT3-L3HG] (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the interconnection built
by HFT markets in modern markets).
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address some of the risks caused by this shift to HFT, Treasuries have
remained largely overlooked. 8 The investigation into the 2014 Flash

Rally, prepared by the Treasury, the Fed, N.Y. Fed, SEC, and CFTC
revealed that regulators were caught off-guard by the scale of high-speed
automation in Treasuries.179 The findings pointed to unexpected sources

of fragility created by this shift, such as abnormal automated trades as well
as rapid deterioration in the liquidity of a market that is supposed to
maintain its resiliency to such loss at all times. 180 A full discussion of the
implications of algorithmic trading writ large is outside the scope of this

Article, 181 but the brief observations that follow underscore the dramatic
nature of ongoing structural transformation in Treasuries trading and the
challenges posed for the traditional assumptions currently anchoring its

regulation.
1. Automation and Speed in Treasuries Trading. - While trading algorithms have been used in securities markets for decades, advances in communications technology, programming, artificial intelligence, and data
processing have enabled them to drive markets toward ever fuller degrees
of automation. 182 Trading algorithms are generally highly sophisticated
178. See, e.g., SEC Regulation SCI-Systems Compliance and Integrity, 17 C.F.R.

§§ 242.1000-.1007 (2020) (regulating the resiliency of equity trading platforms markets to
accommodate an automated market). Following the Flash Rally inquest in 2017, regulators
introduced fuller reporting of secondary market Treasury trades. See Aguilar, supra note 10
(outlining the need for regulatory reform to respond to the fragilities introduced by
automated, high-speed trading); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
179. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4-7, 1519, 32-33 (detailing strained liquidity conditions during the Flash Rally that were due in
part to the "growth of high-speed electronic trading," which contributed to a larger
presence of PTFs in Treasury markets); see also Aguilar, supra note 10 (explaining how
regulators could not access vital Treasury market information in the effort to understand
what happened during the Flash Rally).
180. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, app. C at
54-55.
181. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New
Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 Duke L.J. 191, 201-07 (2015) (categorizing the eight
most controversial HFT practices in the "new stock market," including HFT activities that
lead to "increased volatility and crashes"); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading
Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1607, 1622-25 (2015)
[hereinafter Yadav, Algorithmic Trading] (reviewing the costs and benefits of implementing
HFT and relevant strategies); SEC, Equity Market Structure Literature Review, Part II: High
Frequency Trading 5-7 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft-lit_
[hereinafter SEC, Literature
reviewmarch_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q9G-XK67]
Survey] (surveying literature that collectively illustrates the difficulty of precisely defining
"HFT"); SEC, Staff Report on Algorithmic Trading in U.S. Capital Markets 30-51 (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/AlgoTradingReport_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z2E-X5W
4] [hereinafter SEC, Algorithmic Study] ("Generally, studies on this type of algorithmic
trading indicate that some dimensions and activities can have positive effects on market
quality and efficiency, while others may impose costs on other market participants or pose
risks during periods of unusual market stress.").
182. See U.K. Gov't Off. for Sci., Foresight: The Future of Computer Trading in
Financial Markets: An International Perspective 30-50 (2012) https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
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and effective. They are trained to evaluate incoming news, price-related

information, data on economic trends, prevailing market sentiment (for
example, by scraping Twitter feeds), or behavioral cues (by observing how
others are trading) in order to respond nearly instantaneously by
83
submitting a series of orders for securities at a particular price.1 Over

time, programming advances, wide-ranging and novel data sources, and
increasingly complex artificial intelligence have produced modern-day
trading algorithms capable of transacting almost entirely independently in
real time.1 84 Based on their presequenced programming, algorithms send

out orders, receive confirmation about their success or failure, and react
85
automatically by learning from their real-world performance.1 These
algorithms have become ubiquitous in securities markets, displacing
86
human traders in trade-by-trade decisionmaking.1 Using HFT, securities
trades now turn over at speeds measured in milliseconds and microseconds, harness large quantities of data, and utilize complex financial
modeling.18 7 By some estimates, HFT is responsible for around 50% to 70%
of U.S. equity trading by volume, and as much as 80% in certain futures

markets.1 88

&

default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/tacfuturecomputertrading
1012.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3TX-Q5GW].
183. Id. at 32; see also Elaine Wah, Computational Models of Algorithmic Trading in
Financial Markets 15-25, 50-60 (2016) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan) (providing an insightful discussion of computational
modeling and analytical techniques underpinning algorithmic trading programming).
184. See Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market
Microstructure and High Frequency Trading, in High-Frequency Trading: New Realities for
Traders, Markets and Regulators 91, 96-104 (David Easley, Marcos L6pez de Prado
Maureen O'Hara eds., 2013); Wah, supra note 183, at 52 (explaining the details of HIF
trading); see also Michael P. Wellman & Uday Rajan, Ethical Issues for Autonomous Trading
Agents, 27 Minds & Machs. 609, 611-12 (2017) (noting the significance of high-speed,
nonhuman decisionmaking in stock markets, but emphasizing that algorithms are
programmed by humans with flaws).
185. See Kearns & Nevmyvaka, supra note 184, at 94-99 ("Typically [HFT activity is
driven by] ... microstructure data that details every order placed, every execution and every
cancellation, directly from the exchanges, and ... thus permits the faithful reconstruction
(at least for equities) of the full limit order book, both historically and in real time.").
186. See Wellman & Rajan, supra note 184, at 609-10 (outlining the likely
entrenchment of algorithms in financial markets).
187. There is no established definition of HIT in regulation. Rather, the SEC looks to
certain identifying features that are generally characteristic of and necessary for HFT:
securities turnover in milliseconds (or less), traders that locate their servers close to those
of exchanges, reliance on large volumes of data, and use of automated decisionmaking. See
SEC, Literature Survey, supra note 181, at 4-7.
188. Rena S. Miller & Gary Shorter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44443, High Frequency
Trading: Overview of Recent Developments 1-2 (2016) (observing that HFT-related trading
drives around 55% of volume in equities, 80% of volume in foreign-exchange-related
futures, and around 66% in interest rate and ten-year Treasury futures); see also Michael
Mackenzie, High Frequency Trading Dominates the Debate, Fin. Times (Oct. 20, 2009),
(on file with the
https://www.ft.com/content/fa347c26-bc41-1lde-9426-00144feab49a
Columbia Law Review) (noting that HFT equity volume had reached more than 70%).
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Automated traders do more than increase the pace of the market,
however. They help markets become more liquid because investors enjoy
ample trading opportunities and the ability to make trades without causing
abrupt price swings. 189 Given this heightened liquidity, HFT offers investors a continuous supply of willing counterparties that can trade with them
at low cost, keeping markets well-oiled and attractive. 190 Finance scholars
have underscored the positive impact of high-speed algorithms on both
liquidity and cost (by reducing the "spread" that investors must pay, in

some cases by as much as 50%).191
Additionally, algorithmic markets are much more informationally
efficient, at least in the short term. It is a basic tenet of the efficient capital
markets theory that markets work better when securities prices quickly
incorporate the measure of available public information. 192 In theory and

&

189. See, e.g., Jonathan Brogaard, Allen Carrion, Thibaut Moyaert, Andriy Shkilko
Konstantin Sokolov, High Frequency Trading and Extreme Price Movements, 128 J. Fin.
Econ. 253, 254 (2018) (arguing that HFT does not cause extreme price movements, but can
help in absorbing the impact of extreme price movements by supplying liquidity when
extreme events occur with reference to single stock); Jonathan Brogaard, Bjorn
Hagstromer, Lars Nord6n & Ryan Riordan, Trading Fast and Slow: Colocation and
Liquidity, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3407, 3410-15 (2015) (noting that increased speeds for marketmakers improves liquidity provision, applying to HFT as well as slower traders); Bruno Biais,
Fany Declerck & Sophie Moinas, Who Supplies Liquidity, How and When? 3-4 (Bank for
Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 563, 2016), https://www.bis.org/publ/work563.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P53S-8S6K] (noting that proprietary traders, including HFT, supply
liquidity to the market); Jonathan Brogaard, Konstantin Sokolov & Jiang Zhang, How Do
Extreme Price Movements End? 3-6 (Sept. 26, 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract=3700218
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (observing that liquidity
provision increases toward the end of an extreme price movement); see also SEC,
Algorithmic Study, supra note 181, at 44-47. But see AlbertJ. Menkveld & Maius A. Zoican,
Need for Speed? Exchange Latency and Liquidity, 30 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1188, 1193 (2017)
(arguing that HFT does not enhance liquidity).
190. See, e.g., Biais et al., supra note 189, at 12.
191. See, e.g., Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, HighFrequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2267, 2268-70 (2014)
[hereinafter Brogaard et al., Price Discovery]; AlbertJ. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading
and the New Market Makers, 16J. Fin. Mkts. 712, 714-16 (2013). But see X. Frank Zhang,
High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 2-3 (Dec. 2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished
manuscript) (arguing that HFT can increase volatility). On HFT market-making, see
discussion of the activity by one major HET firm, Virtu Financial, which operates as a marketmaker across multiple asset classes. Gregory Laughlin, Insights into High Frequency
Trading from the Virtu Initial Public Offering 2-4 (Univ. of Cal. Santa Cruz, Ctr. for
Analytical Fin., Working Paper No. 11, 2014), https://cafin.ucsc.edu/research/work_
papers/CAFINWP11 .pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
192. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 (1970) ("A market in which prices always 'fully reflect' available
information is called 'efficient.'"); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 549-60 (1984) (describing the process
by which the interaction of informed and other types of traders helps build efficient
markets). For a critical view, see Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 181, at 1611, 1633-
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in practice, then, it follows that HFT-capable of responding in millisec-

onds to large pools of data-should generate powerful informational efficiencies as prices adjust to emerging insights. Moreover, as high-speed
traders transact across multiple markets (for shares, derivatives, or
Treasuries), prices across all these different asset classes can synchronize. 193 Finance studies have empirically observed that these intuitions play
out in real-world trading: (1) Prices respond rapidly to vast quantities of
data; (2) these efficiencies extend across markets to minimize price

differences; and (3) securities prices across the board showcase short-term
194
informational efficiencies in response to these dynamics.
But HFT also carries risks. Algorithms inevitably misfire. "Fat-finger"

trades can cause automated programs to send out orders in error;
algorithms may trade on "fake news" or inaccurate information; they may
all respond in tandem to similar kinds of data, artificially amplifying price
swings; the programming may be ill-designed to handle overly complex
market environments; and algorithms can be biased, manipulative, and
predatory. 195 Importantly, the incremental costs of these errors can rapidly
compound as prices across the system incorporate these problems too
quickly for human traders to contain the damage. 96 Commentators have
pointed to more frequent instances of extreme price movements, sudden
flash events, and resulting volatility as becoming a characteristic trait of

37 (arguing that algorithms may simultaneously increase informational efficiency while also
creating greater costs in allocating capital productively).
193. Gerig, supra note 177, at 7.
194. See, e.g., Brogaard et al., Price Discovery, supra note 191, at 2269 (noting that HFT
traders tend to make markets very efficient in the short-term as HFT trades transact in the
direction of near-term price changes); Gerig, supra note 177, at 7 (highlighting the
interconnection between markets and the ability of HFT traders to foster this synchronicity);
see also SEC, Literature Survey, supra note 181, at 4-7 (compiling the considerable
literature on this subject); Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara
Vega, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, 69J. Fin.
2045, 2075 (2014) (noting high efficiencies in foreign exchange markets).
195. See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, Hackers Send Fake Market-Moving AP Tweet on White
House Explosions, Reuters (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usawhitehouse-ap/hackers-send-fake-market-moving-ap-tweet-on-white-house-explosions-idUS
BRE93M12Y20130423 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on how a "fake
news" tweet caused a rapid fall in the Dow Jones index and other indices); Alexandra
Stevenson, Knight Capital to Pay $12 Million Fine on Trading Violations, N.Y. Times:
Dealbook (Oct. 16, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/knight-capital-topay-12-million-fine-on-trading-violations (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting
the Knight Capital debacle, when a misfiring router caused the firm to lose around $450
million in forty-five minutes); see also Bruno Biais, Johan Hombert & Pierre-Olivier Weill,
Equilibrium Pricing and Trading Volume Under Preference Uncertainty, 81 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 1401, 1402-03 (2014) (noting the difficulties of algorithms to choose between
different possible trading pathways during complex trading conditions); Robert A. Jarrow
& Phillip Protter, A Dysfunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in Electronic Markets,
15 Int'lJ. Theoretical & Applied Fin. 1, 3-6 (2012) (arguing that high-frequency traders can
create a mispricing that they unknowingly exploit to the disadvantage of ordinary investors).
196. See Gerig, supra note 177, at 7.
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modern markets, necessitating regulatory and industry intervention to
manage these negative HFT externalities.197
In a short period of time, high-speed algorithms migrated from other

securities markets to become a mainstay in Treasuries.198 A market that
was, until recently, dependent on telephonic trades has transformed into
a near-fully automated marketplace.'` Interdealer Treasuries trading
occurs largely on two electronic platforms, BrokerTec and eSpeed, with
BrokerTec enjoying as much as 80% of trading volume in certain
Treasuries. 2 0 The interdealer market sees around $269 billion worth of
1
trading volume daily.20
As in equity markets, there are obvious efficiency advantages to this

development. One study found that HFT resulted in Treasury markets be202
coming more efficient when responding to new government disclosures.
Measuring reactions to macroeconomic reports, the study confirmed that
HFT traders are first to transact on the incoming data.203 As a result,

Treasury prices have also come to exhibit high efficiencies by rapidly
204
reflecting new information in just fractions of a second.
But as illustrated by the 2014 Flash Rally and other disruptions, there

are also dangers to HFT, the underlying dynamics of which are poorly
understood. For a start, the reporting regime for Treasuries trades is
relatively new, coming into force only in 2017.205 The lack of systematic

reporting over the years means that both regulators and the marketplace
197. See Bd. of the Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Mechanisms Used by Trading Venues
to Manage Extreme Volatility and Preserve Orderly Trading 8 (2018), https://www.iosco.org
/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD607.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVW6-YJXB]; see also SEC,
Algorithmic Study, supra note 181, at 60-68.
198. McPartland, Sizing and Segmenting, supra note 163, at 7; Joe Rennison, HighFrequency Traders: Bond Market Scourge or Saviour?, Fin. Times (Sept. 1, 2015), https://
www.ft.com/content/ab70bdf2-4507-11e5-b3b2-1672f710807b [hereinafter Rennison, HighFrequency Traders] (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Smith & Wigglesworth, supra
note 1; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
199. See Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report, supra note 132, at 5-6 (noting that nearly
all interdealer trading took place using telephones until 1999); Harkrader & Puglia, supra
note 15 (noting that 61% of trading volume in the interdealer market was driven by HFT).
200. See McPartland, Sizing and Segmenting, supra note 163, at 6-7.
201. Brain et al., supra note 119.
202. See Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 4-5 (noting, however, some negative effects on
liquidity as high-speed traders transact aggressively on new disclosures); see also supra notes
169-172 and accompanying text.
203. See Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 4-5.
204. Id. There is even some evidence that prices can drift in Treasury-related.assets even
before a macroeconomic news release, suggesting that some traders may be privately
informed of the news ahead of the release. See Alexander Kurov, Alessio Sancetta, Georg
Strasser & Marketa Halova Wolfe, Price Drift Before U.S. Macroeconomic News: Private
Information About Public Announcements?, 54J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 449, 455-56 (2018)
("[W]e replace every price at the release time of an announcement with the price that was
prevailing 5 seconds before the announcement release.").
205. Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15.
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lack a full accounting of the varied disruptions such as fat-finger trades,
mini-flash events, predatory behaviors, or misfiring algorithms that may

have impacted Treasuries trading. Further, the disruptions thus far
observed point to deep uncertainties about the risks posed by automated,
high-speed trading of Treasuries.
In the case of the Flash Rally, regulators' investigation revealed no
definitive causal trigger to explain why prices experienced a short, sharp,
and sudden upward flux, though the Joint Staff Report observed that
general market conditions had been strained and that global market risks
may have played a role.2 06 Several large transactions had taken place
following a release of retail sales data, reducing available liquidity. In the
event window, HFT and primary dealers markedly limited how fully they

were willing to continue trading and supplying trading opportunities to
the marketplace. 207 Abnormal "wash" trades appeared to arise where trad208
ers, especially HFTs, were simply transacting with themselves. Yet despite
these factors, the report could not point to a single cause explaining the
209
rapid deterioration in the market's functions.
A similar, albeit smaller-scale, episode occurred on June 7, 2018, when
Treasuries prices appeared to surge abnormally for a few minutes before
returning to normal.21 0 Commentators suggested possible turmoil in Brazil
21 1
And the
as a triggering factor but again drew no definitive conclusions.
leading interdealer Treasuries trading platform, BrokerTec, experienced
21 2
In this ina one-hour outage in 2019 for reasons that remain unclear.
stance, the damage to the market was limited, but regulators admitted that
it could have been far worse under different circumstances (for example,
if the surge had occurred during a different time in the trading day).213
Perhaps more fundamentally, some commentators question how valuable the theoretical gains in informational efficiency are in the broader
context of algorithmic markets. In high-speed trading, price efficiency
214
And whether algorithms
measures tend to be very short term in nature.
to deeply reflect the
expected
can
be
designed to transact in milliseconds

206. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4-6, 15-19.
207. Id. at 4-6.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Chappatta, supra note 42.
211. Id.
212. See Treasury Market Practices Group, N.Y. Fed, TMPG Meeting Minutes 1 (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/tmpg/files/Jan-2019-TMPGMeeting-Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ECU-USNU] [hereinafter TMPG, Jan. 2019
Meeting Minutes].
213. See id.; see also Yesha Yadav, Blueprint for Reforming Treasury Markets 4-5
(Vanderbilt L. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20-58, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739971
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Yadav, Blueprint].
214. See Brogaard et al., Price Discovery, supra note 191, at 2270 (measuring short-term
efficiency gains over increments ofjust a few seconds).
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meaning of macroeconomic disclosures is an open question. 21 5 Research
suggests that high-speed algorithms have greater facility in interpreting
hard data like numbers and statistics. 21 6 But interpreting qualitative
information can be fraught with difficulty, even for programs that exhibit
advanced machine learning and natural language processing abilities. 21 7

For example, such systems showed discrepancies in classifying qualitative
financial information, with most accuracy rates under 60%.218
This more fundamental limitation on algorithmic efficiency is especially relevant in the context of Treasuries. Macroeconomic reports revealing news about the health of the United States' economy tend to mark
moments of significant trading activity and are usually the major driver of
Treasuries price changes. 2 1 9 Where these market-moving disclosures take
the form of complex macroeconomic reports on matters like unemployment, inflation, retail reports, or the health of the country's agricultural
sector, it is to be expected that their qualitative content can hinder
algorithms designed to quickly process the simpler and "hardest" data

contained in the texts.220 Macroeconomic disclosures can be lengthy and
complicated; their drafting often entails use of footnotes, statistical

&

215. See Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 181, at 1644-55 (detailing the
challenges of achieving more fundamental allocative efficiency in automated markets).
216. See, e.g., Bastian von Beschwitz, Donald B. Keim & Massimo Massa, First to "Read"
the News: News Analytics and Algorithmic Trading, 10 Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 122, 123
(2020) (describing the reliance placed on sentiment coding by news analytics companies
that supply packages of coded news to HFT firms); Sean Cao, Wei Jiang, Baozhong Yang
Alan L. Zhang, How to Talk When a Machine Is Listening: Corporate Disclosure in the Age
of AI 2-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27950, 2021), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3683802 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing that trading algorithms
that use machine learning rely on rules-of-the-road in relation to how they code and process
words and phrases, leading corporate executives to adjust their disclosures to cater to these
algorithms); S. Sarah Zhang, Need for Speed: Hard Information Processing in a HighFrequency World 19 (Aug. 16, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1985951 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (finding empirically that "[i]nformation
processing speed matters especially for 'hard' quantitative information shocks and arbitrage
trading"); see also Robin Wigglesworth, Robo-Surveillance Shifts Tone of CEO Earnings
Calls, Fin. Times (Dec. 5, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ca086139-8af-4d36-a39d409339227832 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
217. Further, it is worth noting that the coding used by news analytics companies that
package news releases for algorithmic traders has a meaningful impact on prices, for
example, in relation to errors becoming incorporated into prices in the short-term even
though errors were corrected by the market. See Beschwitz et al., supra note 216, at 124-28.
218. Boming Huang, Yuxiang Huan, Li Da Xu, Lirong Zheng & Zhuo Zou, Automated
Trading Systems Statistical and Machine Learning Methods and Hardware Implementation:
A Survey, 13 Ent. Info. Sys. 132, 137 (2019).
219. Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 3-4; see also supra notes 169-173 and accompanying
text.

220. Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 3-4.
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assumptions, soft qualifiers, and explanatory text.22 1 Limitations in pro-

cessing such data can therefore lead to volatility. Moreover, unlike other
markets, inaccuracies or incompleteness in data processing can impact
trading and prices across the entire asset class of Treasuries rather than
just those of a single security (such as the price of Company X's shares) .222
To be clear, these risks are only hypothetical. The current literature

has focused largely on measuring the rapid, millisecond efficiencies to
macroeconomic news releases rather than parsing how fully algorithmic
actors can incorporate relevant insights into prices for the purpose of

Treasuries trading. 22 ' But they raise the question of just how beneficial
algorithmic trading has been for fundamental efficiency in Treasury mar-

kets, where-given its unique position-maintaining smooth operation
and resiliency around key announcements is critical to the overall health
of the financial system and the integrity of prices for financial assets
24
around the globe. 2
-

2. Competitionand a ChangingCast of Tradersin the InterdealerMarket.
A related critical transformation in the Treasury market also lies in the
changing cast of market actors and the introduction of a new kind of
trader: smaller, less regulated, nondealer securities firms that compete

with primary dealers in the interdealer market. 225 According to one leaked
BrokerTec report in 2015, primary dealers appear at the bottom of the
rankings of the most active participants, while HFTs comprised eight out
of the ten most active firms. 22 1 The top three-Jump Trading, Citadel
Securities, and Teza Technologies-intermediated around $4.2 trillion
22 7
dollars in Treasuries over two months.
These new entrants fit a different regulatory profile than traditional
ones in the interdealer market. Unlike primary dealers, HFT firms tend to
trade using their own capital. 228 In equity markets, HFT strategies hinge

221. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., News Release: The Employment
Situation-October 2018, at 1-3 (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives
/empsit-11022018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN7D-QLGRI.
222. Fleming & Remolona, Response to Public Information, supra note 173, at 1902.
223. See, e.g., Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 19-20.
224. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 1, 8-9
(identifying the Treasury market as critical in the global economy).
225. The issue of balancing competition against stability in Treasury market structure is
a critical issue for future exploration. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive
Government Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 119, 120
(2009) (describing the globalization of antitrust law, the process of creating public
restraints, and the negative impact of those restraints).
226. Smith, HFT Dominance, supra note 30 (reporting on a confidential list of the top
ten firms trading by volume on BrokerTec).
227. Id. (noting that the top three nonbank firms made up 51% of market share, but
also reporting that the interdealer broker ICAP, which then owned BrokerTec, disputed the
data as inflated).
228. See Eamon Javers, Why PTF Matters to HIT (No, Really!), CNBC (July 16, 2015),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/16/why-ptf-matters-to-hft-no-really.html [https://perma
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2
on using small amounts of capital to buy and sell through the day. " By
using their own funds rather than intermediating for clients, and not
seeking out the formal designation of primary dealers, HFT traders in the
230
Treasury market are generally subject to far lower regulatory burdens.
their
Most have avoided registration with FINRA altogether by structuring
businesses to fall outside of the regulatory definition of a Treasuries
broker-dealer. 23 1 This means that HFT firms that avoid holding themselves
out as FINRA-registered brokers or dealers are not subject to the 2017

TRACE

mandatory reporting

requirement. 232 Avoiding

registration

further exempts them from complying with other provisions commonly
applying to broker-dealers (such as capital requirements or anti-

.cc/C2XV-NE2F] (reporting on how regulators picked up the term Principal Trading Firms
(PTFs) to designate certain HFTs from the HFT industry itself because "the firms ... tend
to invest their own principal and not have clients as do traditional banks and hedge funds").
229. See Miller & Shorter, supra note 188, at 2 ("In general, the traders that employ
HFT strategies are attempting to earn small amounts of profit per trade."); see also U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 37-39.
230. To be clear, HFT firms in equity or derivative markets do not fall outside of the
regulatory perimeter. See, e.g., SEC Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with
Market Access, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2020). However, there is a disparity in regulatory
attention on HFT trading firms in those markets compared to Treasury markets, where
HFTs operate under a lighter regulatory regime than primary dealer firms because they can
avoid registration under FINRA rules. See Steven T. Mnuchin & Craig S. Phillips, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunities: Capital Markets
79-80 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/a-finan
cial-system-capital-markets-final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT86-TS8R] (recommending
"closing the gap in the granularity of PTF data" by requiring "trading platforms operated
by FINRA member broker-dealers that facilitate transactions in Treasury securities . .. to
identify customers in their reports of Treasury security transactions to TRACE"); Harkrader
& Puglia, supra note 15 ("PTFs ... were anonymous in the 'original' version of the TRACE
data ... [since] most do not meet the definition of 'dealer' as set in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. As such, PTFs were and still are not required to register with FINRA or report
their transactions to TRACE."). PTFs generally refer to HFT firms in Treasury markets. See
Javers, supra note 228.
231. See Mnuchin & Phillips, supra note 230, at 79-80 (noting that "the activity of
unregistered PTFs in the IDB market is captured by TRACE through the reports of these
interdealer brokers," but "the interdealer brokers do not identify the unregistered PTF
trade counterparts ... because the PTFs are not FINRA members"); see also U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 9-10 (discussing the multifarious
agencies that regulate the Treasury Market); Scaggs, Dealer-Trader Distinction, supra note
15 ("[HFTs] may be forming separate entities to trade Treasuries and claiming they fall into
the SEC's 'trader' category, dodging the [FINRA] registration requirement ... [which] may
also help them avoid the 'dealer' designation.").
232. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Regulatory Notice 16-39, Reporting Transactions in U.S.
Treasury Securities: SEC Approves Rule Change to Require Reporting of Transactions in
U.S. Treasury Securities to the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 2-3
(2016), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/noticedocfile_ref/Regulatory-Notice16-39.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH96-W5LC] [hereinafter FINRA TRACE Regulatory Notice
16-39] (providing notice of new 2017 rule requiring FINRA member firms to report
transactions in Treasury securities and acknowledging a continued gap in reporting for
institutions that regularly trade in Treasuries but are not FINRA members).
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intimidation and coordination rules).233 More broadly, by falling outside
of this regulatory oversight, most HFTs avoid coming under the direct
scrutiny of a major regulator, affording them arguably greater flexibility in

developing riskier trading strategies.
This relative asymmetry in compliance burdens faced by HFTs on the
one hand and primary dealers on the other imports a novel competitive
dynamic into Treasury markets. 23 4 HFT firms like Virtu Financial, Citadel,
or Jump Trading may not be commonly recognized, but they occupy a critical position in maintaining market function due to the variety and volume
of securities they transact daily. 235 Their broad presence throughout capital markets strengthens interconnections between different types of
securities and trading platforms: By linking markets together at ultra-high
speeds, HFTs fluidly connect the Treasury market to others, and vice

versa. 236

233. Elad L. Roisman, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at U.S. Treasury Market Conference
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-us-treasury-conference-202009-29 [https://perma.cc/CKB6-GPVZ] ("PTFs that are not SEC-registered dealers are not
necessarily subject to capital requirements and thus can trade intraday in amounts that
could significantly exceed the firm's capital."); see also Luparello, FINRA Request Letter,
supra note 17 (requesting that FINRA "undertake a comprehensive review of its rulebook
to identify existing FINRA rules that exclude or may otherwise not apply to U.S. Treasury
securities (or government securities more generally) ... and to assess the continuing validity
for such exclusions").
234. See infra section III.B.
235. See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and Its Impact on Market
Quality 64 (July 16, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript);
Kevin McPartland, What's Next for High Frequency Traders?, Greenwich Assocs.: Blog
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.greenwich.com/blog/what%E2%80%99s-next-high-frequen
[hereinafter McPartland, What's Next?]
cy-traders [https://perma.cc/WQM9-7H8N]
(arguing that HFTs "do in fact improve overall market liquidity-both directly via the
trading that they do (i.e. tightening spreads, offering firm pricing), but also indirectly by
fostering greater competition and technology innovation amongst all bank and non-bank
liquidity providers"). Indeed, HFT firms recently expanded their reach, with Jump Trading
entering into the customer-dealer space in addition to the interdealer market. See Joe
Rennison, Jump Trading Joins Challenge to Banks in Treasury Market Making, Fin. Times
(Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/8c8a39be-9990-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465
[hereinafter Rennison, Jump Trading] (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review); McPartland,
What's Next?, supra ("Jump Trading createdJump Liquidity, a strategy that trades both U.S.
Treasuries, FX and other asset classes on a name-disclosed basis with customers."). There
are also HIT collaborations. In 2016, for example, Virtu andJ.P. Morgan Chase announced
a strategic partnership, with Virtu providing technology to J.P. Morgan to trade in the
interdealer market, and J.P. Morgan returning a fixed payment and portion of the profits.
Nicole Bullock, High-Frequency Traders Adjust to Overcapacity and Leaner Times, Fin.
Times (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ca98bd2c-80c6-11e7-94e2-c5b903247a
fd (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Nicole Bullock & Joe Rennison, JPMorgan and
Virtu Financial in U.S. Treasuries Tie-Up, Fin. Times (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/04687116-5998-11e6-9f70-badealb336d4 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
236. See Gerig, supra note 177, at 1 (providing "evidence that HFT synchronizes
security prices in financial markets" by ensuring that "a price change in the first security
coincides nearly instantaneously with a similar price change in the second security").
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The success of HFT firms in Treasuries, therefore, marks the emergence of a new category of firm that is now dominant in this all-important
marketplace. 27 While these traders bring expertise and generate liquidity,

the success of HFT means competition for primary dealers and reduced
returns from their preeminent position throughout Treasury primary and
secondary markets. As the next Part details, this growing market influence
increases the challenges of motivating compliance and cooperation
between one set of highly regulated actors (primary dealers) and those
that face a far lower burden (HFTs).
III. FRAGILITY AND FAILURE IN TREASURY MARKET OVERSIGHT
This Part addresses the implications for Treasury markets under

conditions created by both a fragmented regulatory environment and
HFT domination. Because Treasury markets lack a meaningful and

effective oversight structure, regulators have been slow to even become
238
aware of the new reality of the risks HFT has imported into Treasuries.
These weaknesses leave regulators ill-equipped to impose well-crafted ex
ante constraints on risky market behavior, which in turn makes ad hoc and
ex post interventions-like broad, openhanded interventions by the Fed
with public money-inevitable. This regulatory gap has the additional
effect of making private firm risk-taking in Treasury markets cheaper than

in other spaces supported by a workable and diligent oversight structure
(like equities) .231 With interdealer competition, limited accountability,

and weak economic constraints tying them to Treasuries, traders may also
rationally exit the market during times of trouble or unpredictability.
Cheap exit by dealers drains the market of liquidity and leaves it vulnerable

to volatility and price instabilities, as seen during the COVID-19 market
"

panic. 2

This set of circumstances would be problematic for any market, but

for the global safe haven for financial stability, it constitutes an especially
pernicious systemic threat. From the standpoint of the domestic U.S.
economy alone, cracks in Treasuries' armor diminish the country's
unparalleled power to borrow expansively. 241 This Part therefore sets out

the deficiencies arising from fragmentation and limited attention to
adaptive rulemaking within public regulation and highlights the costs
resulting from a competitive trading structure for private self-regulation.

237. See Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15 ("[N]ew data .. . suggests that PTFs are
making inroads into parts of the Treasury cash market outside of their traditional
domain.").
238. See supra section I.B.
239. See supra section II.C.2.
240. See infra section III.C.
241. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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An Ineffective Model of Public Oversight

Unlike equities or derivatives markets overseen by an expert primary
regulator (the SEC and CFTC mainly, assisted by FINRA), Treasuries func-

tion under a looser framework of multiple regulators working together
24 2
In some ways, this fragmentation is
without any of them taking the lead.

advantageous: Collaborative oversight should be less costly than setting up

24
As Professors Freeman and Rossi
a new agency to regulate Treasuries.

observe, administrative agencies sharing regulatory burdens is nothing

244
By strategically
new; indeed, there are advantages to this arrangement.
harnessing expertise and varying sources of authority, shared oversight can

be better informed, tailored, and anchored by a bedrock of historical prac-

245
tice that makes agency action familiar to respectively regulated firms.
But as Freeman and Rossi also caution, "[I] nteragency coordination
2
Shared
is one of the central challenges of modern governance."
247
Fragmentation creates
oversight of Treasuries is emblematic of this.
institutional hurdles that hamper regulators' ability to develop an
248
Thus, the kind of
understanding of the risks facing Treasury markets.
decisionmaking needed to agree on these risks, how they might manifest,
and what to do about them-complex even for a single agency-takes on
added difficulty when multiple regulators must all come to agreement.
A first-order problem lies in agencies suffering difficult information

deficits that preclude them from developing a picture of the risks created
by the activities of firms within the Treasury marketplace. These arise on
account of (1) a longstanding lack of systematic and detailed reporting in
Treasuries trading, and (2) gaps in entity-based regulation that limit the
ability of agencies to extract information, through certification and
discipline, from firms active in Treasuries intermediation.
1. Limited HistoricalReporting. - A lack of a historical trade reporting
regime in the secondary market has left agencies without a bank of deep
institutional memory from which to derive insights about the risks created

242. See supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text (setting out the mandates of the
various regulators involved in overseeing Treasuries, their regulatory spheres, and the
aspects of the market they are tasked with overseeing).
243. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Government Securities Regulation Joint Study,
supra note 56, at 2-4.
244. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1140-43, 1146 (exploring the challenges
and mechanisms of agency coordination, highlighting the benefits and shortcomings of
shared regulation, and suggesting strategies for improved coordination).
245. See id.
246. Id. at 1134.
247. See id. at 1181-88 (arguing that while coordination may raise agency costs in
administrating decisionmaking, this is an "up-front investment" that can "produce savings
down the line").
248. See id. at 1150-51 (noting that following Flash Rally, the CFTC, which maintains
confidential Treasury futures transactions, "didn't initially have a legal agreement to share
it with" Treasury, the Fed, or the SEC).
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by Treasuries trading firms. 249 As noted, Treasuries only became subject to
mandatory TRACE reporting in 2017.250 Before 2017, reporting on
Treasuries trading was patchy and came from a mishmash of sources. For

example, firms reported only their large trading positions, 25 1 and primary
dealers provided weekly reports to the N.Y. Fed about their exposures just
to inform it about the state of the market, rather than to detect market
misbehavior. 25 2 Regulators were thus unavoidably dependent on infor253
mation warehoused by trading platforms to fill in some of the gaps.
With real-time trade-by-trade reporting implemented only in 2017and still excluding firms that are not FINRA-registered broker-dealers-

agencies have endemic deficits in historical data that impair a fulsome
understanding of how firms have traded in Treasuries, as well as the kinds
of risks generated by their behavior.25 4 Far from being obsolete, historical
reserves of information offer invaluable insights into critical present-day
questions, such as: Which firms have been the most active suppliers of

249. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 6-7
(describing how the 2014 Flash Rally underscored the inadequacy of the current system of
monitoring and surveillance of the Treasury market).
250. See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Relating to the
Reporting of Transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities to TRACE, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,167,
73,168-69 (Oct. 18, 2016).
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-5(f) (2018) (authorizing the Treasury Secretary to "adopt
rules to require specified persons . .. controlling large positions in to-be-issued or recently
issued Treasury securities to file such reports regarding such positions ... for the purpose
of monitoring the impact ... in the Treasury securities market .... "); U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury et al., Government Securities Regulation Joint Study, supra note 56, at 6-7.
252. See, e.g., N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22 ("Primary dealers are
required to provide data on their market activity. The New York Fed expects primary dealers
to submit accurate data, but it does not audit the data."); FR 2004: Government Securities
Dealers Reports, Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/
reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDZq2f74T6blcw== [https://perma.cc/C2TA-FH
FU] [hereinafter The Fed, Government Securities Dealer Reports] (last visited Feb. 24,
2021) (collecting reports that gather "information on market activity from primary dealers
in U.S. government securities").
253. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 15 (noting
that data supporting the report's findings had to be collated and pieced together from
major interdealer Treasuries trading platforms).
254. Granted, this gap has been remedied somewhat since 2019. Trading platforms like
BrokerTec are now required to identify traders in reports to regulators. See Fin. Indus. Reg.
Auth., Regulatory Notice 18-34, SEC Approves Amendment to Require Alternative Trading
Systems to Identify Non-FINRA Member Subscribers in TRACE Reports for U.S. Treasury
Securities 2 (2018), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice docfileref/Regula
tory-Notice-18-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CH6-NN2N]. Previously, an HFT may have only
been identified generically as "customer" in these reports, but now a platform has to provide
an actual identifier. Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15. While this is clearly an
improvement, however, the benefits of this more granular reporting are still questionable.
This design suggests that, rather than requiring an HFT to report directly and internalize a
reporting costs ex ante-thus motivating the trader to be careful in how it behaves-the
system looks to lagging, ex post reporting by a third-party platform to cover the gap.

FAILED REGULATION

2021]

1221

liquidity through the years? How committed are they as key providers of
liquidity? In other words, are they ready to buy and sell even during
periods of market stress-or do they simply exit en masse in times of
trouble? The Flash Rally revealed the costly effect of such information gaps

by catching regulators in a state of unpreparedness. 5

5

Indeed, the

implementation of the 2017 TRACE reporting regime has at least helped

regulators

begin

answering

such

fundamental

questions

more

systematically by unraveling insights about how the market divides
intermediation between primary dealers and HFIs as well as its
25 6
implications for market quality.
A lack of granular historical information also prevents regulators from
developing a thorough picture of the kinds of trading activities that may
be specifically harmful and disruptive in Treasuries intermediation. For
example, does sudden exit by certain liquidity providers result in
damaging price distortions-and if so, how costly can such damage be
when occurring in the premier risk-free security? Do traders engage in
activities designed to manipulate or bluff others, and what form does such
manipulation or bluffing take? Do customers receive best prices from the
dealers with which they transact for Treasuries or cash?
The Flash Rally made clear that Treasury markets are, at minimum,
vulnerable to some of these potentially manipulative practices. During the
event, an unusual amount of "self-trading" (or "wash trades"), representing around 14% of the market volume, occurred between Treasuries traders.257 Essentially, a number of automated traders were trading with themselves. 5 8 A recent study suggests that self-trading appears to be somewhat
pervasive to Treasuries, representing 5% of overall volume in the
interdealer market. 5 9 It is not clear why this should be the case, but one
implication of these self-trades is that markets convey a false impression of
2
liquidity due to the inflated trading volume generated by illusory trades. 0

255. See, e.g., Tracy & Ackerman, supra note 14 (reporting on how regulators were
caught by surprise at the level of automation in interdealer markets).
256. Brain et al., supra note 119; Monahan, supra note 16 (noting the importance of
TRACE reporting for revealing insights about Treasury market operations).
257. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 32-33;
see also Treasury Mkt. Practices Grp., Automated Trading in Treasury Markets 6 (2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/TMPG/medialibrary/microsites/tmpg/files/TPMGJune-20
15-Automated-Trading-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN32-RM3Z] ("'Wash trades'
are ... intentionally manipulative non-bona fide transactions that do not result in a change
in beneficial ownership of the security .... [Even] where trading is bona fide and not
designed to be disruptive, certain automated trading strategies could nevertheless create a
false or misleading impression of market liquidity.").
258. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 32-33.
259. See Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15 (finding that PTFs account for nearly all
self-trading in the interdealer market).
260. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 54 (noting
that automated trading provides traders with opportunities to create "false impressions of
market depth, trading volume, and prices").
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Without robust, systematic data on these kinds of historical and presentday firm activities, however, regulators lack effective means to gain perspective into disruptive practices in Treasuries and subsequent effects on

price integrity and trader behavior.
2. Limited Entity-Based Regulation. -

Information opacity arising from

the absence of historical trading data is compounded by the lack of a
certification regime for Treasuries traders. Conventionally, information
gaps can be mitigated by entity-based checks on who can enter the market
in the first place based on whether they possess the resources to

participate.

Although

gatekeeping

is detrimental

to

competition,

regulatory certification can still aid in safeguarding systemic stability and
reliability. 26 ' But Treasury markets lack a uniform and systematic public
certification regime for major traders and platforms, further contributing
to the costs of public oversight and regulatory action. As explained, a
number of major HFTs that trade in Treasuries expressly structure their
operations with the goal of escaping broker-dealer designation under
either FINRA or SEC oversight.26 2 The twenty-four primary dealers, of
course, do undergo certification to be eligible and must furnish various
disclosures to qualify; indeed, regulators have sought to tweak eligibility
conditions in a bid to encourage leading HFTs to consider applying for
primary dealer designation. 263 The fact that some of the most active HFT

firms in Treasuries trading have not been tempted to opt into primary
dealer certification, however, indicates that it is still too costly an
undertaking for such algorithmic firms. 264

This limited entity-based (or "firm-level") regulation of nonprimary
dealer traders hinders regulators' capacity to police firm behavior in real
time. Firms that avoid registration have every incentive to pursue privately
profitable yet risky trading strategies, while divergences in current

reporting rules mean that instances of bad behavior by nonreporters can
261. The literature on the relationship between certification and market stability is
extensive. See, e.g., Dean Corbae & Ross Levine, Competition, Stability, and Efficiency in
Financial Markets 2 (Aug. 10, 2018), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
corbae-levine-paper_0825.pdfmod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/YM6H-BSBS] (unpublished manuscript) (finding that there is a "competition-stability tradeoff: the removal
of regulatory impediments to competition increases the fragility of the banking system").
Of course, regulatory certification can also fail, as it did in the 2008 Financial Crisis. See
Sokol, supra note 225, at 120 (noting how the financial crisis "led countries to provide
various benefits to favored companies, which may distort competition").
262. See Scaggs, Dealer-Trader Distinction, supra note 15; Harkrader & Puglia, supra
note 15; see also supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
263. See Alexandra Scaggs &Joe Rennison, Citadel Looking into Becoming a Treasury
Primary Dealer, Fin. Times, (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4792e56-ab4b11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that the rule
changes "reduce the barriers to entry, in an effort to 'expand and diversify the pool of firms
eligible to apply for primary dealer status"'); see also N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra
note 22.
264. See Scaggs, Dealer-Trader Distinction, supra note 15 (detailing efforts by trading
firms to stay outside of FINRA's regulatory perimeter).
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be costly to track. 26 5 Because forcible exclusion from the market and other
serious penalties become less likely due to these costs, and reputational
harm through public disclosures is limited, punishment becomes too weak
a deterrent to dissuade traders from taking risks.
In fact, traders need not even anticipate large profits in order to

behave riskily, given these weak constraints and the low chance of
detection and punishment. Traders might send enormous volumes of

orders to platforms that stress their systems, fail to test algorithms before
use, crowd out or trick other traders through creative strategies, transact
on unreliable news sources, or engage in manipulative activities that hurt
price integrity. It is a decent bet that their bad actions will go unnoticed
and unpunished in a market where regulators are fragmented, poorly
coordinated, and lack fulsome information. A limited rulebook means
that disruptive conduct may not even be prohibited; for example, within
the body of the FINRA rules that do bite, there is some doubt as to whether
behaviors like frontrunning, intimidation, and coordination are even
applicable to Treasuries.2 "' Disciplinary actions are thus likely to be fewer,
reducing the ability of regulators to extract information from investigations and limiting litigation against misbehaving trading firms.
In addition to a lack of historical institutional memory, agencies are
also hobbled by barriers to pooling and sharing intelligence with one
another, diminishing regulators' understanding of how individually
collected insights form the bigger picture of market-wide trends and

practices. Treasuries regulators possess unique repositories of internal
data, but do not consolidate this information by releasing it publicly.
Under the 2017 TRACE reporting rules, member firms report secondary
267
market trades to FINRA, but this data is not disclosed to the public. Only
in March 2020 did FINRA begin to release weekly aggregate statistics of
secondary market activity-a far cry from the efforts the SEC has led in
equities markets to speed up and increase the detail in public
dissemination of real-time trading data. 268 Data from bank dealers,

265. See Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15.
266. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Regulatory Notice 18-05, FINRA Requests Comment on
the Application of Certain Rules to Government Securities and to Other Debt Securities
More Broadly (2018), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Regulatory-Notice-18-05.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3F9F-8KWQ].
267. See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Relating to the
Reporting of Transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities to TRACE, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,167, 73,167
(Oct. 18, 2016).
268. Now Available-Weekly Aggregated Reports and Statistics for U.S. Treasury
Securities, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth. (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/
trace/now-available-weekly-aggregated-reports-and-statistics-us-treasury [https://perma.cc/
63YT-9PHK] [hereinafter FINRA, Reports and Statistics for U.S. Treasury Securities]; see
also Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules to Modernize Key Market Infrastructure Responsible
for Collecting, Consolidating, and Disseminating Equity Market Data (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-311 [https://perma.cc/C7Q2-TQQY].
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meanwhile, is collected by the Fed and N.Y. Fed. 269 The Fed and FINRA
are currently exploring finalizing a pact to allow FINRA to collect data

submitted by banks, but this initiative still appears to be a work in progress
despite around three years of negotiation. 270 The lack of centralized

private reporting and pooling among regulators means that data collected
by various agencies has to be reconciled, standardized, and shared
systematically. This can add delays before each regulator gets to see the
information, and it raises the risk of data loss where such processes are
weakly set up and supervised. Beyond trading data, of course, regulators

each also possess institutional information on the firms that they supervise

'

(such as assessments and disciplinary actions, among others) and may
consider it useful to regularly share this intelligence with each other as
part of their collective oversight of Treasury markets. 27
Individual agencies, however, are also constrained by institutional
rules that prevent them from freely sharing data with other regulatory

bodies. The CFTC needed two months to conclude a legal agreement with
partner agencies to share confidential data from the futures market in the
Flash Rally investigation.2 72 The new 2017 TRACE reporting regime also

did not alter the GSA's allocation of regulatory responsibility assigning
each agency responsibility for policing its own regulated entities. 273
Individual regulators thus lack the institutional incentive-and possibly
the authority-to demand information from one another on private
entities that they do not directly oversee. Thus, even if one agency is willing

to take a lead in monitoring the market as a whole, it is unlikely to be able
to take direct action against those firms that do not fall under its
supervision, and it will incur costs just in exercising basic diligence due to
bureaucratic and legal roadblocks to sharing data and insights.
Thus, differentiated regulators obscure a systemwide understanding
of aggregate trends, practices, and risks created by the transforming
market structure. As Part II details, high-speed automated trading has
swiftly created new sources of market fragility. 274 Diverging spheres of

&

269. See N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22 ("Primary dealers are required to
provide data on their market activity. The New York Fed expects primary dealers to submit
accurate data, but it does not audit the data."); The Fed, Government Securities Dealer
Reports, supra note 253 (collecting reports that gather "information on market activity from
primary dealers in U.S. government securities").
270. After announcing a plan to negotiate in 2016, there does not appear to have been
an update with news of a successful collaboration between the Fed and FINRA since then.
See The Fed, FINRA Negotiation Press Release, supra note 15; see also Kate Davidson
Gabriel T. Rubin, Brainard: Fed Close to Finalizing Deal on Treasury Market Data
Collection, Wall St. J. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brainard-fed-close-tofinalizing-deal-on-treasury-market-data-collection-1543851220 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).

271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
See Tracy & Ackerman, supra note 14.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al.,Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 2, 9-10.
See supra section II.C.1.
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regulatory authority are a barrier to agency efforts to piece together the
systemic quality of the new risks that market transformations have
generated. For example, a large HFT securities firm that ranks as a major
trader in the interdealer space will either be overseen by the SEC and
275
FINRA as a broker-dealer or fall outside that definitional perimeter.
Either way, this makes it difficult for the Fed or N.Y. Fed, as expert
regulators of the financial system as a whole, to understand a given firm
and its trades, strategies, and impact on market quality. A large firm that
engages in wash trades, for instance, may be creating a false illusion of
276
Or an HFT not subject
liquidity that risks the price quality of Treasuries.
to the usual broker-dealer capital requirements may take risks and trade
277
Similarly, trading
in amounts exceeding the capital it actually holds.
platforms like BrokerTec and eSpeed nominally fall under the SEC's
278
Regulation ATS regime, albeit as exempt entities. At the same time, the
systemic importance of both platforms is undeniable: Were BrokerTec to
fail, the ripple effects on the financial system as a whole would likely be
grave. 27 1 Put simply, varying jurisdictional boundaries make it difficult to
assign the best-suited regulator to a particular entity.
This state of affairs is problematic. Transformations in Treasury
market structure demonstrate the importance of regulatory cooperation
in basic information gathering in order to understand the novel risks
280
The multiplicity of responsible
posed by high-speed automatic trading.
agencies, along with the light and largely unchanged present-day rulebook, signals that regulators have struggled to coordinate to develop a
responsive system of rules and constraints to address emerging risks. It also
suggests that regulators lack the necessary administrative motivation to
collectively deploy their individual stores of information and access to
281
The consequences of this
monitor new technologies and firms.
275. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 9-10;
Scaggs, Dealer-Trader Distinction, supra note 15; Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15.
276. Treasury Market Practices Group, Automated Trading in Treasury Markets 6
(2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/TMPG/medialibrary/microsites/tmpg/files/TPMGJune-2015-Automated-Trading-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/88GL-5EGS] ("'Wash
trades' are ... intentionally manipulative non-bona fide transactions that do not result in a
change in beneficial ownership of the security.... [Even] where trading is bona fide and
not designed to be disruptive, certain automated trading strategies could nevertheless create
a false or misleading impression of market liquidity.").
277. See Roisman, supra note 233.
278. See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
279. See TMPG, Jan. 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 212, at 1.
280. See Katy Burne, Concern About Trading of U.S. Treasurys Prompts Review by
Regulators, Wall St. J. (July 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/concerns-abouttrading-of-u-s-treasurys-prompts-review-by-regulators-1436729365 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Burne, Concern Prompts Review].
281. In the case of equities, for example, regulators have crafted a detailed process to
study and implement a host of rules to respond to vulnerabilities created by high-speed
automation and HFT firms. For rules governing direct market access to utilize HFT on
equity exchanges, including reasonable levels of checks and controls on automated traders
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fragmentation amplify the costs of action and the likelihood of regulatory
apathy or inertia. 282
Finally, these frictions in information gathering, sharing, and
aggregation cast doubt on regulators' ability to craft effective, responsive

rules and ex ante constraints on firm behavior. Because market risks are
imperfectly understood, regulators face high hurdles in determining how
best to construct legislation and enforcement priorities. For example,
regulators would need to consider how harmful a particular action might
be in the context of Treasuries trading. A single trader deciding to exit the

market might not be serious, but an entire group of traders doing so (as
they may well do automatically in high-speed markets) could rapidly drain
the market of much-needed liquidity.2 8 3 Another important issue for regulators is determining who bears responsibility for harm from disruptive
behaviors like wash trades or stuffing the market with orders without good
reason, and how does such conduct affect other traders (perhaps by
causing them to retreat)? What are the externalities transmitted into other

markets by this sort of behavior, such as those for Treasury futures? What
is the optimal regulatory constraint that reduces risk-taking while
preserving market-makers' willingness to provide ready liquidity-capital
requirements, stricter reporting, or punishment through high fines and
public sanction?
Answering such questions would be difficult for any single regulator

attempting to craft tailored rules to govern the complex Treasury market.
But they raise nearly impossible hurdles for a loosely organized and
uncoordinated group of agencies-burdened with varying institutional
mandates, turf conflicts, constraints on information sharing, and

enhanced internal negotiation costs-to develop rules and enforcement
priorities for a fast-moving, integrated, and interconnected marketplace.

The need to secure agreement between multiple regulators on
complicated matters of technological detail is likely to result in regulation
that addresses either only the most flagrant violations or concerns that are
uncontroversial and relatively minor. In the meantime, evolutions in

and their systems, see, for example, SEC Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers
with Market Access, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2020). Exchanges must also demonstrate
operational resilience. See Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act
Release No. 73639 (Nov. 19, 2014), 79 Fed. Reg. 72,252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 242 & 249). The CFTC also proposed amendments to its regulatory regime
governing electronic trading for derivatives. See Electronic Trading Risk Principles, 85 Fed.
Reg. 42,761, 42,766-69 (proposed July 15, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 38); see also
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Approves Two Final Rules
and Two Proposed Rules atJune 25 Open Meeting (June 25, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/8188-20 [https://perma.cc/LH9L-RLQA].
282. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1146, 1147-51 (detailing the costs of agency
fragmentation in fostering coordination costs, barriers to information sharing, and inaction
in areas ofjoint oversight).
283. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4-7; see
also supra section II.C.1.
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traders' behavior that are not captured by anemic reporting and
registration requirements could be proliferating risks to Treasury markets
in regulators' blind spots.
B.

Misaligned Incentivesfor PrivateSelf-Regulation

Private, industry-driven self-regulation also lacks effective incentives
to fill the gaps left by this fragmented public oversight regime.
Traditionally, primary dealers have offered some information about the
state of Treasuries and provided a degree of stability and continuity given
their economic skin in the game across Treasury markets as a whole. But
they have now seen their dominance erode dramatically in the interdealer
market, giving way to HFT firms subject to lighter regulatory requirements. 284 In the absence of robust regulatory oversight, private self-regulation in Treasuries to manage the externalities created by HFs is certainly
possible. As Professors Egorov and Harstad observe, private self-regulation
is likely to arise either in the absence of public regulation, especially to
respond to (customer) market demand, or to preempt oversight by a strict
regulator. 285 Of course, for Treasuries, the prospect of strict regulation is
not a relevant motivating factor given the hands-off, fragmented regulatory framework and the perception of Treasuries as ultrasafe investments.
But self-regulation could still theoretically develop to fill the gaps left in
public oversight, especially in light of its potential benefits to investors and
the market. Major Treasuries traders might come together-primary
dealers and HFs alike-to develop standards and rules to monitor themselves, ensuring that bad behavior is kept in check through private discipline. Yet, as this section argues, the current design of Treasury market
structure negates the incentives of primary dealers and HFTs to cooperate
in delivering both private oversight and self-discipline.
On paper, the self-interest of primary dealers ought to create a
powerful motive for them to use their resources to exercise self-discipline
and take losses to fight off episodic crises.28 6 As section II.A describes,
primary dealers derive profits from each part of the market (primary and
secondary) as well as a reputational halo from their efforts. They have,
therefore, had a great deal to lose-not only the profits from their
28 7
Treasuries franchise but also their standing with regulators and clients.
Perhaps understanding the compelling incentives created by the privilege
of primary dealer status, regulators imposed no affirmative obligations on
284. See Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15.
285. See Egorov & Harstad, supra note 34, at 1652-57.
286. See Marco Arnone & Piero Ugolini, IMF, Primary Dealers in Government
7
7
Securities 19 (2005), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF058/05414-9 81589063 92/
[https://
05414-9781589063792/Other formats/SourcePDF/05414-9781451980325.pdf
perma.cc/R5PM-99BC] (noting that countries with primary dealer systems may "establish
privileges for the primary dealers, not only as a reward for their function, but also to
motivate primary dealers to perform their functions efficiently and in a cost-effective way").
287. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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primary dealers to either monitor the market or to keep trading and

maintain the market's resiliency in case of crisis. 288
And, as a fairly homogenous cohort of international banks and
investment firms, primary dealers are well-situated to police themselves in
Treasuries. 289 Owing to repeat interactions within a small, similar, and
closed group, firms should have a store of information on each other and
have an incentive to conduct peer-to-peer surveillance. Punishment can be
meted out by way of reputational sanction or threats of exclusion from the
club. 2 0 Although there are obvious downsides to primary dealer monopolization (such as the potential for collusion), this collective economic stake

theoretically promotes good behavior and a shared interest in the market's
success.
The interaction of once-dominant primary dealers with nowdominant HFT traders in the interdealer market, however, distorts these
cooperative incentives. For a start, the likely returns from the franchise are
diminished for primary dealers; primary dealers remain major buyers at
debt auctions and in the dealer-client market for now, but they have lost
significant turf to HFTs in the interdealer market. 291 Even in auctions and
the dealer-client market, primary dealers have seen their costs mount with
high government debt issuance and uncertain client demand.29 2 HFTs
have also begun to nudge into the dealer-client space.2 3
This means that rather than competing within a tight-knit group of
similarly advantaged peers, primary dealers are now competing with
nimble, market-dominant experts that can afford to deploy aggressive
trading strategies with little fear of discovery or sanction by regulators. 294
288. Alexandra Scaggs, Opinion, Please Let's Stop Saying U.S. Primary Dealers Are
Required to Make Markets (Updated), Fin. Times (June 17, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/b6c87af-6d50-3f46-b27a-5ecc83d12dc5 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
289. See Dupont & Sack, supra note 21, at 787-89 (noting the historical reliance on
major banks as primary dealers); see also N.Y. Fed, Primary Dealer List, supra note 22.
290. See, e.g., Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Repeated Play, Cooperation and
Coordination: An Experimental Study, 61 Rev. Econ. Stud. 545, 564 (1994) ("Repetition
leads to more cooperative behaviour ... and improves efficiency, and better monitoring has
a similar effect.").
291. Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15 (explaining HFT dominance in the interdealer
market).
292. Rennison, Jump Trading, supra note 235; Colby Smith, Huge U.S. Bond Issuance
May Compel Fed to Alter Purchase Plans, Fin. Times (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.ft.com/
content/c1d0847f-1f9a-4304-8413-5d64501c2ef4 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Smith, Huge U.S. Bond Issuance] (describing the complex auctions arising out
of the large volume of government debt issuance and uncertain client demand).
293. See Jim Greco, The Final Nail in the Coffin, Trading Places (May 15, 2018),
https://tradingplacesnewsletter.com/the-final-nail-in-the-coffin-ad2e9e826499 [https://pe
rma.cc/S3ZJ-BA4Q] (tracing the history of dealers' waning influence on the U.S.
government debt market and how BrokerTec and eSpeed first permitted HFTs onto their
platforms in the early 2000s "to supercharge liquidity in the hopes of gaining an edge in
market share"); see also Rennison, Jump Trading, supra note 235.
294. See supra notes 289-293 and accompanying text.
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This dynamic suggests that cooperation between primary dealers and
HFTs is neither likely nor feasible. A diminished franchise means that

primary dealers have much less to lose if they choose to pursue risk-so
when crisis strikes, rather than spend scarce capital to weather volatility

and take losses, it makes more sense to save themselves. Indeed, during
the Flash Rally, bank dealers reduced their trading much more sharply
295
relative to HFTs that continued trading, albeit posting far fewer orders.
Similarly, the collapse in the Treasury market during the COVID-19 crisis
6
saw a rapid exit by all major dealers, but HFTs exited especially sharply."
HFT traders also lack formal constraints bonding them to the market
and have limited institutional capacity to engage in monitoring, self297
disciplining, and liquidity protection. They are also less resilient market
participants, tending to run a lean operation using small amounts of their
298
Margins on individual trades
own capital to transact through the day.
are small, and the business model depends on continuous and
incremental gains on trades.' Unlike primary dealers, then, this leaves
little room for HFTs to invest in the apparatus of active market policing. It
also means that HFTs are likely to be especially sensitive to losses-and
thus, have limited tolerance to remain in the market during a crisis.
This sensitivity to losses and compulsion to exit trading is especially
powerful in the specific context of Treasury markets. 300 As an asset class,
Treasuries primarily respond to public information relating to the risk of
a single issuer: the U.S. economy. This is a unique market feature com3 01 If the stock price of
pared to equities, corporate bonds, or derivatives.
Company X experiences a volatile period, algorithmic traders might withdraw from dealing in its securities for a time, but they can still continue
trading shares of Companies Y and Z. But HFT traders possess fewer
3 02
options to diversify their operations within the Treasury market itself.

295. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4-6.
296. Joshua Younger, Revisiting the Ides of March, Part I: A Thousand Year Flood,
Council on Foreign Rels.: Follow the Money (July 20, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/blog/
revisiting-ides-march-part-i-thousand-year-flood [https://perma.cc/3QA6-WERN]; see also
infra section III.C.
297. As noted above, primary dealers are not subject to affirmative obligations to remain
trading on the market, and neither are HFTs, which are subject to a lower regulatory
burden. See Younger, supra note 296; see also supra section II.B.
298. See Younger, supra note 296.
299. See Miller & Shorter, supra note 188, at 2.
300. See supra section II.C.1.
301. Haitao Li, Junbo Wang, Chunchi Wu & Yan He, Are Liquidity and Information
Risks Priced in the Treasury Bond Market?, 64 J. Fin. 467, 469-70 (2009) (stating that
Treasuries are mainly affected by public information, though investors can hold private
interpretations, while information about stocks varies in accordance with firms' private
information).
302. This picture is complicated; some maturities of Treasuries are more heavily traded
than others, and different maturities are impacted by information with varying intensity. See
Fleming et al., BrokerTec Report, supra note 132, at 1-4.
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From this perspective, HFTs have every incentive to build algorithms that
retreat as soon as conditions seem stressed, as the risk of staying can expose
firms to extensive liability across an entire market. Despite the obvious

growth in trading volume since the arrival of high-speed trading in
Treasuries, policymakers have groused about the reliability of this liquidity
in times of market stress.3 In other words, the perception of liquidity may
turn out to be illusoryjust when liquidity is needed the most. 4

Expecting cooperation between HFTs and primary dealers under
these conditions is therefore impractical when the market is home to a

heterogeneous group, and any group member is free to exit the moment
the market appears even slightly inhospitable. When exit is easy and limited regulation and monitoring reduces detection for individual firms, the

gains from private cooperation have to be sufficiently large tojustify giving
up profitable opportunities. But for the lesser-regulated firms, imposing a
heavy dose of self-discipline at the cost of their competitive edge is simply
irrational. Even for primary dealers, taking periodic risks makes up for
losing competitive power to HFTs and internalizing asymmetrical
regulatory burdens.
C.

COVID-19 and Revealed Fragility in Treasury Market Structure

Post-Flash Rally, the real-world effects of these transformations in
Treasury market structure came into brutal view during the initial days of
the COVID-19 pandemic. Treasury market disruptions of this kind are
alarming for two reasons: (1) Treasury markets constitute the recognized
systemic bulwark against risk and uncertainty, designed to provide a safe
haven in turbulent times; and (2) their workings interconnect deeply with
other markets like those for equities, bonds, and derivatives.3 0 5 Highprofile breakdowns in Treasuries like the March 2020 incident suggest
underlying structural fragilities and, most importantly, expose the reality
that current Treasuries traders possess few private incentives to remain in
the market during a crisis.

In March 2020, Treasury market trading conditions deteriorated
sharply in response to growing panic about the impact of COVID-19 on
the U.S. economy. Since late February, stock markets had been wrenched
from a high-flying decade toward a rapid cratering, with the S&P 500 index
losing almost 30% of its value in just twenty-two trading days-the quickest

303. Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 5 (noting an "illusion of liquidity" in Treasury
markets); see also Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4 (detailing the diminished liquidity in
Treasuries during and following the March 2020 COVID-19 crisis).
304. See Katy Burne, The New Bond Market: Algorithms Trumps Humans, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-bond-market-algorithms-trump-hu
mans-1443051304 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (reporting on concern about bond
market liquidity among regulators in 2015 when the Fed signaled its intention to raise
interest rates).
305. See supra section I.A.
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on record.306 With extreme uncertainty about the impact of the pandemic

pervasive across equities and corporate bonds, investors sought out
Treasuries as the go-to recourse for cash and fail-safe, liquid securities.
Analysts observed that the month of March saw Treasuries experience

various glitches, in part related to the large-scale shift of traders away from
their offices to working from home in lockdown. 307 Reflecting the impact
of remote work on how analog traders engaged and communicated with

one another, transaction costs rose and the number of orders being posted
started to decline.308
Then on March 12, 2020, Treasury market function in the dealerclient and interdealer markets came close to collapse. The period was
characterized by heavy investor demand to sell Treasuries and realize
cash. 309 From the standpoint of panicking investors, evidence of market
failure came in two main forms. First, they could not find dealers to trade
with them.3 10 In the dealer-to-client market, the normal system for dealers
posting available prices lurched toward extreme disruption. 31 ' Prices
sometimes failed to appear on screens.31 2 Second, when investors did

manage to see prices, they encountered sky-high quotes for otherwise
normal trades that would ordinarily have been much cheaper.3 1 3 As
liquidity drained out of the market, prices became highly volatile, further

306. Eva Su, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46424, Capital Markets Volatility and COVID-19:
Background and Policy Responses 5-6 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R46424 [https://perma.cc/M36N-N8Z6].
307. Samson et al., supra note 2.
308. Id.
309. Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1. There is some evidence that hedge funds
engaging in the Treasuries bond-basis trade, a trade that exploits minute differences in price
between the price of a Treasury and that of a Treasury future, contributed to the Treasuries
sell-off. See Annette VissingJorgensen, Bond Markets in Spring 2020 and the Response of
the Federal Reserve 26 (Jan. 7, 2021), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vissing/vissing_
jorgensen _bonds2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K2D-BD9H] (unpublished manuscript);
Adam Tooze, What Happened in the U.S. Treasury Market in March 2020?, Chartbook
(Nov. 28, 2020), https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-newsletter-5 [https://per
ma.cc/4SX8-GZJ8]. The Fed's official account, however, hedges against this interpretation.
See Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Financial Stability Report 34-35 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.
gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf [https://perma.cc/53HM-U
99A] ("[T]he reduction in hedge fund Treasury positions may have contributed notably to
Treasury market volatility in mid-March amid a massive repositioning by a wide range of
investors. However, so far, the evidence that large-scale deleveraging of hedge fund Treasury
positions was the primary driver of the turmoil remains weak.").
310. Lorie K. Logan, Treasury Market Liquidity and Early Lessons from the Pandemic
Shock (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/log201
023 [https://perma.cc/9MF8-96SZ] (detailing the enormous volume of sell orders and
dealers' difficulties in trying absorb the order flow).
311. Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1; Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4.
312. Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1.
313. Id.; Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4.
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fueling the feedback loop toward dealers simply stepping back from
314
trading with investors.
Trading was also deeply disrupted in the interdealer market, as
evidenced by a rapid decline in liquidity as well as a sudden increase in
costs as liquidity providers stepped away.31 5 Rather than traders

transaction
staying in and supplying continuous trading opportunities to one another,
traders disengaged quickly as conditions became choppy, and the
interdealer markets predictably saw a sharp and lasting decline in their
quality. 316 HEFT activity in the interdealer market had been up to as much
as 76% of the trading volume in the two months prior to March 12.317 But
318
HFTs withdrew dramatically as conditions turned sour. Given the heavy
dependence on their provision of ready liquidity, this retreat spelled
319
For example, the costs of
immediate doom, triggering price instability.
a thirty-year Treasury bond spiked by almost 50%.s20
In addition to the apparently weak constraints binding Treasuries
traders to the market in the midst of a crisis, highly automated trading

systems simply struggled to cope with the extreme trading conditions.3 21
314. See Cheng et al., supra note 1; see also Smith & Wigglesworth, supra note 1;
Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4.
315. See Henry St. John, Joshua Younger & Sejal Aggarwal, J.P. Morgan, The Life
Aquatic: Deeper Depth in the Treasury Market Microstructure 2 (2020) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("[HFTs'] rapid withdrawal from market making contributed
significantly to the spike in volatility during March, including some evidence of short-lived
but violent price action evoking the events of October 15, 2014."); Smith & Wigglesworth,
supra note 1; Younger, supra note 296.
316. St. John et al., supra note 315, at 1, 5; Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4; Younger,
supra note 296.
317. St. John et al., supra note 315, at 2.
318. BlackRock, Lessons from COVID-19: Market Structure Underlies Interconnectedness of the Financial Market Ecosystem 8-9 (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-lessons-from-covid-19-market-structure-november-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2HC-EDQJI] (noting that PTFs pulled back from market-making in
Treasuries in response to deteriorating conditions); see also Younger, supra note 296.
319. St. John et al., supra note 315, at 2-3; Fleming & Ruela, supra note 4.
320. Liz McCormick & Alyce Andres, Treasuries Liquidity Drying Up Puts $50 Trillion
in Question, Bloomberg (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020
(on file
-03-11/-50-trillion-in-question-after-u-s-treasury-liquidity-dries-up?sref=2qugYeNO
with the Columbia Law Review).
321. Dhara Ranasinghe & Saikat Chatterjee, Pandemic Propels Old-School Bond
Traders Towards an Electronic Future, Reuters (June 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-health-coronavirus-bond-trading-insig/pandemic-propels-old-school-bond-trader
s-towards-an-electronic-future-idUSKBN23TOMP (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that, despite increased use of electronic systems during the COVID-19 crisis, a
number of traders sought to use personal interactions to deal with heightened volatility).
Algorithms generally encounter challenges when navigating complex and stressed
scenarios. See Jonathan Brogaard, Matthew C. Ringgenberg & Dominik R6sch, Does Floor
Trading Matter 5-6 (Jan. 25, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3609007 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that since market quality is
lower when complexity is high, floor traders become more important when the price process
is more complex); Vikas Raman, Michel A. Robe & Pradeep K. Yadav, Man v. Machine:
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With HFT firms being, by definition, automated in their operations, the
inability to rely on their programs to maneuver through the costly volatility
322
These disruptions are
likely contributed to their sharp and rapid exit.

not surprising in light of the unprepared and ill-equipped system of public
323
Despite the
and private oversight currently tasked to oversee Treasuries.
warning shot fired by the Flash Rally years earlier, the impact of
transformations in technology and dealer firms has gone largely
unaddressed. Burdened by fragmentation and constrained information
sharing, public regulators failed to take the opportunity to develop a
workable disaster plan that might have insulated Treasury markets from
324
such unexpected shocks.
Given that Treasuries effectively constitute a kind of disaster insurance for investors, this preventative regulatory neglect is striking. Early
warning signals-rising transaction costs and decreasing market depth, for

example-might have triggered a cooperative effort between the major
Treasuries regulators to share surveillance and plan for the potential that
Treasuries might buckle under the weight of extreme volatility. Limited
coordination and clogged information highways between agencies likely
also acted as a brake on developing a map of interconnections between
Treasuries and other markets, and vice versa.
After all, as studies from regulators and industry experts into the
March 2020 crisis emerge, one of the key potential accelerants of the
collapse might have been trades that exploit differences between the
prices of Treasuries and those for Treasuries futures (derivatives written
on the value of Treasuries) .325 As markets grew turbulent, dislocations in
the costs of trading Treasuries futures caused investors-notably,
leveraged hedge funds-to rapidly unwind their positions and sell
326
Without a
Treasuries, putting pressure on secondary market liquidity.

preexisting means of engaging in monitoring, communication, and
information sharing, regulators were caught off-guard by this channel for

Liquidity Provision and Market Fragility 2-4 (2015), https://ifrogs.org/PDF/CONF_2015/
("[A]lgorithms preRamann_Robe_Yadav_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/28KE-Q3LT]
programmed ex ante cannot deal with the complexity of turbulent periods as effectively as
manual traders.").
322. Molly Smith & Matthew Leising, Humans Top Bots in COVID Crisis Electronic
Bond Trading Test, Bloomberg (May 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-05-20/humans-top-bots-in-covid-crisis-test-of-electronic-bond-trading (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Younger, supra note 296.
323. See supra section I.B.
324. See supra section III.A.
325. Daniel Barth & Jay Kahn, Off. of Fin. Rsch., Basis Trades and Treasury Market
Illiquidity 14 (July 16, 2020), https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRBr_2020
_01_Basis-Trades.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8ZF-NBHB); Jeanna Smialek & Deborah B.
Solomon, A Hedge Fund Bailout Highlights How Regulators Ignored Big Risks, N.Y. Times
(July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/business/economy/hedge-fundbailout-dodd-frank.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
326. See Barth & Kahn, supra note 325, at 14; Smialek & Solomon, supra note 325.
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transmitting risk between Treasuries and other markets.32 And without a
taxonomy of risks to quickly ascertain the pathways by which Treasuries
might become destabilized, regulators did not develop prophylactic

measures that could have contained some of the damage ex ante (like
checking leverage in the Treasuries futures market).328 In the absence of
a plan and effective constraints to control, mitigate the chance of, or
reduce the scale of a fallout, public authorities had little choice but to
deploy blunt tools ex post: expansive and open-ended financial resources
to stabilize the market. In March 2020, the Fed did just that by preparing
to lay out over $5 trillion to revive the functions of Treasury marketrelated operations. 329
Moreover, fragmentation between banking and securities regulators
meant they had little prognostication of what might be expected to
happen if the highly automated market structure for Treasuries was

suddenly confronted with a fast-moving and uncertain crisis. That prices
might grow volatile, causing HFT and other market markers to rapidly exit,

is something that has already occurred in other spaces with a longer history
of automation and high-speed trading (like derivatives or equities).330

While other markets have responded with efforts at containment-testing
the resiliency of trading systems and platforms or implementing circuit
breakers to reset panicked markets-Treasuries have undergone no such
engaged reflection.3 3 1 In other words, this individually rational, but deeply

damaging, mass flight of traders from the world's most significant market
was an extreme but still fairly predictable response to sudden market
panic.
Moreover, as the COVID-19 crisis in Treasuries revealed, private

traders-primary dealers and HFTs alike-cannot be relied on to step in
and close liquidity gaps through private self-regulation. Private actors did
not step in to push each other to promote market stability and resiliency
at a critical time. To be sure, it is unrealistic and administratively irrational
to expect otherwise. As section III.B illustrates, there are no affirmative

requirements on the industry to engage in self-discipline and peer
monitoring. 332 There are also no obligations imposed on key traders to

327. Smialek & Solomon, supra note 325.
328. Id.
329. Stephen Spratt, How a Little Known Trade Upended the U.S. Treasury Market,
Bloomberg (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-17/treas
ury-futures-domino-that-helped-drive-fed-s-5-trillion-repo (on file with the Columbia Law
Reuiew).

330. See, e.g., Andrei Kirilenko, Albert S. Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi & Tugkan Tuzun, The
Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market, 72J. Fin. 967,
968 (2017) (examining the role of HFT liquidity providers and their rapid exit amplifying
the flash crash in May 2010, when the Dow Jones crashed almost 1,000 points before
rebounding).
331. See, e.g., SEC, Algorithmic Study, supra note 181, at 55-69.
332. See supra section III.B.
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33
continue trading and absorb losses if the market is in dire need. In such
circumstances, confronted by enormous uncertainty, losses, and
deteriorating conditions, traders should be expected to prioritize their
own interests and cut and run.
Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic market shock was an extreme
stress test of Treasury markets, and hindsight offers a comfortable perch
from which to draw conclusions about the consequences of regulatory
omission. Nevertheless, these concessions fail to reassure in the specific
context of Treasury markets. For one, they are supposed to function
34
While
smoothly at all times, and especially during crisis, however grave.
the pandemic is certainly epochal, smaller, unexplained disruptions such
as the Flash Rally are likely to become more frequent. Yet in both extreme
disasters as well as banal snafus, the existing regulatory system for
Treasuries has largely failed to mobilize.
Additionally, the assumption that the COVID-19 crisis in Treasuries is
just a one-off event may be optimistic. The U.S. government expects to
borrow trillions in order to stage an economic recovery over the coming
years, heightening dependence on investors in government bonds rather
35 Yet if investors suspect
than U.S. taxpayers to meet immediate needs.
that the United States no longer constitutes the ideal debtor because of an
unexpectedly fragile market structure, then taxpayers will have to pick up
the slack. Impending turbulence in Treasury markets if the COVID-19
pandemic worsens, for example, may be especially damaging. The Fed has
already deployed its immense resources to bolster markets, but how fully
it can keep doing so-and whether it even should-is an ongoing, heated
336
policy debate that hints at possible limits to this aid and its effectiveness.

In summary, weaknesses in the public and private oversight model for
Treasuries have proven to be a point of profound fragility for both the
market and the broader economy. Fragmentation and a lack of
coordination leaves regulators unprepared and bereft of effective ex ante
mechanisms to mitigate the disruptive effects of new technology. Private

oversight, meanwhile, has not stepped in to supervise the market, especially as primary dealers' ties to Treasuries have weakened due to newly
333. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
334. See Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 5-6; Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 18;
see also supra section I.A.
335. See, e.g., Smith, Huge U.S. Bond Issuance, supra note 292 (reporting on the
Treasury Department's plan to issue long-dated debt).
336. Michael Fleming, Asani Sarkar & Peter Van Tassel, The COVID-19 Pandemic and
the Fed's Response, Liberty St. Econ. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed.org/2020/04/the-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-feds-response.html [https://per
ma.cc/GV73-JEPQ]. The Fed has come under significant scrutiny for its expansive role
during the COVID-19 crisis, with attempts to reduce its legislative authorities debated as part
of congressional negotiations over the terms of the December 2020 stimulus package. See
Jeanna Smialek, The Year the Fed Changed Forever, N.Y. Times (Dec. 23, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/business/economy/jerome-powell-federal-reserve.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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vigorous competition from HFTs. Moreover, neither HFTs nor primary
dealers possess any real incentive to remain in the market during emergencies, the precise time when Treasuries are needed most. With these
regulatory failures in both the public and private domains, Treasury
markets are vulnerable to deterioration and a longer-term decline in the

perception of reliability that has so far made them the safest security
market on the planet.
IV. TWO PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OVERSIGHT

This Article concludes by advocating for a thorough review and
reform of Treasury market regulation. Attention is most commonly
trained on the question of whether the United States can pay its debts on
time,337 but the health of secondary markets is essential to ensuring that
investors and economies can depend on Treasuries to meet a broad
spectrum of financial need. Ineffective regulation of this trading structure
allows fragilities to develop, risking the ability of investors to fully realize
the economic utility of Treasuries and undermining how efficiently the
United States can access vast pools of investor capital as it currently-and

often-needs to do.
The vulnerabilities Part III highlights risk extensive economic damage
to U.S. interests, but are frequently overlooked or dismissed. There are the
usual reasons for doing so: Transformations arising on account of high-

speed trading algorithms might appear esoteric at first glance, and a newly
tech-savvy cast of characters in interdealer Treasury markets seems far
removed from the prosaic demands of funding government. Flash events
blow over; glitches usually inflict fleeting blows to Treasury prices; and
risky traders causing losses to another Wall Street firm represent pocketshifting between sophisticated players that can, and should, look after
themselves.
But as demonstrated by the COVID-19 catastrophe, 338 failure to
provide effective regulation of Treasury markets presents a far more
insidious source of structural harm than first meets the eye, demanding
focus on their integrity as an essential priority for regulators. Thinly
regulated Treasury markets heighten uncertainties about whether highspeed algorithms, and the infrastructure needed to support them, will
perform under conditions that require Treasury markets to hold firm
when other markets cannot. If traders know they can simply stop trading
in tough times, why bother investing in building resilient systems to

337. See, e.g, James McBride, Andrew Chatzky & Anshu Siripurapu, The National Debt
Dilemma, Council on Foreign Rels., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/national-debtdilemma [https://perma.cc/6H98-MZNY] (last updated Sept. 9, 2020) ("The massive
borrowing due to the pandemic has renewed debate over the peril posed by the national
debt.").
338. See supra section III.C.
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33 9
A loss of investor confidence in the
anticipate and weather future crises?

market's reliability and robustness can directly threaten the United States'
global standing as a financial safe haven, opening the door for other
countries to offer their markets as the choicest destinations for
international capital. The singular importance of the Treasury market

makes it imperative for its structural workings to be safeguarded at all
times. Yet weaknesses in public and private oversight leave the Treasury
market dangerously vulnerable to this sort of disruption and liquidity

flight, creating systemic risks for the economy and financial system that are
40
virtually impossible to effectively mitigate under the current framework.
This Part offers two proposals as near-term correctives. Rather than
advocating for the pursuit of "nirvana" solutions, this Part proposes practical, workable ideas that fit within the current overall tenor of financial

regulation and can be implemented in the relatively short term.3" These
reforms aim to (1) remedy fragmentation deficiencies in public regulation
by securing more formal and systematic interagency coordination through

the FSOC, and (2) remedy private incentives to encourage industryfocused risk mitigation and peer monitoring by introducing a clearinghouse for secondary markets in Treasuries. This proposed framework
provides an initial set of structural safeguards to improve public oversight
and foster incentives for private actors to invest in monitoring the market

as well as each other. These recommendations are by no means perfect.
Clearinghouses, for example, can be risky in their own right. 4 2 However,
the objective is simply to introduce regulatory mechanisms that have long
proven effective in other markets in order to minimize the fallout from
the rare but catastrophic "tail risks" unique to Treasuries.
A.

FormalizingCoordination in Public Oversight
Establishing an effective public oversight structure for Treasuries is a

first priority. Just as the interdealer market for Treasuries has shifted
toward full automation and high-speed trading, the dealer-client market
can be expected to eventually experience a similar change as technology
34 3
As
makes it easier for market participants to connect with one another.
when
own
their
of
efficiencies
clients (like big mutual funds) look for price
buying and selling Treasuries, the wall separating one part of the Treasury
3
market from another is unlikely to hold for long. " These radical changes
339. See supra sections III.B.
340. See Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 4-5.
341. For a larger treatment of the famous "Nirvana Fallacy" and the tendency to
propose "ideal" but ultimately unworkable solutions, see generally Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1, 3 (1969).
342. Yadav, Problematic Clearinghouses, supra note 48, at 393.
343. See, e.g., Greco, supra note 293 (detailing the various technology software that
have eased access to the market); Rennison, High-Frequency Traders, supra note 198,
(describing the increasing prevalence of the dealer-client market due to electrification).
344. See, e.g., Greco, supra note 293.
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in the operation of a market vaunted for its stability calls for regulators to
invest in understanding how these transformations fuel new risks, or

reshape existing ones in troubling ways. An initial priority should be to
overcome the institutionalized deficiencies of regulatory fragmentation in
order to build mechanisms that more fully facilitate information collection, monitoring, and enforcement.

A reflexive response to the need to remedy fragmentation might
point to a proposal designed to consolidate oversight in a single new
agency created specifically for monitoring Treasuries. In other contexts,
policymakers have floated the idea of reducing the fragmentation in financial regulation by creating a single or a small set of agencies that fold the
functions of many multiple, existing regulators into a more streamlined
model. 345 The rationale driving these proposals broadly lies in ensuring
that the regulatory state more fully reflects the interconnected nature of
financial markets. 3 * Formal distinctions, which might mean that a capital

markets regulator like the SEC only oversees securities firms while a
banking regulator only supervises banks, are replaced by a more substance-

driven mode of regulation that is able to capture complex risks more
easily. 347
While certainly attractive, such a radical overhaul of financial
regulatory structure is impractical. This has been made abundantly clear

by the fact that efforts to dismantle the current framework and formally
consolidate regulatory agencies have consistently failed.34 8 The force of
political economy has worked to preserve existing spheres of agency power
rather than giving way to reform. 349 In light of the urgency of Treasuries
reform, the creation of a single regulator for Treasuries appears to be a
chimerical aspiration that cannot be relied on to address the weaknesses

Parts II and III identify.
Moreover, as Freeman and Rossi convincingly argue, consolidation

does not always provide a ready or even the most optimal answer to the

345. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory
Structure 137-80 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/document
s/blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HBC-644B] [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Blueprint]; see also Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation
of Financial Regulation in the United States 3-7 (Harv. L. Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series No. 09-19, 2008), https://ssm.com/abstract=1300431 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (detailing the advantages of creating a more consolidated
regulatory framework under a "United States Financial Regulatory Authority" that would
replace agencies like the SEC and CFTC).
346. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Blueprint, supra note 345, at 137-80.
347. See id.
348. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1151 (noting that calls to consolidate the
SEC and the CFTC have long failed to succeed).
349. See id.
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problems of interagency bureaucratic inefficiencies.35 0 Logistically, consolidation demands political will and congressional action-a tall order
during periods of partisan gridlock. Calls for consolidation in securities
regulation have long gone unheeded."' And even then, consolidation by
itself does not guarantee expertise and optimal deployment of regulatory
power; after all, a new bureaucracy may be slow-moving or insufficiently
3 52
endowed with authority.

So, in order to mitigate the challenges of present-day fragmentation,
regulators need to determine how best to cooperate and to establish
institutional levers that facilitate effective rulemaking, surveillance, and
oversight of Treasuries. Without formal structural consolidation of
Treasuries oversight in a single authority, a detailed MOU offers a low-cost
mechanism for agencies to coordinate as a first, workable step. That is,
rather than collapsing respective authorities into a single agency or

expecting major regulators to give up their power to one among them,
MOUs can at least create a specific practical framework for agencies to
35 3
collectively address deficiencies through a kind of quasi-contract.
An MOU can more easily permit regulators to draw up workable
354
procedures to share information and establish priorities for rulemaking.
This would allow Treasuries regulators to create a forum for regular
discussion on existing and emerging risks (for example, in relation to
automated trading and new trading firms) and allow policymakers to
develop a taxonomy of fragilities that need to be addressed. As Parts II and
III identify, regulators face a number of urgent questions key to advancing
reform of Treasury markets: They must identify (1) how precisely
automated, high-speed trading exposes Treasury interdealer markets to
new risks; (2) how the risks of misfiring algorithms might spread to other
markets; (3) what degree of scrutiny ought to be applied to platforms like
BrokerTec that host trades in Treasuries; (4) what kinds of safeguards (like
350. See id. (highlighting the shortcomings of consolidating agencies within the
administrative state).
351. See id. The Treasury's proposed Blueprint in 2008 has not been implemented
despite the opportunity to do so after the Financial Crisis.
352. See id. at 1151-53 ("[I]t is not clear that large-scale consolidation achieves its
purported goals. It may, for example, simply relocate rather than eradicate bureaucratic
redundancy and inefficiency.").
353. See id. at 1161 (noting that MOUs resemble contracts, though they lack any
enforcement power).
354. See id. at 1161-65 (describing the flexibility of MOUs in organizing relationships
between agencies). As Professors Freeman and Rossi note, MOUs between agencies offer
their drafters flexibility, discretion in choosing the purposes and content of the MOU and
are not subject to a specific federal legal regime that mandates that particular requirements
be followed. Id. They can be helpful in securing mutually binding commitments between
agencies to fulfill a stated mission, ensuring that personnel are allocated efficiently and that
shared authority between agencies is precisely clarified to avoid confusion and duplication.
Id. These features can make a detailed MOU especially apt for the Treasury market where
the significance of the issues at hand makes it necessary for regulators to craft a complex
bargain.
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circuit breakers) might protect Treasury markets from unduly sharp and
anomalous price movements like those seen during the Flash Rally and

COVID-19 crises; and (5) how regulators should motivate major traders to
keep providing liquidity in a crisis-whether through a formal mandate to
stay trading, or soft inducements. 355
An MOU would permit regulators to navigate their varying mandates
to be in a position to oversee Treasuries together effectively by securing

necessary institutional approvals to share data with one another, pool
insights, and determine actionable protocols (for example, if evidence of
misconduct or risk is detected) .3 An MOU can also allocate supervisory
responsibilities, like requiring Treasuries trading platforms to be overseen
jointly by the SEC and the Fed, in recognition of their significance for
trading and systemic stability.357 And it can assign responsibilities and
procedures for progressing enforcement actions, like if a securities firm
engages in manipulation in the interdealer market. 358 To overcome turf
issues and regulatory capture concerns, 359 regulators might agree to
delegate enforcement decisions to ajoint panel charged with determining
appropriate enforcement actions. The process of creating an MOU will
also force deliberation on how best to deploy agency expertise, skill, and
constitutional authority to oversee Treasury markets.

To be clear, existing legislation does establish a formal demarcation
of authority between regulators: The Fed monitors bank dealers, the SEC
360
supervises securities firms, and the N.Y. Fed oversees Treasury auctions.
But as Part II argues, this current arrangement is lacking. It failed to
identify the effects of the transformative and (arguably predictable) arrival
361
of high-speed automated trading in interdealer secondary markets.
Attempts to study the 2014 Flash Rally were constrained by the need for
regulators to negotiate permission to share data,3 6 2 and it took several years
355. See supra sections III.B-.C.
356. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1161-62; see also Rory Van Loo, The Missing
Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1563,
1573-85 (2019) (detailing the tradeoffs involved in government monitoring of businesses).
357. See supra section III.A.
358. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1161-62.
359. See, e.g., James Cox & Randall Thomas, Revolving Elites: The Unexplored Risk of
Capturing the SEC, 107 Geo. LJ. 845, 848-55 (2019) ("In recent years, the revolving door
phenomenon-where attorneys transition between positions at the SEC and position in
private practice-has become commonplace.").
360. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
361. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 46-47; see
also supra section II.C.
362. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 47-49
(explaining that Treasuries trading data is only available for a small "subset of trades and
only to those trading on a specific platform or venue," and noting the planned development
of a "standing multilateral information sharing agreement" among members of an
interagency working group to alleviate issues created by the lack of information sharing);
Tracy & Ackerman, supra note 14, (noting that accessing critical Treasuries trading data
took over two months because the CFTC didn't have an agreement in place to share it with
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for fairly basic trade reporting regulations to be put in place, amended,

and implemented. 36 3
This suggests that a refreshed and more systematized MOU is needed.
Dividing responsibility for monitoring bank dealers from securities firms
in interdealer Treasuries trading markets makes little sense where nearly
all firms are engaged in securities trading with one another using various
kinds of automated technologies. The traditional functional classifications

between different types of market actors have little meaning when banks

"

and securities firms are fluidly transacting with one another, as they do in
36 4
the interdealer Treasuries space.
To be sure, relying on MOUs alone imperfectly fills in bureaucratic
gaps, particularly among established financial regulators long used to
dominating their own spheres of authority. MOUs invariably leave out
important details, lack specificity sufficient to coordinate action in a crisis,
36 5
So, to add greater institutional
and are judicially unenforceable.
accountability and formalization, regulators should take advantage of the
FSOC, a body created by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, to coordinate
3
supervision over systemic risk and large, complex financial institutions.
The FSOC offers an institutional locus of responsibility to coordinate

overseeing Treasuries and to apply greater pressure on individual agencies
to enforce and follow through on an MOU.
The FSOC is well placed to take on the role: It convenes fourteen of
the country's major financial services regulators, including the Treasury
Secretary (who chairs the FSOC), Comptroller of the Currency, and Chairs
367
of the Fed, SEC, and CFTC. The FSOC enjoys an expansive mandate to
monitor and respond to systemic financial risks, having the authority to
surveil both financial and nonfinancial firms and to "designate" them as a
systemically important financial institution (SIFI) if they pose a threat to
systemic stability, which then permits the imposition of measures to curb

other agencies); Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 28 ("[S]ignificant data gaps prevent
authorities from having a complete view of the U.S. Treasury market.").
363. See Harkrader & Puglia, supra note 15 (describing the adoption of a new 2019
FINRA rule requiring IDBs to identify customers in TRACE data reporting).
364. Id.
365. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 9, at 1161-65.
366. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), §
111(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a) (2018); see also Jeffrey M. Stupak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45052,
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC): Structure and Activities 1 (2018), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R45052.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEL4-KUWT] ("[T]he FSOC's primary
mission includes identifying risks to financial stability emanating from large interconnected
financial institutions and utilities, promoting market discipline by eliminating investor
expectations of government support to financial institutions' creditors, and responding to
emerging threats to financial instability."); Bouveret et al., supra note 1, at 26 ("It is selfthat strong interagency coordination, eventually under the auspices of the
evident ...
Financial Stability Oversight Council, is warranted.").
367. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (1)-(2); see also Christina Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A
Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 Geo. L.J. 1379, 1389-90 (2017).
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their riskiness.368 Granted, the FSOC has exercised its designation power
sparingly over the last decade. 369 That said, as a body specifically designed
to facilitate the coordination of these major financial regulators in the
interest of supervising interconnected firms and markets, it offers

expertise and experience to help bridge the supervisory gaps over
Treasury markets. 70 And, as an existing body officially organized under the
aegis of the U.S. Treasury, relying on the FSOC elides the need for
policymakers to create a new agency specifically designed to oversee
Treasury markets.
The FSOC, designed to operate as a kind of "financial stability czar"

that is supposed to respond to actual and future threats to financial
markets' systemic safety, already ought to possess skills in data collection
and analysis to build a map of how risks from one market or firm can

spread outward and into the financial system a whole." This places
oversight of the systemically essential Treasury market squarely within its

sphere of action. 37 2 The FSOC's membership also already gathers together
most of the major regulators that are collectively entrusted to supervise
Treasuries.37 3 And as part of determining whether to treat a firm as a
significant risk, the FSOC is supposed to undertake a deep and thorough

368. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321(a)(1)(A), 5322(d), 5323(a); Skinner, supra note 367, at 1390;
see also Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310 (2020); Stupak, supra note 366, at 1. These measures can
include requiring the firms to submit to oversight by the Fed as well as to maintain stronger
capital buffers. See FSOC: Designations, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, https://home.treasury.
gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations
[https://perma.cc/MX77-8D83] [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FSOC Designations]
(last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
369. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FSOC Designations, supra note 368. The FSOC has
only designated four nonbank financial firms as SIFIs, and these designations have been
rescinded as firms have reformed their businesses to become less systemically risky, or in the
case of MetLife, challenged this designation in court. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 242 (D.D.C. 2016). In addition, the FSOC has
designated eight financial markets utilities, firms that offer clearing and settlement services
in financial markets infrastructure, as "systemically important." See U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, FSOC Designations, supra note 368.
370. See Skinner, supra note 367, at 1389-92 (analyzing the critical role of the FSOC in
financial stability by regulating nonbanks and its broad designation power over systemically
important financial entities); see also Hillary Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in
Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1090 (2015) (highlighting the
risk that the FSOC can fail to secure fulsome oversight of systemic risks due to issues of
political economy); Daniel Schwarcz & David T. Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank
and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1813, 1817-20 (2017) (advocating for the
FSOC's designation powers to highlight their role in preemptively deterring firms from
engaging in systemically risky behavior).
371. See Skinner, supra note 367, at 1382.
372. See id. at 1382-83.
373. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (1).
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analysis of its activities and impact, harnessing the expertise of its member

regulators. 374
To be clear, during its short history, the FSOC has been criticized for
having a nebulous mandate, insufficient transparency, and flawed
deliberative process. 375 Its work has also been viewed as vulnerable to
376
capture by the prevailing political economy and dominant agencies.

This is despite the fact that the intensity of its oversight has been relatively
light, with the FSOC using its power to designate firms as systemically risky
only a handful of times.37 7 Indeed, even when it has acted, legal challenges
378
have successfully undone its SIFI designation decisions.

But while the FSOC is not free of either criticism or controversy, it
remains an available regulatory forum with a mandate suited to the task of

overseeing Treasuries and ensuring MOU compliance. Establishing MOUs
and centralizing negotiation invariably requires political will and buy-in
from agencies, and undertaking this task through the FSOC, where each
agency retains its authority but functions within the framework of a larger
coordinating whole, makes this task easier than if each had to cede power
to a new body.37 9 And the creation of a detailed MOU-buttressed by
coordination under the purview of the FSOC-at least permits agencies to
harness the benefits of shared interagency supervision of the Treasury
market, within an existing mechanism already designed to foster more
cooperative supervision and rulemaking. This solution adapts to the

374. See id. § 5322(3) (A) ("[The FSOC] may require the submission of periodic and
other reports from any nonbank financial company or bank holding company for the
the nonbank financial company or bank
purpose of assessing the extent to which ...
holding company .. . poses a threat to the financial stability of the United States."); see also
Skinner, supra note 367, at 1389-96 (describing the designation process and its reliance on
detailed analysis of firm businesses and the risks they create).
375. See, e.g., BoraYagiz, U.S. House Republican Report Slams Federal Council FSOC
for 'Inconsistent' SIFI Designation Process, Reuters (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.
com/article/bc-finreg-fsoc-sifi-designation/u-s-house-republican-report-slams-federal-coun
cil-fsoc-for-inconsistent-sifi-designation-process-idUSKBN16E238 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).

376. See Allen, supra note 370, at 1120-34 (noting the impact of political economy on
FSOC decisionmaking with the Fed and Treasury having an outsize role); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated
and Systematic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1021-25 (2012) (discussing how
regulatory attention on systemic stability is impacted by temporary political forces and how
attention to such regulation becomes more intense following a crisis).
377. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FSOC Designations, supra note 368.
378. See, e.g., MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 242
(D.D.C. 2016).
379. Some agency authority must be pooled, and accommodations must be made. This
is, granted, a tough sell; recent years have seen rancorous debates surrounding the
expansion of FSOC authority at some cost to its prestige and authority. See Allen, supra note
370, at 1120-34 (arguing that "there are flaws in the FSOC's structure and mandate that will
likely increase its susceptibility to the cycle of political economy and to regulatory capture").
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current state of financial regulation, 380 rather than implausibly waiting for

Congress to create a new agency or an entirely new regulatory approach
in coming years.
B.

Central Clearingand PrivateIncentivesfor Oversight

Complementing greater public oversight through MOUs and the
FSOC, regulators must also focus on building strong, workable mechanisms for private self-regulation in Treasury markets. Regulators, however,

face tradeoffs when increasing the compliance burden on key participants,
such as those requiring the industry to engage in self-monitoring and peer-

discipline. 381 Imposing high transaction costs on traders can discourage
them from entering the market, potentially increasing the Treasury's
borrowing costs where secondary markets lack liquidity or are dominated
by only large players that charge higher spreads. 382 On the other hand, an

absence of private incentives to preserve market integrity creates the
potential for risk-taking and suboptimal cost shifting. 383 As Part II shows,
this regulatory balancing act historically relied on primary dealers to both
maintain liquidity and keep the market in good order out of pure self-

interest. 384 More recently, this approach is being tested as primary dealers
face competition from HFTs subject to asymmetrically lower compliance
COStS. 385

Clearinghouses offer a compelling private solution that promises to
mitigate newly distorted incentives, at least in the Treasuries secondary
market. Specifically designed to mitigate default risks in trading, clearinghouses are a tried-and-tested mechanism to harness private ordering in the
interests of reinforcing security and resilience in financial markets, and
they have long been a familiar and reassuring actor in equities and
380. See Markham, supra note 8, at 199-204 (noting that the "[r] egulatoryjurisdiction
over the Treasury market has been allocated among several regulators").
381. See Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule 3-7 (Rock
Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1990472 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Duffie, Volcker Rule] (noting
the potential adverse impact on Treasury market-making following the imposition of rules
forbidding banks from using their own money to undertake proprietary trading-the
"Volcker Rule"-and highlighting the sensitivity of market-makers to a regulation that
constrained their activities and increased their compliance burden); Telis Demos, CME
Warns of Volcker Rule Impact on Treasuries, Fin. Times (Feb. 14, 2012),
(on file with the
https://www.ft.com/content/6fae1290-5728-1lel-be25-00144feabdcO
Columbia Law Review) (reporting on the potential negative impact of the Volcker Rule on
primary dealer participation in Treasuries).
382. See Duffie, Volcker Rule, supra note 381, at 3-7.
383. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411, 413-17 (2011) (underscoring the private
incentives embedded in financial markets toward risk-taking and shifting the costs to the
taxpayer, while also noting the importance of creating a framework of building incentives
for financial firms to exercise private self-regulation).
384. See supra section II.A.
385. See supra section III.B.
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derivatives markets.38 6 As automation and algorithmic trading causes the
secondary market in Treasuries to more closely resemble those markets,
similar benefits. 387

there is good reason to believe they can deliver
In other markets, clearinghouses reduce the risk that a trading party

will fail to follow through on their side of the bargain-either to supply

securities (a seller) or to provide cash (a buyer).388 If this happens in the
case of a trader's insolvency, for example, the clearinghouse steps in to
389
The basic idea is that the clearinghouse will
make good on the trade.

use its own resources to buy securities from a seller or ensure that a buyer
390
gets their assets under these conditions. The key innovation of clearinghouses is that they become the legal counterparty to each side of the
trade. 391 Once a deal is concluded on an exchange, a clearinghouse takes
over and becomes the buyer to the seller and a seller to the buyer, standing
in the middle of the two parties to prevent each trader from having to take
392
Clearinghouses are an invisible yet essential pillar of
risks on the other.
modern securities markets. To take just one example, the Depository Trust
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC)-a clearinghouse for around fifty
exchanges and equity trading platforms-reported settling over two

386. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech to
the 2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial
2
Reform (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 0l1
0404a.htm [https://perma.cc/77FA-KUUA].
387. Notably, Professor Duffie also proposes introducing central clearing for Treasury
markets and highlighted it as a way to mitigate some of the risks that surfaced in the March
COVID-19 panic. See Duffie, Redesigning After COVID-19, supra note 2, at 4-5, 15-16. It
should be noted that the Treasury market does have limited clearing for trades that are
concluded between primary dealers. This is undertaken through a clearinghouse known as
the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation. See Treasury Market Practices Group, White Paper
on Clearing and Settlement in the Secondary Market for U.S. Treasury Securities 2-3, 34
(2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/tmpg/files/CS-DraftPaper[hereinafter TMPG, Clearing in the
071218.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX62-ERVL]
Secondary Market White Paper] (describing the products cleared by the FICC, including
Treasuries).
388. See Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When "Skin in the Game"
Is Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 Yale J. on Regul. 601, 614-19
(2017) (highlighting the protective role played by clearinghouses in reducing counterparty
risks through their ability to become a counterparty to each side of the trade, ensuring that
each trader is transacting with a strong institution rather than a potentially risky trader).

&

389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting,
Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty
16-17 (Jan. 8, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1340660 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (unpublished manuscript). But see Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central
Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 74, 74-75
n.1 (2011) (showing that clearinghouses that clear certain classes of derivatives, like credit
default swaps, can see lowered ability to manage risk).
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quadrillion dollars' worth of trades annually in 2019.393 Clearinghouses
also largely benefit the market as a whole by assuring traders that their
bargains will be honored, meaning they do not have to undertake-and
pay for-preemptive due diligence on counterparties. This allows trades
to flow more freely and without traders having to discount what they put
into the market to reflect systematic counterparty risks. 394
Clearinghouses can also, in theory, incentivize their membersusually comprising the leading firms in a given market-to behave with

more risk aversion. 395 Clearinghouses operate like insurance; to take
advantage of the clearinghouse's protections, members contribute into its
reserves, providing sufficient resources to withstand crises and also to

ensure that they can make good on their obligations on an ongoing
basis.39 Should a crisis arise, these reserves can be used up by the
clearinghouse to fulfill any shortfalls on outstanding bargains. 397
Because their funds are on the line in case of an overly risky
participant, clearinghouses have a direct economic interest in staying alert
to risk-taking and fraudulent, malicious, or disruptive trading. Clearinghouses are also well placed to take advantage of their position at the center
of a market to collect data, process this information, and maintain

vigilance about emerging risks and possible exposures. Clearinghouses
thus offer a compelling private mechanism requiring market participants
to take responsibility and pay for their own risk-taking ex ante, rather than

relying on the Fed to pump trillions to save the market from collapse as a
last-ditch measure. 398 In addition to the secondary market, situating the
interdealer market, if not also the dealer-client market, into an ecosystem
of central clearing can also bring the known advantages of clearinghouses
into Treasuries. 3" Central clearing can also help mitigate some of the
393. Advancing Financial Markets Together, Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp. (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.dtcc.com/dtcc-connection/articles/2020/april/09/dtcc-2019-annualreport-advancing-financial-markets-together [https://perma.cc/STW5-2EJ7].
394. See Pirrong, supra note 392, at 16-17.
395. See id. at 18-19 (expanding on the theoretical ability of clearinghouses to encourage good behavior among members). But see Yadav, Problematic Clearinghouses, supra
note 48, at 433-42 (detailing the potential for clearinghouses to also encourage risk-taking
by members if not properly checked); Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Over-Confidence, Project
Syndicate (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roe6/English
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the potential for clearinghouses to cause
members to transfer risk into the financial system).
396. See Saguato, supra note 388, at 120-21.
397. Id.
398. Reflecting this thinking, the role of clearinghouses has expanded significantly after
the 2008 Financial Crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank, which covers over-the-counter
derivatives markets. See G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh
Summit 7 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_
20090826_en_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W5D-GALM] (pushing for mandatory clearing for
over-the-counter derivatives).
399. Of course, some clearing does already exist in Treasuries. See TMPG, Clearing in
the Secondary Market White Paper, supra note 387, at 7-8. It is, however, limited to a small
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uncertainty and systemic risks, helping to hold markets up when a crisis
like COVID-19 or the Flash Rally strikes or if a major Treasuries trader is
close to failure or fails outright.
The intervention of a clearinghouse ensures that trades, once agreed
to on a platform, are essentially guaranteed to settle, with securities and
cash changing hands. This helps create investor confidence, because
investors will be able to get the benefit of their bargain even if a dealer or
counterparty fails or decides not to perform for whatever reason. This
certainty is especially valuable in Treasuries given their significance for
investor portfolios and financial stability. In fact, this certainty is even more
valuable because Treasuries become especially important during a crisisa period during which it is more likely that counterparties will renege on
their bargains owing to the heightened possibility of private financial
stress. The panic in March 2020, when investors sought to sell their
Treasuries quickly and in large numbers, caused a wave of transaction
failures. 0 Treasury trades that were centrally cleared experienced far
fewer such failures, however, supporting the potential benefits of central

clearing for backstopping transaction continuity and preventing systemic
spillovers.40
In the context of automated, high-speed trading, moreover, a
clearinghouse can help contain the costs of HFT firm failure. Since HFT
firms trading in Treasuries are often not subject to the usual FINRA
rulebook for broker-dealers, including those governing how much capital
40 2
markets are vulnerable to a
must be maintained as a safety buffer,
scenario where an HFT firm fails without having a sufficient amount of

cash on hand to make good on overly large commitments. Its inability to
fulfill its obligations can quickly bleed into the financial system where
investors and others do not receive Treasuries or cash. In a high-speed,
interconnected market, the prospect of disorderly and rapid failures is all
fraction of the secondary market and operates only as between primary dealers. Id. With
HF1's predominant in the interdealer market, central clearing for these Treasuries trades
is, for the most part, patchy, if not largely absent from the modern market. See id. at 8-9
(reviewing the current and limited patchwork clearing arrangements in the Treasury
secondary market and advocating for reevaluating the scope of clearing in Treasuries in
light of the changing market structure that draws in HFT firms).
400. See BlackRock, supra note 318, at 9-11. BlackRock's post-COVID-19 crash report
noted heightened failure in certain kinds of Treasuries, with affected sellers that normally
hold their securities exiting instead. Id. Because these firms then loan out these securities,
their need to quickly sell them required them to terminate these lending arrangements and
recall the securities. This demand led to a higher number of failures as securities were not
returned in time. Id.
401. See id. As noted, limited clearing exists in the Treasury market, notably between
primary dealers and undertaken through the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, which
reported clearing around $40 trillion in Treasuries in March 2020. Id.; TMPG, Clearing in
the Secondary Market White Paper, supra note 387, at 7-8; see also supra note 399 and
accompanying text.
402. See supra section III.B.
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too familiar. In 2012, for example, Knight Capital-a top HFT firm and
liquidity provider that was responsible for around 11% of trading volume
in U.S. stocks-lost around $440 million in forty-five minutes because of a
technical malfunction. 03 This disaster caused Knight Capital to end up on
the verge of bankruptcy almost overnight."0 4

That Treasury markets are also vulnerable to algorithmic mishaps is
suggested (although never fully understood by regulators) by shock events
like the Flash Rally. Central clearing in Treasuries would offer assurance
that such a failure does not have to result in falling dominoes, because a

clearinghouse can step into the shoes of the failing firm and make good
on its trades. It makes sense, then, to adopt a well-worn mechanism that
has shown itself able to handle large-scale failures without stressing the
market.
Clearing also ensures that the settlement system for processing
Treasuries and cash is streamlined across the secondary markets, assuring
that each trader and investor receives their entitlement in accordance with

a set process and timetable. This kind of procedural certainty offers those
using the Treasuries secondary market the capacity to make decisions
about how to use the assets they are selling and purchasing. As it currently

stands, the patchwork of post-trade settlement systems in Treasury
secondary markets-with some using central clearing, while others rely on
bilateral processes-is ad hoc and results in a confusing and
nonstandardized system.40 5 Systematization, however, offers a pathway
toward a more efficient and cost-effective market. As Professor Duffie has
suggested, central clearing can help promote a secondary market that is
not bifurcated by the dealer-client and interdealer distinction. 6 In other
words, the Treasuries secondary market might look more like equities
markets, allowing investors to transact directly with a wider swath of
counterparties.4 7
Of course, central clearing is neither a perfect solution nor one
comprehensive enough to tackle all of the known and unknown problems
403. Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It $440 Million, N.Y.
Times: Dealbook (Aug. 2, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/knightcapital-says-trading-mishap-cost-it-440-million (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
404. See Nathaniel Popper, High-Speed Trade Giants to Merge, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/knight-capital-announces-sale-togetco.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). As an example of how clearinghouses can
mitigate large firm failures in other markets, however, consider LCH (then called
LCH.Clearnet), a major clearinghouse that successfully resolved Lehman Brothers's $9 trillion worth of outstanding interest-rate derivatives after its 2008 downfall. Julia Lees Allen,
Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis,
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1079, 1089-92 (2012).
405. See TMPG, Clearing in the Secondary Market White Paper, supra note 387, at 2.
406. See Duffie, Redesigning After COVID-19, supra note 2, at 16 (" [T]he existence of
broadly accessible central clearing also allows for .. . the emergence of trading directly
between ultimate non-dealer buyers and non-dealer sellers .... ").
407. See id.
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in today's Treasury markets. It is not clear whether and how well a
clearinghouse might have mitigated the scale of the March 2020 fallout
before the Fed intervened. A clearinghouse would not by itself
disincentivize traders from misbehaving, using badly tested algorithms, or

engaging in dangerous and predatory strategies that disrupt a platform
(like stuffing the venue with orders). If traders are not subject to effective
oversight restraining the use of suboptimal algorithms or checking
misbehavior like cheating, the clearinghouse simply picks up the costs of
any fallout. In fact, the presence of a clearinghouse might even encourage
risk-taking precisely because a bad trader is able to shift some of the costs
408
of disruptive acts onto the risk-bearing capacities of the clearinghouse.
Moreover, a clearinghouse does not compel traders to keep their
capital in the market during troubled times. Traders can still exit abruptly

or reduce their engagement in response to unsettled and unexpected
conditions, as they did during the March 2020 COVID-19 panic and Flash
Rally.409 A clearinghouse can certainly step in where exit might result in
traders failing to deliver Treasuries or cash, but it does not prevent them
from removing themselves and draining the market of liquidity. Finallyand perhaps most worryingly-an improperly designed clearinghouse can
grow to become one of the most fundamentally systemic risks anywhere in
the financial system. By becoming the counterparty for hundreds of
billions of dollars' worth of daily trades, a clearinghouse may effectively
and too big to fail.'" 0

become itself indispensable

Thus, a clearinghouse cannot be haphazardly thrown into Treasury
markets without careful design choices precisely crafted to ensure safety
and soundness by answering the following outstanding questions: Which
firms can be members of the clearinghouse? How fully should a clearinghouse maintain reserves, and which kinds of assets qualify? What governance arrangements would ensure that clearinghouses make sound risk
management decisions and do not imperil the safety and soundness of the
411
financial system and economy?

-

&

408. See Yadav, Problematic Clearinghouses, supra note 48, at 393; see also Pirrong,
supra note 392, at 5.
409. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report, supra note 13, at 4-7;
Younger, supra note 296.
410. See Yadav, Blueprint, supra note 213, at 15 (elaborating on how requiring a
clearinghouse may create an institution that is too big to fail); see also Laura Noonan
Phillip Stafford, Ex-BoE Deputy Governor Fears 'Utter Mayhem' from Clearing House
7
Reform, Fin. Times (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/01669e74-8585-43e6-9aa
39086573dccd (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
411. See, e.g., Letter from Systemic Risk Council to the Hon. Randal Quarles,
Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd., Bank for Int'l Settlements (July 31, 2020), http://www.systemic
riskcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Comment-Letter-of-Systemic-Risk-Councilon-FSB-Consultation-on-CCP-Resolution-Guidance7.31.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3J7B9EV] (describing outstanding issues in relation to risks posed by clearinghouses, such as
whether clearinghouse owners are properly incentivized to monitor and protect the
clearinghouse). A full treatment of central clearing design for secondary Treasury markets
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These are not simple questions to answer and remain open for future
research. This Article, however, forwards two proposals to take first steps
toward filling the gaps in public and private oversight of Treasury markets.
A more formal system of coordination anchored by an MOU through the

FSOC harnesses an existing administrative mechanism to streamline communication, monitoring, and discipline between public regulators. And to
help align the incentives of private traders toward protecting Treasury
market integrity, central clearing in Treasuries presents a possible solu-

tion. Both pathways-while representing efforts at fundamental market
reform for Treasuries-would strengthen the market's foundations using

tried-and-tested means common to other major markets.
CONCLUSION

This Article argues that the U.S. Treasury market lacks effective public
and private oversight to support its essential functions for the U.S economy

and global financial stability. Excessive and uncoordinated fragmentation
in public oversight has hobbled the development of a workable rulebook
that creates basic guardrails against misbehavior and disruption. Private
actors, comprising comparatively unregulated HFT traders competing
with highly regulated primary dealers, lack meaningful incentives to bind
themselves to each other and to the market. This Article proposes two
solutions-one to tackle the public shortfall in oversight, and the other to
build a private system for risk management-that can help make the

Treasury markets more resilient and responsive to the demands of a
modern, automated ecosystem. A way forward is necessary given the
singular importance of Treasuries to the domestic and global financial
system. This analysis is only the first step of a longer scholarly study into a
market whose enormous significance highlights a tension between the
perception of a risk-free asset and the real-life fragility of the market
structure that governs its trading.

is beyond the scope of this Article, which simply endeavors to present a preliminary sketch
of a credible proposal to bring attention to the need to build strong private incentive
structures for Treasury oversight.

